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1. Introduction 
This article presents the results of a study of infrastructure procurement for international 
sporting events. The objective was to map both the institutional frameworks and the 
procedures and governance mechanisms. We were concerned only with the acquisition 
process and not with prior decisions on whether to host events, what to procure (such as 
the number and siting of stadiums) or subsequent maintenance2. The aim was to provide 
information relevant to studying the implementation of procurement objectives and the 
risks to attaining those objectives and to lay the foundations for further work. The study 
originated in work by the authors in collaboration with the OECD to assist the 
International Partnership Against Corruption in Sport (IPACS)3 in managing integrity 
risks, but also provides a map that can facilitate future study of other issues, such as 
sustainability.  
The study sought to map procurement for key sport-specific infrastructure (such as 
stadiums and swimming pools) and a sample of other infrastructure (sport-specific, 
sport-related – such as athlete accommodation – and/or other infrastructure procured 
for the event (such as transport facilities) for 14 international events. It covered events 
of various sizes and types in the ten-year period to 2018, using public sources. These 
events were: Summer Olympic and Paralympic Games, London, United Kingdom, 2012 
(London); Summer Olympic and Paralympic Games, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, 2016 (Rio); 
Winter Olympic and Paralympic Games, Vancouver, Canada, 2010 (Vancouver); Winter 
Olympic and Paralympic Games, Sochi, Russia, 2014 (Sochi); World Games, Wrocław, 
Poland, 2017 (Wroclaw); Youth Olympics, Buenos Aires, Argentina, 2018 (Buenos Aires); 
Asian Games, Guangzhou, China, 2010 (Guangzhou); Commonwealth Games, New 
Delhi, India, 2010 (New Delhi); Central American and Caribbean Games, Veracruz, 
Mexico, 2014 (Vera Cruz); FIFA [soccer] World Cup, South Africa, 2010 (South Africa); 
Commonwealth Games, Gold Coast, Australia, 2018 (Gold Coast); FINA World 
Championships (aquatics), Budapest, Hungary, 2017 (Budapest); African Games, 
Brazzaville, Republic of the Congo, 2015 (Brazzaville); and Africa Cup of Nations 
(soccer), Gabon, 2017 (Gabon). 
                                                          
1 Sue Arrowsmith, Achilles Professor of Public Procurement Law and Policy, School of Law, University of 
Nottingham; Ruth Bayley, Managing Director, Bayley & Associates Pty Ltd; Anna Gorczynska, Professor, 
University of Lodz; Joshua Idoku; Steve Kay, consultant; Jorge Faria Lopes, PhD candidate, Universidade 
Católica Portuguesa; Carlos Sebastian Barreto Cifuentes, Research Assistant and PhD candidate, School of Law, 
University of Nottingham; Geo Quinot, Professor, Department of Public Law, Stellenbosch University; Ashraf-
Ul-Bari Nobel, Research Assistant and PhD candidate, School of Law, University of Nottingham; Ke Ren; 
Astghik Solomanyan, Research Assistant and PhD candidate, School of Law, University of Nottingham; Izabella 
Sobieraj, PhD Student, University of Lodz; Gábor Soós, PhD candidate, National University of Public Service, 
Hungary; and Alex Thurston, School of Sport, Exercise and Health Sciences, Loughborough University. The 
authors would like to thank Serban Filipon for his excellent assistance with technical work on this manuscript. 
2 All are controversial issues and perhaps more studied than our subject matter. As is well known, the value of 
funding these events and long term viability of the infrastructure, even when claimed to create a legacy, is 
often dubious. See e.g. J. Alm, World Stadium Index: Stadiums built for major sporting events – bright future 
or future burden? (Copenhagen: Danish Institute for Sports Studies/Play the Game, May 2012), available at 
https://www.playthegame.org/knowledge-bank/downloads/world-stadium-index/c714c866-7a44-4501-a9a5-
a3af00f4d750; S. Menary, “China’s Programme of stadium diplomacy” (2015) 3:3 ICSS Journal 2; K. 
Schoonbee and S. Brümmer, “Public loss, FIFA’s gain: How Cape Town got its ‘white elephant’”, in C. Schulz 
Herzenberg (ed.), Player and referee: Conflicting interests and the 2010 FIFA World CupTM (Pretoria: Institute 
of Security Studies, 2010), Ch.6, pp.133–167 [e-book], retrieved from 
http://ccs.ukzn.ac.za/files/ISS%20Player%20and%20Referee.pdf.  
3 See http://www.oecd.org/corruption/multi-stakeholder-sports-integrity-taskforces-established.htm. 
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Study data from the first ten projects above was used as the basis for the 2019 IPACS 
report on procurement standards and risk management in procuring infrastructure for 
sporting events (IPACS report)4. That report analysed the aggregate data to identify and 
analyse integrity risks and make concrete proposals for mitigating them. This article 
supplements the IPACS report by giving more information on the methodology; 
providing data from four additional projects, which offer further evidence and insights; 
and presenting the key information through a project-based, as well as aggregate, 
approach, to place it in context.  
We will, first, outline briefly the objectives and importance of the procurement process in 
this field, other research, and the objectives of IPACS (section 2). We then explain the 
aims and methodology of our mapping (section 3) and briefly summarise of IPACS’ 
findings and recommendations based on our mapping of the ten initial events (section 
4). Section 5 then presents a brief summary of the mapping findings in context for each 
of the 14 events. Section 6 concludes.  
2. Background and context 
As we will see, infrastructure procurement for international sporting events is almost 
entirely a public sector activity and objectives are largely the same as with public sector 
procurement in general5, notably value for money – delivery of what is required and on 
the best commercial terms - integrity, and sustainability. The means for achieving them 
is also largely the same, relying on a transaction-based approach with a competition for 
each transaction, as opposed to the partnering model found in much private sector 
procurement6.  
Such literature as exists highlights special features of “event” procurement, including the 
particular importance of achieving procurement objectives and the special challenges in 
doing so (see below). However, procurement for sport events – as with sport 
procurement generally - has attracted little interest as a distinct subject in management 
or legal literature7. Thus textbooks, including those on event management8 or sport law9 
barely mention it and, while there is an increasing interest in, and research on, 
corruption and sport, this has not extended to procurement10.  However, several works 
                                                          
4 IPACS Task Force 1 Report, Mapping of procurement standards and risk management activities in the 
construction of infrastructure for sporting events (2019), p.53, citing the study as University of Nottingham 
and OECD (2018), “Collaborative research on procurement and risk management in infrastructure relating to 
sporting events for the purpose of IPACS Task Force” (unpublished). 
5 See S. Arrowsmith, J. Linarelli and D. Wallace Jr., Regulating Public Procurement: National and International 
Perspectives (London: Kluwer Law International, 2000), Ch.1; S. Arrowsmith (ed.), Public Procurement 
Regulation: An Introduction (EU Asia Inter University Network for Teaching and Research in Public Procurement 
Regulation, 2011) available at 
https://www.nottingham.ac.uk/pprg/documentsarchive/asialinkmaterials/publicprocurementregulationintroduct
ion.pdf, Chs 1 and 2; S.L. Schooner,  “Desiderata: Objectives for a System of Government Contract Law” 
(2002) 11 P.P.L.R. 103. 
6 See e.g. D. Parker and K. Hartley, “The Economics of Partnership Sourcing Versus Adversarial Competition: A 
Critique” (1997) 3 European Journal of Purchasing & Supply Management 115.  
7 For a review see S. Arrowsmith, “Procurement and Sport Organizations”, in T. Slack, T. Byers and A. Thurston 
(eds), Understanding Sport Organizations: the Application of Organization Theory 3rd edition, forthcoming 
(Champaign, IL: Human Kinetics), Ch.24. The lack of attention to corruption risks in procurement in 
international events is also highlighted in the IPACS report, p.5, which points out that most efforts on 
corruption in sport have primarily focused on general sports governance and competition manipulation.  
8 Books on event management only include a brief paragraph or so on procurement and related matters – e.g. 
M.M. Parent and S. Smith-Swan, Managing Major Sports Events: Theory and Practice (Abingdon: Routledge, 
2013), p.63; D. Getz, Event Management & Event Tourism, 2nd edn (New York: Cognizant Communication 
Corporation, 2005), p.118 – and discuss risk management in general terms without specific reference to 
procurement.  
9 E.g. S. Gardiner, J. O’Leary, R. Welch, S. Boyes and U. Naidoo, Sports Law, 4th edn (London: Routledge, 
2012); A. Lewis and J. Taylor, Sport: Law and Practice, 3rd edn (Haywards Heath: Bloomsbury, 2014); L.A. 
Sharp, A.M. Moorman and C.L. Claussen, Sport Law: A Managerial Approach, 3rd edn (London and New York: 
Routledge, 2017) – although this last does briefly discuss finance and ownership models. 
10 For example, G. Brooks, A. Aleem and M. Button, “The Extent of Fraud and Corruption in Sport” in G. 
Brooks, A. Aleem and M. Button, Fraud, Corruption and Sport (London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2013), Ch.3, 
pp.30–44: while the authors mention the area in a list of relevant topics, it is not covered in the case studies. 
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do look at procurement from the perspective of one or more of the three objectives 
above in the context of “mega-events”, notably the Olympics and FIFA World Cups11; 
and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) guide on corruption in 
mega-events gives procurement substantial attention12. 
The funds involved in such events and their public importance and high visibility means 
that procurement failings can have significant adverse consequences. The extent and 
nature of such failings are amply illustrated by the mapping. For example, as we will see, 
of the 12 events in the study for which there was sufficient information for mapping, in 
seven the procurement gave rise to significant alleged or proven integrity issues (five 
were the subject of significant corruption findings or allegations (Sochi, Guangzhou, Rio, 
Veracruz and New Delhi), South Africa involved significant bid-rigging, and Budapest 
attracted criticism for waste and cronyism, while most were beset by extensive cost 
overruns beyond the norm for major infrastructure. Conversely, however, some of these 
same features of high spend and visibility also provide a positive opportunity to develop 
and showcase improvements or even excellence13, with potential benefits not just for 
future similar events but more broadly, as illustrated in the case studies of London, in 
which a procurement “legacy” (including for integrity) was an explicit objective, and Rio, 
which has arguably left a positive legacy in terms both of pursuing corruption and of 
modernising the procurement framework. 
Literature on specific sporting events also indicates that these features of such events 
can present some specific challenges for procurement as catalogued by, for example, 
Schulz Herzenberg14, and these are again illustrated by our study.   
One is that international sporting events are generally a “one-off”. As IPACS points out15, 
this means that most host governments have no or limited experience in organising such 
an event. The one-off nature of the work can also make construction work more 
expensive, including because of large volumes of work on the market in a short 
timeframe and because of the absence of cost benchmarks. Bidders may also be 
deterred by the unique nature of the projects and/or high visibility, which create risks for 
contractors as well as procuring entities – a problem with the London Olympic stadium, 
as we will see.  
Another significant problem is the immovable deadline: “when problems arise there can 
be no trade-off between schedule and cost, as is common for other megaprojects”16. 
This may help to explain why cost overruns for Olympic sport-related infrastructure 
greatly exceed those for other major construction projects17, as with three of the four 
Olympics in our study (London, Sochi, and Rio, Vancouver being the exception). It 
seems uncommon for event-specific infrastructure not to be completed in time: our 
mapped procurements produced just one example in the athletes’ village for Veracruz 
                                                          
11  See the works cited in the event summaries below, in particular on London, South Africa and Rio.  
12 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), The United Nations Convention against Corruption: A 
Strategy for Safeguarding against Corruption in Major Public Events (United Nations, 2013), retrieved from 
http://www.unodc.org/documents/corruption/Publications/2013/13-84527_Ebook.pdf. 
13 As UNODC suggests, “The organization of a major event should serve as an opportunity to review and 
strengthen existing procurement, tendering and contracting rules” United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 
(UNODC), The United Nations Convention against Corruption: A Strategy for Safeguarding against Corruption 
in Major Public Events (United Nations, 2013), p.34, at 
http://www.unodc.org/documents/corruption/Publications/2013/13-84527_Ebook.pdf. 
14 C. Schulz Herzenberg, “Introduction”, in C. Schulz Herzenberg (ed.), Player and referee: Conflicting interests 
and the 2010 FIFA World CupTM (Pretoria: Institute of Security Studies, 2010), Ch.1, pp.1–19 [e-book], at 
http://ccs.ukzn.ac.za/files/ISS%20Player%20and%20Referee.pdf. 
15 IPACS report, p.5. 
16 B. Flyvbjerg, A. Stewart and A. Budzier, “The Oxford Olympics Study 2016: Cost and Cost Overrun at the 
Games” (University of Oxford, Saïd Business School Research Papers, July 2016), p.14, available at 
https://eureka.sbs.ox.ac.uk/6195/1/2016-20.pdf. 
17 B. Flyvbjerg, A. Stewart and A. Budzier, “The Oxford Olympics Study 2016: Cost and Cost Overrun at the 




(although some appears not to have been completed to a satisfactory standard because 
of lack of time, as with the athletes’ accommodation for Rio). Time pressures also make 
it difficult to control costs and prevent corruption, including because of pressure to 
modify regular procedures or to invoke exemptions - or can provide a pretext for 
dispensing with regular procedures even when not justified. Of the events in our study, 
New Delhi was seriously criticised by audit bodies for modifications to regular procedures 
and other problems caused by preparation delays, while Budapest was criticised by the 
media for exorbitantly expensive infrastructure against a backdrop of a “blanket” 
exemption from the usual requirements for open public tender (the stated justification 
for which, as discussed later, was that Budapest replaced another host just two years 
before the event). Time pressures can also make adequate control of amendments, with 
attendant corruption risks, more difficult. 
Particular challenges also arise from the complexity of institutions involved, both in the 
local organising committees (LOCs) and more generally. Stakeholders often include 
public institutions, sometimes (as with several of our case studies) at multiple levels 
(local, regional and/or national), as well as national and international federations, 
sometimes with conflicting interests, as examined by Schulz Herzenberg et al in more 
detail in the context of one of our case study events, South Africa18. The structural 
challenges have sometimes been addressed by creating one or more bespoke agencies 
for organisation, including procurement, or at least new teams or units to deal with 
exceptional procurement demands, as with South Africa (see later). However, as the 
literature shows, a transient organizational structure also makes it more difficult to 
transmit lessons19 (something that the IOC has tried to address with the Olympic Games 
Knowledge Management Program). The bespoke nature of agencies can also contribute 
to the difficulty of ensuring transparency, as our study shows. Thus, as described below, 
where a specific bespoke agency is established for infrastructure procurement, accessing 
documentation can prove largely impossible once the agencies are wound up (London, 
Vancouver and Sochi), and this was also an issue with South Africa because of the 
winding up of both the main organising committee and units set up in existing 
Government departments. The involvement of multiple agencies can also create 
problems in this regard: at Rio where, as explained later, the central Transparency Portal 
in theory covered all contracts using federal funding, but the required information was 
simply not included by some agencies. Further challenges highlighted by Kauppi et al20 
are short duration combined with a long planning period, massive size, diversity of 
activities and services, and the mix of employed and volunteer workforce.  
Finally, the environment can involve high corruption risks, in particular the fact that the 
infrastructure procurement (as our study confirms) is overwhelmingly undertaken by the 
public sector combined with the increasing tendency for transparent and democratic 
Governments to eschew expensive events or fail in the bidding processes. Corruption 
and its causes are hard to measure21 and there may be a higher perception of corruption 
                                                          
18 C. Schulz Herzenberg (ed.), Player and referee: Conflicting interests and the 2010 FIFA World CupTM 
(Pretoria: Institute of Security Studies, 2010) [e-book], at 
http://ccs.ukzn.ac.za/files/ISS%20Player%20and%20Referee.pdf. 
19 R. Agarwal and W. Selen, “Dynamic Capability Building in Service Value Networks for Achieving Service 
Innovation” (2009) 40 Decision Sciences 431.  
20 K. Kauppi, C. Moxham and D. Bamford, “Should we try out for the major leagues? A call for research in sport 
operations management” (2013) 33 International Journal of Operations & Production Management 1368, 
drawing on analysis of the Olympic Games by I. Minis, M. Parashi, and A. Tzimourtas, “The design of logistics 
operations for the Olympic Games” (2006) 36 International Journal of Physical Distribution & Logistics 
Management 621, and on D.A. Beis, P. Loucopoulos, Y. Pyrgiotis, and K.G. Zografos, “PLATO helps Athens win 
gold: Olympic Games knowledge modelling for organizational change and resource management” (2006) 36 
Interfaces 26.  
21 See generally A. Lanyi, “Measuring the Economic Impact of Corruption: A Survey” (Center for Institutional 
Reform and the Informal Sector at the University of Maryland – IRIS, The IRIS Discussion Papers on 
Institutions & Development, Paper No. 04/04, February 2004), retrieved from 
http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/apcity/unpan024055.pdf; and in the specific context 
of sport G. Brooks, A. Aleem and M. Button, “The Extent of Fraud and Corruption in Sport” in G. Brooks, A. 
Aleem and M. Button, Fraud, Corruption and Sport (London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2013), Ch.3, pp.30–44. 
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in public sector activity simply because of greater scrutiny22 but there is also some 
indication of higher corruption levels23, possibly explained by factors such as low pay, 
pay structures, absence of a profit motive, bureaucratic rules, budgets unrelated to 
goals, and political involvement24. The last, in particular, can result in entrenched 
corruption, making it difficult to address by traditional transparency mechanisms which, 
as Trepte argues, assume a “principled principal” and that corruption is simply about 
controlling the rogue agent (procurement officer)25. Some of these features of the public 
sector are shared by sport federations involved in international events, which often lack 
even the basic oversight mechanisms found in the public sector26.  
Although, as noted, procurement has received little attention in sport integrity literature, 
the risks it presents have led IPACS to focus on this. The globalisation of both sport and 
corruption that has led to greater integrity problems in sport as well as making them 
more difficult to address has led to various international cooperative efforts and IPACS, 
launched in 201727, is one of these, with a core group of the International Olympic 
Committee (IOC), Council of Europe, OECD, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 
(UNODC) and UK Government. At its first working group meeting in June 2017 it set up 
three Task Forces28: Task Force 1 on risks of corruption in procurement relating to 
events and infrastructure; Task Force 2 on integrity in selecting event hosts; and Task 
Force 3, concerned with compliance with good governance principles; and a further task 
Force, on cooperation between national criminal justice and law enforcement authorities 
and sport federations, was set up in July 201929. The objective of Task Force 130 is to 
improve the effectiveness and use of methodologies and tools for identifying and 
assessing risks – in particular, fraud and corruption risks31 - specific to procurement in 
sporting events and infrastructure projects; and to enhance strategies and action plans 
for managing these risks. To this end, IPACS envisaged an exercise for “the mapping of 
procurement standards to the specific context of sport”32, which would be used to 
produce i) a tool for managing risks and ii) a pilot project for applying the results to a 
concrete case33. Our mapping exercise was carried out in part (the initial ten projects) in 
this context in collaboration with the OECD, with this part used as the basis for the 
IPACS report.34 The IPACS report summarises the results of the mapping and, based on 
                                                          
22 F. Jenny, “Competition and Anti-corruption Considerations in Public Procurement”, in Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Fighting Corruption and Promoting Integrity in Public 
Procurement (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2005), Ch.3, pp.29–35, available via https://www.oecd-
ilibrary.org/governance/fighting-corruption-and-promoting-integrity-in-public-procurement_9789264014008-
en. 
23 E.g. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), “2014 OECD Survey on Managing 
Conflict of Interest in the Executive Branch and Whistleblower Protection” (OECD, 2014), retrieved from 
http://www.oecd.org/gov/ethics/2014-survey-managing-conflict-of-interest.pdf. 
24 S. Rose-Ackerman and B.J. Palifka, Corruption and Government: Causes, Consequences, and Reform, 2nd 
edn (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016). 
25 P. Trepte, “Corruption and Procurement: Recalibrating the Sights”, in A. La Chimia and P. Trepte (eds), 
Public Procurement and Aid Effectiveness: a Roadmap under Construction (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2019), 
Ch.7, pp.137–171. 
26  Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), “Organising Sporting Events: Preventing 
corruption and promoting responsible business conduct” (OECD, May 2016), available at 
http://www.oecd.org/corruption/Corruption-Responsible-Business-Conduct-Large-Sporting-Events.pdf. 
27 Initially called the International Sports Integrity Partnership, and launched in February 2017 at the 




hosts-first-meeting-of-international-partnership-against-corruption-in-sport. For the Task Force terms of 
reference see: http://www.oecd.org/corruption/multi-stakeholder-sports-integrity-taskforces-established.htm. 
29 See https://www.sportsintegrityinitiative.com/ipacs-steps-up-cooperation-between-criminal-justice-
authorities-and-sports-organisations/. 
30 The terms of reference are at: https://rm.coe.int/terms-of-reference-of-task-force-1-of-the-international-
partnership-ag/16807b6c84. 
31 The terms of reference, para.5, refer specifically to fraud and corruption but para.6 refers to bid rigging also.  
32 Para.9 of the terms of reference. 
33 Para.6 of the terms of reference.  
34 IPACS report, p.32.  
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this, draws some conclusions on integrity risks and how to mitigate them, along with 
practical recommendations that include a checklist for future events (which will be 
piloted at an actual event to be selected shortly by the Taskforce). As described below, 
our study also includes four further projects. As noted, we do not seek here to replicate 
in detail the analysis and conclusions of the IPACS report but just to highlight its key 
points; offer some additional perspectives based on our further work; and then present 
the results of the mapping in a more contextual manner, through an event-by-event 
summary.  
3. Methodology 
As mentioned, our study covered the institutions and procedures for the procurement of 
infrastructure for 14 events by reference to certain standards for mitigating risks 
(particularly integrity risks) in infrastructure projects. The initial work was done in 
collaboration with the OECD, the technical lead for IPACS Task Force 1. The methodology 
was initially devised by IPACS, led by the OCED, and filled out and refined by some of 
the current authors. The authors conducted the actual mapping, covering an initial ten 
events (chosen by IPACS) and a further four. 
Procurements were selected for analysis at three levels: the event level, the 
infrastructure level, and the procurement level.  
As to the event level, events were chosen from those in 2009-2018, to make the 
information current. The choice was made from an initial long list of 44 identified by the 
authors as involving major infrastructure work, which listed simply (where available) the 
procuring entities and the infrastructure, divided into sport-specific (pools, stadiums etc) 
and other infrastructure (such as, transport infrastructure and athlete villages), and the 
cost of each piece. This long list now provides a bank of information for further projects 
(such as a study of social and environmental dimensions). Events for the long list were 
identified with a view to providing a varied, although not necessarily representative, 
sample, based on criteria relating to “type of infrastructure, geographical balance and 
event size”35 and the nature of the event in terms of single-sport /multi-sport, and 
global/non-global (the latter including regional events, the Commonwealth Games and 
single-country events). IPACS then selected ten events for further study. Four more 
were added to our own study to broaden both the geographic scope and the variety, in 
particular by including one from the Antipodes, and including additional and single-sport 
events in both Europe and Africa to broaden coverage on these continents and extend 
coverage of single-sport events.  
The sample of 14 was influenced by IPACS’ decision to select the initial ten only from 
those events - 44 out of 48 initially identified as falling with the IPACS criteria - for which 
a minimum amount information referred to above (entity, nature of infrastructure and 
cost) was publicly available. This limited, in particular, study of events in the Middle East 
and Africa. However, as a result of the decision to cover more events from Africa and 
further single sport events, our sample of 14 included two events, Brazzaville and 
Gabon, for which this longlisting information was not available. Only one event was 
included from North America; although the criteria warranted including more, no event 
involving significant infrastructure procurement could be identified for the ten-year 
period covered.  
At the infrastructure level, it was considered unnecessary for a significant sample, and 
disproportionate given the IPACS project timescales, to map all infrastructure 
procurement for each event. Mapping was therefore done for each event as follows.   
First, where possible, the mapping included the most important sport-specific 
infrastructure in terms of value and significance, such as the main stadium and aquatics 
centres for multi-sport events. Secondly, it sought to cover a range of other sport- 
                                                          
35 IPACS report, p.9. 
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specific infrastructure, covering a variety from different categories (broken down into 
outdoor arenas, indoor arenas (including courts, velodromes etc), ski facilities, 
bobsleigh/luge tracks, golf courses, bike lanes/trails, water sport or other open water 
facilities, and mixed facilities. For most events it was possible both to identify all the 
infrastructure and find a reasonable amount of information. Therefore the mapping 
covered all or substantially all of this infrastructure for smaller events36 and the main 
venues plus some smaller venues for the two summer Olympics (Rio – where 50% by 
value was mapped – and London), for the Gold Coast, and for New Delhi (20% by value 
being mapped in the latter case), as described later. For both New Delhi and Rio the 
choice of smaller items was influenced to some degree by availability of information, and 
more smaller items were mapped for Rio than London because of the greater ease with 
which the theoretically available information could be accessed. As explained later, 
information was not, however, so readily available for six events: South Africa, Sochi, 
the Guangzhou, the Vancouver, the Brazzaville and Gabon. In the first three cases there 
was sufficient information to map some procurements (although in the case of Sochi not 
relating to the sport venues); in these three cases the selection was made, however, in 
large part based simply on the fact that information was available. With the last two 
there was almost no information so that no mapping was possible at all. For some events 
mapping also covered, thirdly, other infrastructure37, either sport-related (such as 
athlete villages) or other, such as transportation. As noted, with Sochi all mapped 
infrastructure fell into this category as there was little information on other 
infrastructure. For some events, the choice was made specifically to give an overall 
picture, but for others, in particular, Sochi, Vancouver, Guanghzhou and New Delhi, was  
influenced more by the information available. 
At the procurement level, a particular piece of infrastructure could involve just one 
procurement (frequently the case) or multiple procurements. In the latter case, to the 
extent possible, all procurements were analysed for each piece. Some procurements 
were organised to cover parts of more than one piece of infrastructure (for example, 
track laying at New Delhi) and, where these were included in the mapping, have been 
categorise listed in Table 1 below as separate pieces since they do not relate to any one 
specific infrastructure piece. 
Altogether, the mapping covered 54 pieces of infrastructure and 97 procurements across 
12 events (none being formally mapped for Brazzaville and Gabon, given the absence of 
information), of which 42 pieces of infrastructure and 76 procurements were taken into 
account by IPACS38, the others (12 pieces of infrastructure involving 21 procurements) 
relating to two additional events mapped for our own study (Gold Coast and Budapest). 
Table 1 below lists the events and the infrastructure mapped, plus the main sporting 
infrastructure (three pieces) procured for Brazzaville and Gabon.  
[In-house editor: insert Table 1 here. Sent for revision v8 14.08.19] 
In considering the results of the mapping, the extent to which the sample was influenced 
by availability of information must be kept in mind, including the fact that the IPACS 
sample omitted the most opaque procurements. As explained later, it transpired that the 
infrastructure for two of the four further events in our own study was financed by China, 
a common approach with international sporting events/infrastructure in Africa (indeed, 
                                                          
36 Budapest, Vera Cruz, Wroclaw and Buenos Aires. 
37 Listed under the headings of accommodation; media centres and catering facilities; site preparation, 
landscaping and utilities; transportation infrastructure; and operation/training infrastructure (for example, for 
event medical services). 
38 IPACS report, p.10, Table 1.2. We have omitted from the figure on number of pieces of infrastructure studied 
the contract for the delivery partner for the London 2012 Olympics, which is listed as infrastructure in Table 
1.2 of the IPACS report, since this only involved services relating to the infrastructure procurement, and 
contracts involving services only (e.g. design services, or auditing services relating to the infrastructure) were 
not otherwise mapped. 
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the dominant approach in larger events) and also found in other developing countries39, 
often involving the whole infrastructure project being implemented by China under rules 
laid down by the Chinese Government40. Clearly this phenomenon needs to be 
considered when looking at the overall picture of sporting infrastructure. As noted, 
availability of information also influenced selection at infrastructure and procurement 
level, so that use of public tenders overall may not be as great as it appears (see the 
later discussion); but the impact of selectivity within many of the events is in fact likely 
to be limited at least for the venue infrastructure, given the overall volume and nature of 
coverage.  
The study examined the application in procuring the mapped infrastructure of certain 
procedural and institutional features relevant for achieving procurement objectives in a 
public sector environment. IPACS work, as we have seen, focused specifically on 
integrity risks, covering corruption (including bribery), fraud and bid rigging41 - concepts 
which overlap (for example, where a public official is bribed to ignore bid rigging) but are 
distinct. Thus, the study focused on matters relevant to mitigating those risks. It did not 
attempt any comprehensive evaluation of actual integrity and the relationship of the 
mapped features to integrity outcomes. However, it did collate such information as was 
in the public domain on integrity outcomes, to provide context and to lay the foundations 
for further study.  
While the study focused on integrity there is, of course, an important relationship 
between integrity and other procurement objectives, including value for money, in that 
failing to achieve the former can compromise the latter – for example, where bid rigging 
leads to above-market prices or bribery results in a more expensive or incompetent 
contractor42. In addition, many tools employed in the public sector to achieve integrity, 
notably transparency, a transaction-based approach and competition through formal 
tendering, are also seen as a means to achieve other objectives, including value for 
money, effective implementation of social and environmental policies, open markets, 
equal treatment as a substantive value, and accountability43. Thus the information 
collected may be relevant also to risks to other objectives. There is, as is well known, 
tension between integrity and value for money (and also social and environmental 
objectives), in that approaches used to mitigate integrity risks can sometimes hinder 
such objectives44 - for example, where limits on discretion preclude negotiation that 
could produce better prices or service design45. However, the information obtained in the 
study was quite high-level information on matters – such as use of open public 
tendering46 - that are accepted in international standards as central to public 
                                                          
39 See e.g. J. Alm, World Stadium Index: Stadiums built for major sporting events – bright future or future 
burden? (Copenhagen: Danish Institute for Sports Studies/Play the Game, May 2012), at 
https://www.playthegame.org/knowledge-bank/downloads/world-stadium-index/c714c866-7a44-4501-a9a5-
a3af00f4d750; S. Menary, “China’s Programme of stadium diplomacy” (2015) 3:3 ICSS Journal 2. We found no 
other evidence of donor funding of the events in our study, although it should be noted that the study looked 
only at procurement rules and not financing (although a study of the budgetary information for the 2010 South 
Africa World Cup confirmed that no donor funding was involved). 
40 E.g. S. Menary, “China’s Programme of stadium diplomacy” (2015) 3:3 ICSS Journal 2.  
41 These concepts have slightly fuzzy boundaries but their core is well understood and clear. 
42 See e.g. S. Rose-Ackerman and B.J. Palifka, Corruption and Government: Causes, Consequences, and 
Reform, 2nd edn (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016). 
43 S. Arrowsmith (ed.), Public Procurement Regulation: An Introduction (EU Asia Inter University Network for 
Teaching and Research in Public Procurement Regulation, 2011) available at 
https://www.nottingham.ac.uk/pprg/documentsarchive/asialinkmaterials/publicprocurementregulationintroduct
ion.pdf. 
44 E.g. S. Kelman, Procurement and Public Management: The Fear of Discretion and the Quality of Government 
Performance (Washington, DC: The AEI Press, 1990); F. Anechiarico and J.B. Jacobs, The Pursuit of Absolute 
Integrity: How Corruption Control Makes Government Ineffective (Chicago, Illinois: University of Chicago Press, 
1996). 
45 See, for example, K. Krueger, “The Scope for Post-tender Negotiations in International Tendering 
Procedures”, in S. Arrowsmith and A. Davies (eds), Public Procurement: Global Revolution (London: Kluwer 
Law International, 1999), Ch.10. 




procurement systems, and broadly regarded as relevant to various objectives. The 
information collected also provides useful foundations for collecting additional 
information for further studies – for example, on sustainability.  
The analysis was based on information in the public domain, either directly or on request 
(including through use of freedom of information laws). A key source was publicly 
available (generally on-line) documentation generated by the procurement procedure 
itself, such as solicitations, tender documentation, and award notices. The study also 
used other public information, such as government audit reports, the limited academic 
literature, other literature (such as that of international organisations) and media. 
Searches were conducted in all main relevant languages (for example, in the case of 
Chinese-financed procurement in Africa, in Chinese, English and French). Within the 
samples, both obligations to publish and actual publication (including compliance with 
publication obligations) varied, as did retention of published information after the event. 
These points and their significance for integrity risks are briefly considered later. IPACS 
initially intended the public information to be supplemented by information from 
questionnaires by IPACS, in particular to explore information and risk management 
strategies and integration of procurement capacity with other event activity47, but was 
able to collect this information only for Buenos Aires (perhaps because the event was 
still ongoing).  
For each procurement information was sought on a range of matters considered most 
relevant to integrity risks, using a public sector framework, and based (as envisaged in 
the terms of reference of IPACS Task Force 148) on existing international efforts and 
standards49. It needs to be stressed that these reflect the approach to integrity within a 
public sector framework since, as mentioned, the commercial sector’s approach is often 
quite different50. IPACs’ approach assumed that infrastructure procurement for 
international sporting events is generally undertaken by the public sector, an assumption 
verified in the study, as explained later. Collecting information that was comparable 
across different procurements required a carefully nuanced framework, as legal concepts 
with similar names may be quite different (see, for example, the section on regulatory 
frameworks below).  
4. Outline of the map 
4.1. Introduction 
In this section we briefly present the key features of our map, along with key findings 
and recommendations from the IPACS report that were informed by the map of ten of 
our events. The points made are in general based solely on the mapped procurements 
but, where specified, also refer to contextual information from other sources.  
4.2. Public availability of information 
As mentioned, our map needs to be considered in the light of the influence of availability 
of information on the sample. Thus, as noted, the IPACS study covers only events for 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Procurement-e.pdf); the WTO Agreement on Government Procurement 2012 (GPA 2012) (at 
https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/rev-gpr-94_01_e.htm); and the EU procurement directives 
(which are discussed later). 
47 IPACS report, p.1. 
48 Paras 7 and 8 of the terms of reference.  
49 Such as the OECD “Recommendation of the Council on Public Procurement” (OECD, 2015) (at 
https://legalinstruments.oecd.org/en/instruments/OECD-LEGAL-0411); “Recommendation of the OECD Council 
on Fighting Bid Rigging in Public Procurement” (OECD, 2012) (at 
https://www.oecd.org/competition/oecdrecommendationonfightingbidrigginginpublicprocurement.htm); and 
“OECD Recommendation on Public Integrity” (OECD, 2017) (at http://www.oecd.org/gov/ethics/OECD-
Recommendation-Public-Integrity.pdf). As noted earlier, the information sought in the context of award 
procedures reflects also the standards in various international instruments.  
50 D. Parker and K. Hartley, “The Economics of Partnership Sourcing Versus Adversarial Competition: A 
Critique” (1997) 3 European Journal of Purchasing & Supply Management 115. 
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which basic information was publicly available, although our own study also includes two 
for which this was not the case; and of the 12 events mapped for this article the 
procurements studied for, in particular, Sochi, Guangzhou and Vancouver was 
determined mainly by availability of information. For most of those 12 events, as we will 
see in the summaries, information on some matters, notably risk management and 
internal controls and audit, was sparse or non-existent. However, there was generally 
significant information on the award procedure. The reasons for this, in particular, 
whether because the latter phase has a more direct impact on suppliers and therefore is 
often subject to greater visibility requirements for their benefit, or because there that 
phase involves better attention to risks and therefore there is more to find, are not clear. 
Since availability of information is itself a mechanism for mitigating integrity risks, 
relevant to various dimensions of transparency in public procurement (publicity for 
opportunities, disclosure of the rules of the process and monitoring and enforcement)51, 
the availability (or otherwise) of public information is itself a potentially important 
finding. However, the event summaries show that absence of public information at the 
time the study does not necessarily indicate a lack of transparency giving rise to 
integrity risks (although it limits potential for uncovering issues later): for example, for 
some events (such as Guangzhou and South Africa) absence of information might 
possibly be explained by the limited use of electronic means at the time, while for others 
information that was clearly public at one time may simply not remain in the public 
domain, as with Vancouver, Sochi and the Gold Coast.  
4.3. The procuring entity/entities 
Although, as seen in the event summaries, the nature and number of the procuring 
entities varied greatly, our mapping confirmed that procurement of infrastructure (both 
venues and other) for international sporting events tends to be undertaken by public 
sector bodies, subject to public procurement frameworks. This was the case with nearly 
all the mapped procurement, as well as for nearly all other infrastructure procurement 
undertaken for the study events on which information was available (although, as we will 
see, the venue procurement for Sochi was carried out by the State Corporation for the 
Construction of Olympic Venues and the development of the city of Sochi (OlymStroy) 
set up for the Games, which as a state corporation was subject only to a skeletal 
procurement regime). Only in very limited cases was infrastructure procurement 
undertaken by entities not subject to public procurement frameworks52.  
As the event summaries show, for the most part the public bodies undertaking this work 
were established institutions with a remit over the activity at federal, state/provincial or 
municipal level – for example, general authorities, authorities invested with responsibility 
for public works, or specialist agencies concerned with, for example, transport. 
Frequently, this meant more than one procuring entity, especially where the 
infrastructure was geographically dispersed and/or when more than one level of 
government was involved. For example53, major procurements for Rio were undertaken 
by RioUrbe - Municipal Company for Urban Development, the Municipality of Rio de 
Janeiro and the state government; for South Africa infrastructure procurement (stadiums 
and roads) was undertaken by nine host cities as well as numerous specialist agencies, 
such as national and regional transport agencies; and at New Delhi at least seven 
entities were involved in major infrastructure procurement for sporting venues alone. We 
                                                          
51 S. Arrowsmith, J. Linarelli and D. Wallace Jr., Regulating Public Procurement: National and International 
Perspectives (London: Kluwer Law International, 2000), pp.73–75.  
52 Examples from the case studies include the athletes’ village for the Sochi, carried out by a limited liability 
company not subject to public procurement law; some construction works to finalise venues and install 
spectator facilities for the London 2012 Olympics, undertaken by the London Organising Committee of the 
Olympic and Paralympic Games (LOCOG), a private company not considered subject to public procurement law 
(which was also responsible for most of the Games supplies and services procurement); and work on 
upgrading a tennis stadium undertaken by the All India Tennis Association with finance from a  government 
grant. 
53 See the event summaries. 
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noted earlier difficulties created by involvement of multiple agencies and our study 
provides illustrations, such as the difficulty of ensuring that all federally-funded 
procurement for Rio was actually included in the central database.  
For some events, a specialist agency was set up either for managing or procuring 
infrastructure, or with responsibilities in this area: this was a popular, although not 
universal, model for mega-events. As the event summaries explain, a special body that 
undertook at least some venue infrastructure procurement54 was set up in four of the 12 
mapped events, Sochi, London, Vancouver, and Budapest (although in the last case 
some of the large infrastructure contracts were also undertaken by existing bodies), all 
as public bodies (semi-public in the case of Sochi). The information available on these 
dedicated agencies highlights the possibilities offered for successful and innovative 
approaches provided by a “blank canvas”, as shown at London (see the event summary), 
but also the fact that bespoke agencies may not leave significant records once wound 
up. The latter contributes to the danger highlighted in literature that a transient 
organizational structure can make transmission of lessons more difficult55; while 
significant efforts were made in London to counteract this by producing a legacy 
website56 this, of course, produces a version of events edited by the actors. 
4.4. The regulatory frameworks 
Public procurement procedures are in most jurisdictions governed by detailed, and often 
enforceable, national legal rules57, although in some the framework is based on wholly or 
in part on administrative guidance or instructions. In general, applicable legal 
frameworks have tended to converge, being increasingly based on international 
instruments, such as the UNCITRAL Model Law on Public Procurement 201158 (Model 
Law), World Trade Organisation Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA)59 or, in 
Europe, the GPA-compatible EU procurement directives60, although significant differences 
remain; and different rules also frequently apply at national, regional and local level, or 
between bodies at the same level. The regulatory picture may also be complicated where 
a project is aid-funded, when the procurement may be subject to donor rules or even 
                                                          
54 At Wroclaw a bespoke body did most of the non-construction procurement, a model also found with some 
other events, including the London 2012 Olympics: see the event summaries below.  
55 R. Agarwal and W. Selen, “Dynamic Capability Building in Service Value Networks for Achieving Service 
Innovation” (2009) 40 Decision Sciences 431.  
56 https://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20180426101359/http://learninglegacy.independent.gov.uk/. 
57 On the legal regulation of public procurement in general, including the role of international instruments, see 
S. Arrowsmith, J. Linarelli and D. Wallace Jr., Regulating Public Procurement: National and International 
Perspectives (London: Kluwer Law International, 2000), Ch.1; S. Arrowsmith (ed.), Public Procurement 
Regulation: An Introduction (EU Asia Inter University Network for Teaching and Research in Public Procurement 
Regulation, 2011) at 
https://www.nottingham.ac.uk/pprg/documentsarchive/asialinkmaterials/publicprocurementregulationintroduct
ion.pdf; P. Trepte, Regulating Procurement: Understanding the Ends and Means of Public Procurement 
Regulation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004). 
58 Currently the UNCITRAL website notes that this text is used for benchmarking public procurement reforms 
by African Development Bank, Asian Development Bank, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 
Inter-American Development Bank, OECD and the World Bank and lists 25 countries as having “used” the 
Model Law and its accompanying Guide to Enactment as the basis for their procurement reforms: 
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/procurement_infrastructure/2011Model_status.html. 
However, anecdotal evidence and other sources indicate that the number is much higher e.g. on its influence in 
Anglophone Africa see generally G. Quinot and S. Arrowsmith (eds), Public Procurement Regulation in Africa 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013).  
59  R.D. Anderson and A.C. Müller “The Revised WTO Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA): Key 
Design Features and Significance for Global Trade and Development” (2017) 48 Georgetown Journal of 
International Law 949; R.D. Anderson and N. Sporysheva, “The revised WTO Agreement on Government 
Procurement: evolving global footprint, economic impact and policy significance” (2019) 28 P.P.L.R. 71. 
60 The most significant of which is Directive 2014/24/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 
February 2014 on public procurement and repealing Directive 2004/18/EC [2014] OJ L 94/65 (Public Contracts 
Directive). On the EU directives see S. Arrowsmith, The Law of Public and Utilities Procurement: Regulation in 
the EU and UK, 3rd edn (London: Sweet & Maxwell, Volume 1 2014, Volume 2 2018). 
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carried out directly by the donor61. It is assumed a regulatory framework following the 
core elements of international models – such as open solicitations and supplier review 
procedures – has a role in limiting integrity risks, although – as we noted earlier – its 
exact contribution, in particular in countries with endemic integrity problems is open to 
debate.  The study therefore sought information on both the regulatory frameworks and 
the extent to which certain steps envisaged by international models were applied. 
In the 12 mapped events, the mapped procurement was undertaken by the host nation 
using national rules (with no evidence found of donor funding), involving to some 
degree, and in most cases a very significant degree, of regulation, although for the Gold 
Coast and to some extent Delhi the framework was non-legal. (On the other hand, the 
stadium procurements for Brazzaville and Gabon which, as noted, were funded by China 
may have been done by the Chinese authorities using their own rules, as is common for 
Chinese-funded sport facilities in Africa62, or by the national authorities under a 
framework set by China63; there was no public information available, however, to verify 
the position.) In some of the 12 mapped events, different regimes applied to different 
levels of government and/or localities (for example, New Delhi and South Africa), and/or 
some was quite skeletal (as we explained was the case for Sochi).   
As noted, the special challenges of procuring infrastructure for sporting events, including 
immoveable timescales, can create special problems in applying the regulatory 
framework. These can lead to pressure to modify the usual rules or to use urgency-
based exemptions, whether for good reason, because of avoidable problems, or because 
modifications or exemptions are exploited for illegitimate motives, in all cases creating 
risks for procurement objectives. Some of these points are illustrated in the sample 
events. Thus, as discussed later, New Delhi involved many “urgent” non-competitive 
awards justified by reference to urgency because of poor planning – something generally 
precluded by international models, however,64, in view of the risks created by allowing 
exemptions based on entities’ own dilatory conduct65; while a special Law exempted 
much of the procurement for Budapest from the usual procurement laws66. 
Our sample also illustrates, however, that the same factors of high visibility and high 
spend that create special risks, also give rise to special opportunities for improvement, 
including of the legal framework. Our sample events included one legal initiative of this 
kind, the Differentiated Contracting Regime (Law No. 12462/2011) in Brazil, as 
discussed in the event summary.  
4.5. Use of electronic procurement and communications 
                                                          
61 A. La Chimia, “Donors’ influence on developing countries’ procurement systems, rules and markets: a critical 
analysis”, in S. Arrowsmith and G. Quinot (eds), Public Procurement Regulation in Africa (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press), Ch.11, pp.219–260 at pp.235–238. 
62 S. Menary, “China’s Programme of stadium diplomacy” (2015) 3:3 ICSS Journal 2. 
63 On applicable procedures at the present time see Measures on the Management of Turnkey Foreign Technical 
Assistance Projects (Draft) (No. 3 MOFCOM Circular, 2015) and the Measures on the Management of Foreign 
Technical Assistance Projects Management (Draft) (No. 5 MOFCOM Circular, 2015), which came into effect on 
1.8.2016.  
64 GPA 2012, art.XIII(1)(d), allowing direct awards only “insofar as is strictly necessary where, for reasons of 
extreme urgency brought about by events unforeseeable by the procuring entity” the subject matter cannot be 
obtained through an open public tender in our sense; and, in the EU, e.g. Public Contracts Directive; with 
similar wording art.32(2)(c), which also states that “The circumstances invoked to justify extreme urgency 
shall not in any event be attributable to the contracting authority”. These instruments also provide for very 
short time period for open public tenders to deal with such cases of urgency: e.g. GPA 2012, art.XI(2) and (4); 
Public Contracts Directive, art.27(3) and art.28(6). The UNCITRAL Model Law on Public Procurement 2011 is 
even stricter, providing (in art.30(4)(a) and (b)) only for a flexible form of competition (“competitive 
negotiations”) in cases of urgency (which is again confined to where the entity is not at fault, except where 
there is a catastrophe), rather than direct awards (although direct awards are allowed in cases of catastrophe: 
art.30(5)(b)). 
65 See the event summary for Delhi. 
66 See the event summary for Budapest. 
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Use of electronic means has the potential to reduce integrity risks and otherwise to 
enhance performance in many ways, and as Hayman’s article in this issue of the Review 
explains67, open contracting using such means has significant potential in this respect. 
However, use of electronic means in many events was quite limited for many of our 
events, being confined largely to publishing the solicitation - in most cases (usually, 
although not always, required by law) - and award notices, although in several cases 
other documentation is, or was, available on line (such with Rio, Buenos Aires and the 
Gold Coast). Even when significant efforts were made to put documentation on line, 
however, as at Rio, information was often incomplete68 (possibly because of the difficulty 
of securing compliance by multiple agencies). However, as IPACS notes, the events took 
place in a period which saw a gradual spread of e-procurement system worldwide and 
“As such, it is understandable that e-governance tools in general, and e-Procurement 
systems in particular, were not used…..”69 This is an area in which significant 
developments, including in open contracting, could have an impact on future events, as 
Hayman discusses. It is also worth reiterating that even to the extent that electronic 
processes were involved records were not always retained or accessible (see the 
summaries of London, Sochi and the Gold Coast)70 and improvements here could 
facilitate scrutiny for problems, further study of the issues, and transmission of lessons 
learned. 
4.6. Nature and design of the procurement 
The study also looked at the nature and design of procurements, including the approach 
to lots (within a single procurement or through multiple procurements); the approach to 
delivery in terms of packaging of the design, build, operation and ownership elements, 
and the payment models, including use of private finance. The IPACS report analyses the 
respective advantages and disadvantages of different approaches in these respects, 
drawing on the literature, and summarises the findings on the approach of the ten 
events in the study71.  
Another notable finding was that design and build was generally used. However, as the 
event summaries show, in several cases, an outline design was commissioned 
separately: for example, the London Aquatics Centre illustrates a successful use of this 
approach (although the initial design was novated to the building contractor)72. 
Secondly, the sport-related infrastructure was overwhelmingly built with public funds 
and taken into or retained in public ownership, this being the case for all sport venues 
mapped. The Central American Village (athletes’ accommodation) for the 2014 Veracruz 
Central American and Caribbean Games was the only example of use of private finance 
and ownership for sport-related infrastructure – somewhat unsuccessful, since the 
Village was not ready for the Games73.   
4.7. Planning phase 
As IPACS notes: “The early stages of the procurement cycle consisting of project design, 
budget estimates and understanding of market capabilities are of key importance, as 
shortcomings in these early phases may open doors for wrongdoings later on in the 
delivery cycle.”74 As presented there, based on the data from 75 construction 
procurements for 43 pieces of infrastructure in ten events, there was little public 
evidence of such activity. For example, there was evidence of a feasibility study for 
about half of projects; evidence of a cost-benefit impact of delivery method for only two; 
                                                          
67 G. Hayman, “Better procurement for major sporting events: will we see open contracting for Paris 2024?” 
(2019) 28 P.P.L.R. xxx. 
68 See the event summary for Rio. 
69 IPACS report, p.29. 
70 See the relevant event summaries below. 
71 IPACS report, pp.22–25. 
72 See the event summary for London below. 
73 See the event summary for Veracruz. 
74 IPACS report, p.21. 
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and evidence of market analysis for none75. However, it is difficult to draw conclusions 
given that publication of such documents is often neither legally required nor inherent in 
the document’s function, although IPACS does suggest the evidence supports the 
conclusion that pre-tendering transparency measures were not “systematically 
implemented”76. In the case of advance publication of notice of opportunities, an 
inherently public activity, there was evidence of this for 27% of the above 
procurements77.  
4.8. Risk management activities 
As IPACS noted, “There is limited evidence that implementing agencies took a strategic 
approach to risk management in the events reviewed; however, ad hoc activities to 
assess risks in some events were identified. Specifically, only three of the ten events had 
readily available information on the implementing agency’s governance documents that 
demonstrated risk management objectives, policies or activities” (London, South Africa 
and New Delhi). However, absence of public documentation does not necessarily mean 
that such a strategic approach did not exist: as explained below in our event summary of 
the Gold Coast, documents relating to risk management are not routinely published in 
the jurisdiction concerned (Queensland, Australia) but risk management is systematically 
undertaken. Six of the ten IPACS events were also shown to have conducted risk 
assessments related to specific procurements or project implementation, but such 
activities could have existed for other events, too. As explained later, London is of 
particular interest because of its systematic, and apparently quite successful, approach 
to integrity risks although, importantly, in a country in which corruption is not endemic.  
As IPACS highlights78, “Periodic integrity risk assessments—incorporated into broader 
risk assessments or as a stand-alone exercise—are critical to taking a strategic approach 
to risk management in infrastructure delivery” and this approach is advocated in the 
OECD’s Recommendation on Public Integrity as well as in various international standards 
for internal control and risk management. More generally, given the specific features of 
organisation of sporting events highlighted, the report concludes that “To effectively 
safeguard integrity related to sporting events, a critical early step is to have a dedicated 
entity that leads, oversees and co-ordinates risk management activities with multiple 
stakeholders.”79 
The study sought also specific information on audit and inspection activities. Six of the 
twelve events reviewed in detail were shown to have had both internal and external 
audit or inspection; five showed evidence just of external audit80, although the audit 
reports themselves were found only for three events; and no evidence of audit was 
uncovered for Budapest81. Again, however, absence of evidence does not allow the 
conclusion that no such activity existed. Based on some of the events studied, and 
referring specifically to South Africa and London, IPACS also highlights that improving 
risk management and detection activities in international events can act as a catalyst for 
more general improvement82, including through clarification of responsibilities of 
implementing parties (who bears primary responsibility for this under accepted 
standards) and external audits and other mechanisms. Improvement of integrity 
mechanisms is an important legacy also of Brazil’s experience with Rio, as discussed in 
the event summary. Given the limited information in the public domain about risk 
                                                          
75 IPACS report, p.22. 
76 IPACS report, p.26. 
77 For the additional two projects covered by our own study in detail, such notices were found for all the 
procurement studied in relation to the Gold Coast, but none of those studied for Budapest. 
78 IPACS report, p.34.  
79 IPACS report, p.35. 
80 This does not mean that no other audit existed, merely that it was not publicly evidenced. 
81 Although again this does not necessarily mean that none existed. 
82 IPACS report, pp.35–36. 
15 
 
management, it certainly seems desirable to improve access to such information, at the 
least to facilitate further study and the transmission of lessons for future events.  
4.9. The procurement procedure 
The study examined in detail the type of award procedure used83, since theory suggests 
that this affects integrity risks84, although such risks depend also on the institutional 
environment (itself a major factor in choosing appropriate procedures)85 and, as noted, 
the impact of transparent procedures as an integrity tool may also be limited, especially 
where corruption is endemic.  
Various classifications are possible, but for studying integrity risks we chose a three-fold 
classification. A precise definition of each type of procedure was important, since (as 
explained below) labels such as “open” or “restricted” are attached to quite different 
procedures in different systems.  All three of our types have different legal and practical 
features in different systems – such as whether negotiations are allowed/used - some of 
which were captured, but the classification focused on features that are almost universal 
in international transparency instruments. 
The first type we called an “open public tender”. This was defined as a tendering 
procedure in which there is a public solicitation of offers and under which all interested 
suppliers have a right to be considered in accordance with objective criteria. This 
definition covers, among other procedures, open tendering under the UNCITRAL Model 
Law 2011 and the GPA and the EU directives’ open procedure. It covers certain 
procedures that limit submission of offers to pre-qualified suppliers (those that have 
undergone a prequalification stage so that they meet minimum conditions, such as 
technical competence) (and to that extent is wider than open tendering/open procedures 
under the GPA86 and EU directives87, which (unlike the UNCITRAL concept88) do not cover 
procedures with pre-qualification, although nothing much turns on this since procedures 
allowing pre-qualification are anyway also freely available under the GPA and EU 
Directives). This is because the timing of the qualification exercise was not considered to 
affect significant integrity risks significantly (although the existence of pre-qualification 
was identified where possible).  
Our definition of open public tender also covered procedures that allow the procuring 
entity to limit the number of qualified suppliers to tender based on objective criteria 
(called “reduction of numbers” under the EU directives), generally done to reduce the 
costs of preparing and evaluating tenders in complex procurements. This includes 
procedures referred to as selective tendering under the GPA and restricted tendering, 
competitive procedure with negotiation and competitive dialogue under the EU 
                                                          
83 The analysis looked at the procedure actually followed, where this information was available, as well as the 
legal “type” of procedure invoked, since a single legal type can cover a variety of forms (e.g. the EU’s 
restricted procedure and competitive dialogue that were used for some events (see the event summary for the 
London 2012 Olympics) allows both for a form in which all number of qualified suppliers are invited, or merely 
some of these are selected (the ”reduction of numbers” process). 
84 On the different types of award procedure in legal frameworks see generally S. Arrowsmith, J. Linarelli and 
D. Wallace Jr., Regulating Public Procurement: National and International Perspectives (London: Kluwer Law 
International, 2000), Ch.1; S. Arrowsmith (ed.), Public Procurement Regulation: An Introduction (EU Asia Inter 
University Network for Teaching and Research in Public Procurement Regulation, 2011) at 
https://www.nottingham.ac.uk/pprg/documentsarchive/asialinkmaterials/publicprocurementregulationintroduct
ion.pdf; P. Trepte, Regulating Procurement: Understanding the Ends and Means of Public Procurement 
Regulation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004). 
85 A point reflected in the variety of procedures provided for in the UNCITRAL Model Law on Public Procurement 
2011, not all of which are intended to be adopted for every enacting state: see UNCITRAL, “Guide to 
Enactment of the UNCITRAL Model Law on Public Procurement”, pp.129–130, at 
https://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/procurem/ml-procurement-2011/Guide-Enactment-Model-Law-
Public-Procurement-e.pdf.  
86 GPA 2012, art.I(m). 
87 For the details of the EU’s open procedure see S. Arrowsmith, The Law of Public and Utilities Procurement: 
Regulation in the EU and UK, 3rd edn (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2014), Vol.1, in particular Ch.7 and Ch.12.  
88 UNCITRAL Model Law on Public Procurement 2011, art.18(1). 
16 
 
directives. This is wider than UNCITRAL’s open tendering concept, which does not allow 
this, although the Model Law provides for alternatives that do allow it when a specific 
justification applies89. Although the extra discretion increases corruption risks and the 
potentially limited number of participants increases risks of collusion, the former is 
limited when the tenderers are chosen using pre-stated objective criteria, and this is 
reflected in the GPA and EU directives allowing such a phase in their “default” procedures 
(that is, where no justification for use is required). However, again, our study identified 
the existence of such a phase where possible.  Our definition also included procedures 
involving negotiation or other dialogue. This is potentially valuable in infrastructure 
procedures – for example, to identify different solutions, to reduce the risk of non-
compliant tenders or misunderstandings, or to address collusion risks90. However, it is 
also considered to increase corruption risks in certain respects, so that UNCITRAL and 
the main EU directive for the public sector (Directive 2014/24/EU) allow this only in 
specified circumstances. Again, procedures involving dialogue were thus specifically 
identified.  
A further complication arises from the practice in some cases of limiting access to those 
registered on supplier lists. Where the list used is openly advertised and accessible 
without delay or other obstacles – as required, for example, with lists subject to the 
GPA91 – and there is also open solicitation for the specific procurement sufficient to allow 
registration in time, then the procurement is considered open for our purposes. Where 
the list meets these criteria but there is no open solicitation for the specific procurement, 
on the other hand, or even when there is no reasonable time for suppliers in general to 
register after the open solicitation, the openness of the procedure can be considered to 
be qualified in some degree in practice, as it may exclude some who did not consider it 
worth investing in registering in general for the market but might have been interested 
in that specific opportunity.  We classify all procedures using open and accessible lists as 
open procedures but specifically refer to the qualifications above where they exist.  
Our second type of procedure was a restricted invitation, referring to a competitive 
procedure involving no open solicitation but merely an approach to two or more 
suppliers. Restricted tendering under the UNCITRAL Model Law falls into this category, as 
do other Model Law procedures that allow direct solicitation of bids in certain 
circumstances (such as the competitive procedure with negotiations). Such procedures 
are envisaged by UNCITRAL only in exceptional circumstances, such as urgency92, for 
larger procurements93, and the EU directives and GPA do not include explicit procedures 
of this kind (allowing direct awards, however, in some cases of urgency in which 
UNCITRAL prefers this competitive approach)94. The absence of openness in terms of 
who can access the procedure, and consequent lack of control over the procuring entity’s 
selection of participants, means that corruption risks are much greater than with open 
public tendering. In some countries the legal and/or other rules may allow an award 
without any competition at all, but the procuring entity chooses to hold a competition 
                                                          
89 E.g., under art.30, request for proposals with dialogue – which allows this according to notified objective 
criteria – and competitive negotiations.  
90 For discussion of some of these points see, e.g., P. Bajari and S. Tadelis, “Incentives and award procedures: 
competitive tendering vs. negotiations in procurement”, in N. Dimitri, G. Piga and G. Spagnolo (eds), Handbook 
of Procurement (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), Ch.5, pp.121–142; K. Krueger, “The Scope 
for Post-tender Negotiations in International Tendering Procedures”, in S. Arrowsmith and A. Davies (eds), 
Public Procurement: Global Revolution (London: Kluwer Law International, 1999), Ch.10. 
91 GPA Art.IX. 
92 Art.30(4) of the Model Law. 
93 It can be noted that the UNCITRAL Guide to Enactment (of the Model Law on Public Procurement) generally 
counsels against such procedures, which can often now be avoided by setting up transparent mechanisms for a 
more open approach to lower value procurement, for example, using electronic tools. 
94 The Model Law’s general urgency procedure is competitive negotiations as provided in art.30(4)(a), with 
direct award permitted on urgency grounds only in cases of a catastrophic event (art.30(5)(b)), whereas the 
GPA (art.XIII(1)(d)) and EU directives (e.g. Directive 2014/24, art.32) allow direct award as a more general 
procedure for extreme urgency (although its use should be rare under the directives because of the possibility 
for accelerated open and restricted procedures). 
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between invited parties. In this case we classify a procedure as a restricted invitation 
procedure, based on its de facto operation.  
The third type of procedure was the direct award, namely a procedure without a 
competitive process. Use of such procedures significantly increases corruption risks (as 
well as risks to other procurement objectives), and its use is strictly limited by most 
procurement frameworks – including UNCITRAL95, the GPA96 and the EU directives97 - as 
well as subject to various procedural controls98. As noted above, where the law or policy 
allows for a procedure without a competition but competition was held in practice, this 
has been classified as a restricted invitation.  
As IPACS reports, nearly all the 75 infrastructure procurements99 studied for that report 
for which information was available (71 of the 75) open public tender was used, with no 
restricted invitations in a competitive form and a direct award only in three cases100. Of 
the open public tenders for which information was available, 29 of 61 involved 
prequalification. Sometimes, however, (as with Buenos Aires and South Africa) 
participation was limited to suppliers pre-registered on a list, when ease of access to 
specific openly solicited procurements depends on ease of access to the list. In the case 
of the Gold Coast, 4 of the 7 procurements were done by a qualified open method, open 
to all those on a list that was open and continuously accessible list, as outlined later, 
with only very small procurements using other methods.  
The limited use of direct awards may to some extent reflect fact that, as we have seen, 
the choice of mapping targets was influenced, at event, infrastructure and procurement 
level, by availability of information. For example, this influenced the procurements 
chosen for mapping at New Delhi, for which other sources highlight that direct awards 
were used; and for some events (including Vancouver and Sochi) there is simply 
insufficient information to assess the use of direct awards. However, it is at least clear 
that for most of the events studied (including New Delhi) an open public tender was used 
for at least the bulk of significant infrastructure. Of the two additional events, the 
significant Gold Coast procurement was done by a qualified open approach as just noted. 
However, Budapest presented a very different picture, with a restricted invitation being 
used for all six major sport-specific infrastructure contracts based on alleged urgency, as 
the event summary explains. Such a scenario presents a clear red flag for integrity risks, 
and we will see that this event attracted considerable media criticism over value for 
money and conflicts of interest.  
Events varied on including discussions with suppliers in open public tenders. These 
featured at London, where the procurements for both the stadium and aquatics centre 
used an open public tender that allowed for this (and only one bid was received for the 
stadium procurement); in two of the three procurements for which information was 
available for Sochi (not surprisingly given the quasi-public character of the procuring 
entity and flexible procurement framework); and at New Delhi, where there were 
discussions in several infrastructure procurements. However, for most events mapped 
for IPACS either there was no information or, as with Rio, or procedures allowing for 
                                                          
95 UNCITRAL Model Law on Public Procurement 2011, arts 27–28, and the conditions on use of direct awards in 
art.30. 
96 GPA 2012, art.XIII. 
97 E.g. Public Contracts Directive, art.32. 
98 E.g. the Model Law requires (as in all case when open tendering is not used) justification of reasons in the 
record (art.28(3)) and (as for other procurements in which there is no public solicitation) must in most cases 
publish a public notice to inform interested parties of the procurement: art.34(5). 
99 We exclude here the construction services procurement from the 2016 London Olympics, which IPACS 
included. 
100 The Handball Olympic Centre/Future Arena at the Rio 2016 Olympics (but apparently following an open 
public tender in which there were no bidders, which provides a legal basis for a direct award); the 
Sambódromo improvement works at the 2016 Rio Olympics, justified by an urgency derogation; and exterior 
works on the Xalapa Velodrome at the 2014 Veracruz Central American and Caribbean Games 9for which a 
recorded justification was not found): see the relevant event summaries later in this article. 
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discussions were not used. While negotiation is considered a red flag for corruption risk 
these events varied in the extent of perceptions of integrity, however, with the mapped 
procurement for London being generally considered “clean”101, and use of discussions 
merely reflecting common UK practice for complex infrastructure procurement102. Of the 
procedures for which information was available only those for London (stadium, aquatics 
centre and velodrome) appeared to allow a reduction of numbers process, again 
reflecting UK practice103. 
As regards award criteria, as IPACS noted104, for those procurements for which 
information was available (58) 86% used only lowest price. While this can reduce abuse 
of discretion it can also lead to insufficient attention to non-price dimensions and 
facilitate supplier collusion. 
All the IPACS events were conducted under procurement frameworks providing a 
supplier review system, considered an essential feature of a modern procurement 
system and required under, for example, the UNCITRAL Model Law105, GPA106 and EU 
procurement directives107, as well as under the United Nations Convention Against 
Corruption (UNCAC)108. As the summaries report, there were challenges to one or two 
mapped procurement, notably for Wroclaw. There is no information of an adverse impact 
of the events, however, although at Wroclaw it meant that some infrastructure was only 
just finished in time. 
It is clear from the events studied that for the tendering phase applicable procurement 
laws generally provide for open public tendering in line with international standards and 
that this is generally followed. The main issues from an integrity perspective generally 
arise not from the adequacy of the formal framework but from use of exceptions, 
whether lawfully or unlawfully, including because of poor planning, and from the manner 
of conducting procurement within the legal framework, such as planning and choice of 
award criteria. 
4.10. Contract execution 
Inadequate control over contract execution gives rise to significant corruption risks, 
including the controls over the award phase being undermined by amendments (for 
example, minor extensions for large payments that undermine the contract’s economic 
balance). Infrastructure projects are in general prone to renegotiation and, as IPACS 
highlights, the time critical nature of sporting infrastructure can produce particular 
pressures109; and amendment were seen in many of the mapped projects. Since most 
national regimes impose legal controls over execution phase such controls were found to 
a degree, but, as highlighted earlier, transparency was often lacking in this phase.  
4.11. Reported integrity problems 
Of the ten IPACS events, five, namely Sochi, Guangzhou, Rio, Veracruz and New Delhi, 
produced significant corruption allegations by audit bodies, media and/or NGOs, as 
described in the event summaries, in most cases leading to arrests or convictions; while 
South Africa involved significant bid-rigging, as well as allegations of other 
                                                          
101 See the event summary for London. 
102 See the event summary for London. 
103 See the event summary for London. 
104 IPACS report, p.40. 
105 UNCITRAL Model Law on Public Procurement 2011, Ch.VIII. 
106 GPA 2012, art.XVIII. 
107 E.g. Council Directive 89/665/EEC of 21 December 1989 on the coordination of the laws, regulations and 
administrative provisions relating to the application of review procedures to the award of public supply and 
public works contracts [1989] OJ L395/33. 
108 United Nations Convention against Corruption, art.9(1)(d). 
109 IPACS report, p.31. 
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irregularities110. A further event in our study, Budapest, both involved extensive use of 
non-open procedures and attracted media criticism for extensive waste and cronyism111. 
Other events, notably London and Vancouver, were praised by external bodies as “clean” 
events and may thus provide useful lessons although of course the environment in which 
these events took place was quite different from those in which integrity problems 
occurred. Lessons may also be learned, however, from events where integrity problems 
did occur but were brought to light: thus Spalding et al have argued that the legacy of 
the 2014 Brazil World Cup and of Rio has been important for addressing corruption in 
Brazil, in that, while the events were plagued with integrity problems, they provided a 
catalyst for new integrity measures that were successful in bringing to light and pursuing 
these problems, which previously might have remained hidden112. 
 
4.12. IPACS findings and proposals 
As IPACS has reported, the trends and patterns seen by mapping the initial ten events in 
the study has provided the foundations for IPACS to develop tools and practical 
guidelines for addressing integrity risks, and its report makes a number of findings and 
proposals. 
First, the report concludes that mitigating these risks in procuring sporting infrastructure 
requires more strategic approaches to collecting information, in light of the limited public 
information (as we discussed earlier) and the difficulty IPACS experienced in collecting 
further data, noting that “The limitations of institutional memory observed constitute a 
significant obstacle to learning lessons from previous experiences……”113. Secondly, the 
report concludes that there is little evidence that strategies fostering competition, such 
as early market engagement, are systematically applied, despite the importance of 
genuine competition to mitigate integrity risks and the specific difficulties in ensuring 
such competition with major events.114 This reflects the fact that following rules on open 
public tenders cannot alone guarantee competition. Thirdly, the IPACS report stresses 
the importance of oversight in contract execution – an oversight that we have seen was 
little evidenced in the available information - to ensure that the benefits of tendering are 
not undermined.115  
On this basis, the report proposes that stakeholders consider a number of steps. One is 
for international federations, governments, implementing agencies and oversight bodies 
to agree on strategies for centralising information116. Information for specific events 
should include a map of the responsibilities of the (often many and varied) entities 
involved and ensure a more strategic approach to risk management117. Comprehensive 
information could then also provide lessons for future events.  
The report also highlights the need to consider recording procurement data, in a 
standard, consistent, error-free manner and in a searchable and otherwise usable form, 
and to ensure integration of data on award and execution118. This will, among other 
things, allow application of techniques for identifying red flags for integrity risks, 
including of collusion. As Hayman discusses, the Open Contracting system is one way in 
which this can be achieved119. Where made public, as envisaged by the Open Contracting 
approach, such data can also facilitate valuable monitoring by stakeholders. 
                                                          
110 See the events summaries. 
111 See the later event summary. 
112 See the event summary for Rio. 
113 IPACS report, p.38. 
114 IPACS report, p.38. 
115 IPACS report, pp.38–39. 
116 IPACS report, p.39. 
117 IPACS report, pp.39–40. 
118 IPACS report, p.40. 
119 G. Hayman, “Better procurement for major sporting events: will we see open contracting for Paris 2024?” 
(2019) 28 P.P.L.R. xxx. 
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In the light of the limited evidence of pre-tendering activities, the report also 
recommends giving greater attention to these, including early market engagement, and 
recommends considering whether existing general provisions are adequate for specific 
events120. Likewise, IPACS recommends a significant focus on contract execution, 
including governance mechanisms for amendments (to include clear processes for 
submitting and assessing amendment claims), and a structured approach to 
renegotiations121. For the tendering stage, an adequate legal framework generally exists, 
and the main problems concern compliance and use of exceptions, as we have seen; but 
the IPACS report also highlights some issues relating to practice within the framework, 
notably extensive use of lowest price, and recommends greater consideration to non-
price/cost criteria, to foster a better price/quality mix and also limit the risk of 
collusion122.  
Finally, the report stresses the need to consider clear internal and external reporting 
lines, including clear and communicated procedures for reporting integrity suspicions123; 
and for training on identifying bid rigging124.  
The report concludes by proposing specific checklists for addressing the above issues, 
which IPACS will now build on to produce risk assessment tools (methodology and 
assessment questionnaire) for testing in a pilot project. The checklist for implementing 
agencies125 deals with mapping the involvement of different stakeholders through the 
whole cycle; mapping of plans against delivery; provision of detailed guidance on pre-
tender activities tailored to context; consideration of whether there is an understanding 
of bid rigging and the relevant red flags; collection of information on the actual extent of 
competition; collection of information on amendment claims; and provision for periodic 
risk assessments that include identifying and responding to integrity risks.  For 
governments and sport federations the checklist covers126 suitability of the procurement 
workforce; adequacy of the current legal framework(s) for the agencies; provision of a 
comprehensive procurement strategy for the infrastructure as a whole;  provision of an 
overall risk management strategy, including a specific focus on risk, a strategic 
approach, regular monitoring and evaluation and well-defined procedures and 
mechanisms for a co-ordinated response to problems; and existence of a dedicated 
entity for risk management of infrastructure procurement (suggesting that Vancouver 
and London provide good examples); provision of competitive procedures; the extent to 
which risks of bid rigging are understood and mitigated (including through advance 
consultation with competition agencies, provision for collecting data to flag up risks, and 
workforce education); use of appropriate non-price criteria; and provision of updates for 
the public on financial and physical progress. 
5. Events summary 
5.1. Introduction 
In this section we now outline the key findings on an event-by-event basis to put the 
information in context.   
5.2. Olympic and Paralympic Games, London, England, 2012  
There was a reasonable amount of public information on infrastructure procurement for 
London. First, key information was available for open public tenders from the public 
                                                          
120 IPACS report, pp.40–43. 
121 IPACS report, p.41. 
122 IPACS report, p.40. 
123 IPACS report, p.40. 
124 IPACS report, p.40. 
125 IPACS report, pp.42–45. 
126 IPACS report, pp.45–49. 
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notices (advance notification of the procurement127, solicitation notices and award 
notices) required by law in the Official Journal of the European Union (OJEU). While at 
the time of the research (2018) notices were no longer publicly available online as they 
are archived after 5 years, the OJEU provided them on request. Other significant 
procurement information was also available online, including on a “learning legacy” 
event site128, with information such as the infrastructure Procurement Policy129, a  
document on Use of the competitive dialogue procedure130 and a Suppliers’ Guide131. The 
site does not contain the annual reports and accounts of the Olympic Delivery Authority 
(ODA) (the main entity responsible for infrastructure procurement: see below), but some 
are available elsewhere132. Other information was accessible using the Freedom of 
Information Act 2000 and the government provided some of this in an expedited manner 
to assist our research133. Procurement information was also available in a paper whose 
authors included key players in the procurement134 and in other literature and 
commentary135. However, much information that might otherwise have been obtained, 
                                                          
127 Required at the time for the procurement of the delivery partner (as to which see below) but not other 
mapped procurements, which were launched after entry into force of the Public Contracts Regulations 2006 (SI 
2006/5) on 31 January 2006, which no longer included such a requirement; thus publication of advance notices 
for these procurements was on a voluntary basis.  
128 https://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20180426101359/http://learninglegacy.independent.gov.uk/. 
129 [2007] Olympic Delivery Authority, “Procurement Policy”, at 
https://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20130403015932/http://learninglegacy.independent.gov.uk/public
ations/procurement-policy.php. 
130 [2011] Olympic Delivery Authority, “Competitive Dialogue”, at 
https://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20130403015937/http://learninglegacy.independent.gov.uk/public
ations/competitive-dialogue.php. 
131 [2011] Olympic Delivery Authority, “Supplier Guide”, at 
https://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20130403015934/http://learninglegacy.independent.gov.uk/public
ations/supplier-guide.php. 
132  Annual report and accounts for each of the financial years 2006–2014 and the accounts for the final 

























April 1, 2014 – December 2, 2014 at 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/412429/O
DA_AR_2014_-_Web_PDF.pdf. 
133 Such as a draft of a paper provided by the National Audit Office, Review of Olympic Delivery Authority: Data 
Assurance and Reporting. Final Report for the National Audit Office (May 2009) [name of author redacted by 
the National Audit Office]. No explanation was given as to why a draft, rather than final, version was provided. 
The document contains information on the overall governance, process and structure for data reporting as well 
as a review of the delivery partner’s cost and performance.  
134 M. Cornelius, J. Fernau, P. Dickinson and M. Stuart, “Delivering London 2012: procurement” (2011) 164:5 
Proceedings of the Institution of Civil Engineers – Civil Engineering 34.  
135 See, in particular, J.M. Mead and S. Gruneberg, Programme Procurement in Construction: Learning from 
London 2012 (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2013); P. Stanlislas, “Tackling Corruption and Crime in Public 
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including under the Freedom of Information Act, was not available as a result of the 
ODA’s being wound up and existing public bodies being unable to locate the information 
that had, according to anecdotal evidence, been retained and transmitted to these 
entities136. In particular, other than as stated above the sources did not reveal primary 
documentation, including bid documentation or contracts.  
Of the 112 significant construction contracts137, mapping covered those for the three 
major new permanent sporting venues, namely the Olympic Stadium, Aquatics Centre 
and Velodrome - all new constructions by a single contractor - and also a procurement 
for roads, bridges and certain other structures within or adjacent to the Olympic Park138. 
The anticipated final cost of each stated in the Games’ June 2012 Quarterly Report was 
respectively USD596.80m (£428m), USD349.99m (£251m), 121m USD (£87m; for the 
Velopark) and 787.84m USD (£565m)139. 
The body responsible for procuring infrastructure and venues was the ODA, a Non-
departmental public body140 established by statute141 for the event with nearly 400 
personnel. They worked in partnership with a delivery partner, CLM (a consortium), 
chosen by open public tender142 to manage the delivery, planning, design, construction, 
commissioning, maintenance, conversion to legacy mode and cost management of the 
infrastructure procurement143  – an innovative approach to ensure suitable human 
resource capacity, which the evidence suggests was successful and a potential model for 
future events, given the success in delivery (see below) and value for money of the 
arrangement144. The Local Organising Committee, the London Organising Committee of 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Procurement in the 2012 London Olympics and Paralympics Games: The Role of Operation Podium, The 
Specialist Organized, and Economic Crime Unit of the Metropolitan Police”, in P. Gottschalk and P. Stanislas, 
(eds), Public Corruption: Regional and National Perspectives on Procurement Fraud (Boca Raton: CRC Press, 
2017), Ch.7, pp.107–127; P. Smith, “The Olympics ‘Delivery Partner’ model – a precedent worth following? 
(Part 1)” (2012), retrieved from http://spendmatters.com/uk/olympics-delivery-partner-model-precedent-
worth-following-part-1/; P. Smith, “The Olympics ‘Delivery Partner’ model – a precedent worth following? (Part 
2)” (2012), retrieved from http://spendmatters.com/uk/oda-2/; J. Timms, “A socially responsible business 
legacy: raising standards in procurement, supply chains and employment at the London Olympics of 2012”, in 
R. Holt and D. Ruta (eds), Routledge Handbook of Sport and Legacy: Meeting the Challenge of Major Sports 
Events (London: Routledge, 2015), Ch.15, pp.217–228; D. Von Plessen, The procurement strategies for the 
Olympic Stadium and the Aquatic Centre for the London 2012 Olympic Games (Hamburg: Anchor Academic 
Publishing, 2015); K. Carpenter, “Preventing corruption ahead of major sports events: learning from the 2012 
London Games”, in Transparency International, Global Corruption Report: Sport (Abingdon: Routledge, 2016), 
Ch.3.9, pp.178–182, available via 
https://www.transparency.org/whatwedo/publication/global_corruption_report_sport. 
136  Separate Freedom of Information requests were made to the Department for Culture Media and Sport 
(DCMS), HM Treasury (HMT) and the Cabinet Office (CO) for procurement records for the Stadium, Velodrome 
and Aquatics Centre. It was understood that the records may lie with the Infrastructure and Projects Authority, 
which reports to both the CO and HMT. HMT advised that the ODA records were held by DCMS. However all 
these requests failed to locate any documentation or definitive knowledge of where it was. 
137 M. Cornelius, J. Fernau, P. Dickinson and M. Stuart, “Delivering London 2012: procurement” (2011) 164:5 
Proceedings of the Institution of Civil Engineers – Civil Engineering 34.  
138 The actual price is not known as it was withheld in the contract award notice. 
139 Department for Culture, Media and Sport, “London 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games Quarterly Report” 
(June 2012), p.17, at 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/78228/DC
MS_GOE_QR_JUNE-2012.pdf. The respective values are in USD, converted at USD $1.3943989656 /£1, the 
conversion rate at xe.com as at 21.2.2018 when most of the research was completed. 
140 Under the Department for Culture, the Media and Sport, and under the supervision of an overall Olympic 
Board made up of the Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport Mayor of London, Chair of the British 
Olympic Association, Chair of the Local Organising Committee, LOCOG, and Chair of the ODA itself (a non-
voting member). The board of the ODA was appointed by the Minister for Olympics and Paralympics. 
141 The London Olympic and Paralympic Games Act 2006. 
142 The competitive dialogue procedure under the Public Contracts Regulations 2006 (SI 2006/5), which was 
one of the first uses of this procedure in the UK. 
143 On this arrangement see M. Cornelius, J. Fernau, P. Dickinson and M. Stuart, “Delivering London 2012: 
procurement” (2011) 164:5 Proceedings of the Institution of Civil Engineers – Civil Engineering 34.  
144 P. Smith, “The Olympics ‘Delivery Partner’ model – a precedent worth following? (Part 1)” (2012), at 
http://spendmatters.com/uk/olympics-delivery-partner-model-precedent-worth-following-part-1/; P. Smith, 




the Olympic and Paralympic Games (LOCOG), had responsibility for some finalisation 
works and installation of spectator facilities, as well as procurement of supplies and 
services used for the Games, but not for major infrastructure145. The ODA was covered 
by the regular public procurement legal framework of England and Wales146, deriving 
almost wholly from EU procurement law. (LOCOG, on the other hand, was a private 
company limited by guarantee which, because of its make-up, considered itself outside 
that framework.147) 
The ODA carefully assessed design options for the sporting infrastructure148, choosing for 
the stadium being simple Design and Build by a single contractor, whereas with the 
Aquatics Centre and Velodrome a basic design was obtained separately and novated to 
the (single) construction contractor149. The procurements were financed directly by the 
ODA and taken into public sector ownership150. 
A feature of London was the attention to planning, including market engagement and 
research; this was used to design careful procurement strategies on issues such as 
packaging of work to attract bidders151, with an integrated approach facilitated by 
centralisation of infrastructure procurement in the ODA. Advance notices ahead of the 
solicitation were found in the OJEU for all the mapped procurement other than the 
stadium152.  
In addition, London was one of only four of the 14 projects for which evidence of 
significant risk management activity was publicly available. It provided perhaps the most 
comprehensive illustration of such activity, both in general and in relation specifically to 
both integrity risks and procurement153. In 2005 the Metropolitan Police Economic Crime 
Command produced a document, “Who Will Win Gold?”, outlining economic crime risks 
and the author was then tasked with further analysis of both previous successful Games 
and major UK construction projects. The Specialist, Organised and Economic Crime Unit 
of the Metropolitan Police then established Operation Podium in 2006 to target such risks 
in the Games and worked in close partnership with the ODA. The Construction Industry 
Fraud Forum (CIF) was established by Operation Podium to improve understanding of 
risks by the industry, police and ODA. Special funds from Home Office were used to 
                                                          
145 P. Cummings, D. Stubbs and G. Walsh, [LOCOG], “Sustainable procurement – the London 2012 Olympic 
Games and Paralympic Games” (Learning legacy: Lessons learnt from planning and staging the London 2012 
Games, December 2012), p.2, at 
https://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20130228084558/http://learninglegacy.london2012.com/publicati
ons/sustainable-procurement-the-london-2012-olympic-games-an.php?stylesheet=normal. 
146 At that time the 2004 Public Procurement Directive 2004/18/EC, transposed by the Public Contracts 
Regulations 2006 (SI 2006/5). 
147 LOCOG was formed by the Minister for the Olympics and London, the Mayor of London and the BOA which, 
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sales, sponsorship, merchandising and the International Olympic Committee as well as receiving some public 
money.  
148 D. Von Plessen, The procurement strategies for the Olympic Stadium and the Aquatic Centre for the London 
2012 Olympic Games (Hamburg: Anchor Academic Publishing, 2015). 
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The procurement strategies for the Olympic Stadium and the Aquatic Centre for the London 2012 Olympic 
Games (Hamburg: Anchor Academic Publishing, 2015). 
150 None of the mapped procurements planned the use of private financing. Arrangements for the one 
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Circus Maximus: the economic gamble behind hosting the Olympics and the World Cup, 2nd edn (Washington, 
D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2016), pp.121–122. 
151 See e.g. M. Cornelius, J. Fernau, P. Dickinson and M. Stuart, “Delivering London 2012: procurement” (2011) 
164:5 Proceedings of the Institution of Civil Engineers – Civil Engineering 34.  
152 Structures and bridges [2007] OJ/S 020/023201; Aquatics Centre [2006] OJ/S 246/264303; Delivery 
partner [2005] OJ/S 073/070688; Velodrome [2007] OJ/S 026/031062. These notices are now archived and 
not available directly online. The solicitation (contract notice) for the stadium confirms there was no advance 
notice for that. 
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allocate dedicated crime prevention officers to work with the ODA, and two police officers 
from Operation Podium were embedded into the ODA’s workforce to advise and to 
support managers in identifying risks and areas of vulnerability in the procurement and 
how to mitigate them.154. As IPACS concludes: “This example serves as an illustration of 
an organiser investing resources into a strategic approach for managing corruption 
risks.”155 It also illustrates the potential legacy of sporting events for improved 
procurement, with the post-event audit concluding that the experience with the Games 
had enhanced public sector experience and capacity in managing risk156. 
  
The legal framework offered four types of open public tender, the open and restricted 
procedures – single-stage tendering open to all interested parties and freely available - 
and the more flexible competitive dialogue and the negotiated procedure with a call for 
competition, available only in justified cases, which allowed for dialogue and an iterative 
process, and gave entities considerable freedom in designing the procedure157. All but 
the open procedure allow for pre-qualification and reduction of numbers and such phases 
were envisaged by the solicitations. The procedures chosen were negotiated for the 
stadium (the most complex), competitive dialogue for the Aquatics Centre (and also the 
delivery partner) and restricted for the Velodrome and roads/bridges158. The use of 
flexible procedures for the most complex projects was in line with the general approach 
to complex infrastructure procurements in the UK in the light of what was widely 
perceived as an appropriate balance between transparency and discretion for achieving 
value for money in the UK environment159. The ODA’s procurement policy had a specific 
focus on overall value rather than cost160, including a comprehensive programme for 
integrating sustainability concerns161. This was reflected in, among other things, the fact 
that none of the mapped procedures used cost-only award criteria (prohibited by law 
anyway for competitive dialogue)162. The ODA’s Suppliers Guide states that the 
procurement processes, including document submission, were to be electronic163, 
although some negotiation and other dialogue also took place (as explained below) that 
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156 National Audit Office, The London 2012 Olympic Games and Paralympic Games: post-Games review, Report 
by the Comptroller and Auditor General, HC 794, Session 2012-13, 5 December 2012 (London: The Stationery 
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and R. Craven, “Competitive dialogue in the United Kingdom”, in S. Arrowsmith and S. Treumer (eds), 
Competitive Dialogue in EU Procurement (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), Ch.3, pp.181–271.  
160 [2007] Olympic Delivery Authority, “Procurement policy” in full, at 
https://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20120403103002/http://www.london2012.com/publications/oda-
procurement-policy-in-full.php. 
161 This was not specifically a subject of our mapping exercise which, as noted, focused on integrity. For 
information on this see the Learning Legacy Website, 
https://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20180426101359/http://learninglegacy.independent.gov.uk/; M. 
Cornelius, J. Fernau, P. Dickinson and M. Stuart, “Delivering London 2012: procurement” (2011) 164:5 
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may not have been electronic in form. There were no legal challenges relating to the 
mapped procurements or, indeed, any others164, although this should be seen in the 
context of the UK’s generally low level of procurement litigation165. 
Although careful market analysis and engagement generally led to a reasonable 
response166 (including three bids for the Velodrome and three and four for the two lots 
for the road and bridges procurement) this was conspicuously not the case for the key 
procurements of the stadium, for which only one plausible bidder expressed interest 
resulting in an award by negotiation, and Aquatics Centre, involving three potential 
bidders in the initial dialogue but only one actual bid167. Those involved have ascribed 
the poor response to these projects being unattractive in a buoyant market given the 
high risk arising from their novelty, request for novation of the design of the Aquatics 
Centre, a fixed timescale, and the projects’ high profile168. This illustrates that, while the 
high profile of an event could attract interest because of a chance to build a reputation, 
it can also reduce interest because of potential reputational damage. It can also be noted 
that the procurement for the stadium was launched before the procurement structure for 
the ODA was fully in place. It is difficult to know whether better value would have been 
obtained from greater competition. 
 
There was an extensive formal system for controlling financial payments and reporting 
progress (including publicly), as well as provision for internal and external audit169. 
Amendments were controlled by legal rules deriving from EU law that, inter alia, prohibit 
substantial amendments or those changing the contract’s economic balance in favour of 
the contractor, but otherwise it is not known what rules and processes governed 
amendments. There was, at the relevant time, no obligation on, or practice of, 
publishing amendments and other contractual information, although subsequently such a 
policy was introduced for central government170.  
There were very few public suggestions of integrity problems at the time. Some concern 
was raised over the fact that the contractor for the Olympic Village (not one of the 
mapped procurements) was originally to be a company previously headed by the then-
chief executive of the ODA but the original approach, which involved private finance, 
collapsed171; and there was also a serious incident of fraud in which the ODA was duped 
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into making a payment to a fraudster claiming to represent a contractor172, leading the 
ODA to tighten procedures. There have also been allegations, explored in detail in a 
recent book by Gillard, that concern not to tarnish the reputation of the Olympics 
influenced a cover-up of broader corrupt activity by and within the host London Borough 
of Newham173. However, the procurement for the event itself appears to have been 
generally successful from an integrity perspective, with Transparency International 
praising the event’s “fair and transparent” procurement and construction activities174.  
Despite this, based on operation and venue costs and other costs directly relating to the 
Games (that is, leaving aside indirect infrastructure, such as transportation), according 
to the Oxford Olympics Study175 London was easily the most expensive Summer 
Olympics ever (although not as expensive as the Sochi Winter Olympics)176 and also had 
the highest cost per event and per athlete177. Overall costs increased three-fold from the 
bid to host the Games to completion178; and the operational and sporting costs overran 
by 76%179, higher than the 51% median of post-1999 Olympics and even higher than 
the average 75% (which is significantly affected by very high overruns at Sochi180). The 
stadium and Aquatic Centre cost nearly, or more than, double the original estimate181. 
The budget was, however, adjusted accordingly in December 2007 before most work 
began (although well into the procurement processes for the stadium and Aquatics 
Centre, after procurement for the design for the latter) and thereafter the final cost of 
the ODA infrastructure programme came in slightly under budget182 as did, for example, 
the stadium183. The programme was also completed in an appropriate and timely 
manner184. (The only major failure related not to infrastructure a LOCOG contract for 
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security services: the contracted services were extended significantly by agreement at a 
late stage, but the service provider then proved unable to supply the revised 
requirement, so that the armed forces and police were brought in for the work at the last 
minute185. The subsequent media coverage again highlighted the potential reputational 
risks of involvement with high profile events.) There was, however, criticism of the fact 
that the stadium design was not suited to the legacy use as a football stadium, resulting 
in a substantial public subsidy186. 
London, like many other mega-events, fell sigificantly short of both the promise and 
post-event hype in terms of overall legacy187. However, it appears that integrity in the 
Games procurement itself was not a smajor problem and that the procurement 
experience left some positive legacy both for UK procurement and future events.  
 
5.3. Olympic and Paralympic Games, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, 2016  
A reasonable amount of procurement information for Rio was found in 2018, most on 
official websites. Of particular importance were: the Transparency Portal for 
procurement188, which was adopted as part of Brazil’s commitment to the Open 
Government Partnership launched in 2011189 and contains information on all public 
entities in Brazil, including information on public contracts such as tender documents, 
contracts, summary of amendments, price paid and completion date; the website of the 
Public Olympic Authority190 - a public consortium of the federal government, state and 
city hall of Rio de Janeiro191; the website of local implementing agency RioUrbe - 
Municipal Company for Urban Development192; and the official website with a 
Responsibility Matrix193 (which followed a 2014 World Cup initiative to provide to the 
public and Government information on projects and the responsibilities of different 
government bodies). The electronically available information was in theory quite 
comprehensive, including tender documents (although, as explained below, there was no 
e-procurement or even – from available evidence – electronic publication of 
solicitations). However, theory did not quite match practice and the information that was 
supposed to be there was often incomplete, unclear and disorganized, with not all 
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entities supplying the required information. For example, there was a tender for the 
Olympic Park of Barra of around 430 million USD with almost no documentation. There 
was also no publication of the number of bids submitted in public tenders, name of the 
bidders or any elements of the winning bid for any of the mapped procedures, 
information that was required to be collected by Article 38, IV and VII, of Federal Law 
n.º 8666/93 and some of which (such as number of bids and name of bidders) was 
within the intended coverage of the Transparency Portal. Most of the mapped contracts 
were also financed with Federal resources, based on financial agreements that were not 
always available for consultation. Further, by 2019 the Transparency Portal194 had been 
modified, so that tender documents and contract amendments were no longer available 
and the Public Olympic Authority’s website had been removed as a result of its being 
wound up. Some procurement information was also available in an “Instruction Manual” 
approved by legislation, which established certain mandatory rules on the conduct of 
public tenders and financial agreements195.  
 
The Responsibility Matrix indicates 16 main projects for sport-related infrastructure, each 
including diverse infrastructure, in four geographical areas in Rio (Barra, Deodoro, 
Copacabana and Maracanã196), with both new infrastructure (for example, the Aquatics 
Centre and Olympic Handball Arena/Future Arena) and improvements (for example, the 
Stadium João Havelange). The mapping covered nine pieces of infrastructure (one 
mapped procurement for each197), namely the Tennis Centre, Olympic Handball 
Centre/Future Arena, Aquatics Centre, Velodrome, Olympic Sports Centre of Deodoro 
South (Equestrian Centre), Olympic Sports Centre of Deodoro North (Youth Arena, 
Stadium, Aquatic Centre, Hockey Centre, Shooting Park, Radical BMX Park), Olympic 
Stadium "João Havelange", Olympic Park of Barra (Arenas 1, 2 and 3), Main Press 
Centre, Press Hotel, Olympic and Paralympic Village), and Sambódromo. The selection 
was made with preference to the more valuable procurements and those for which there 
was a reasonable volume of official information. The Responsibility Matrix put the 
estimated price for sport-related infrastructure at around 2 billion USD (500 million USD 
from federal funds and investment in a public-private partnership of approximately 430 
million USD198, with a residual 190 million USD from municipal funds)199 and the 
mapping covered 50% of this in value200. 
Most procurements of both sport-related and other infrastructure were carried out by 
local public authorities with federal resources201. The other infrastructure used either a 
PPP model, or the state government as the implementing agency202. The body 
responsible for procuring seven of the pieces of mapped infrastructure was the 
Municipality of Rio de Janeiro, using RioUrbe - Municipal Company for Urban 
Development (a wholly owned company of the Municipality) to fulfil its tasks, whereas 
the other two pieces the Municipality procured directly. All these entities worked 
alongside the Public Olympic Authority203 to manage the implementation of the event. 
With the winding up of the Public Olympic Authority a new entity204 (Autoridade de 
Governança do Legado Olímpico - AGLO) was created to replace it and manage the 
legacy after the event was finished.  
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Apart from the Olympic Park of Barra (a privately-financed PPP model for which tender 
documents were not public), all the mapped procurement followed Federal Law n.º 
8666/93, with the method being simple Build, or Build and Operate205, by a single 
contractor206, and was financed through federal resources.  
 
There was no evidence available in the websites consulted of early market engagement 
and research for any of the mapped projects. There was also no information in the 
Transparency Portal, the Olympic Public Authority’s website and the implementing 
agency’s website on any risk assessments, value for money analysis, market analysis, 
feasibility study, demand analysis or supplier’s engagement studies. It was not possible 
to find any post-event audit reports on procurement issues by the competent entities, 
such as the Account Court of the Union, despite the problems found in many procedures, 
such as reserve prices in tender documents exceeding the planned/budgeted amount: 
see below. 
The primary source of the legal framework for public procurement is Federal Law n.º 
8666/93, which in various respects did not reflect procurement standards in international 
instruments207 and was considered over-complex and a barrier to speedy procurement. 
The 2014 Brazil World Cup and Rio served as a catalyst for calls to modernise the rules 
and address integrity issues, and this led to a new regime, the Regime Diferenciado de 
Contratações Públicas (Differentiated Contracting Regime), approved by Law n.º 
12.462/2011. This was initially adopted specifically for procurement for temporary 
events, contemplating the 2013 Confederations Cup, the World Cup and Rio, and works 
and services for airports208, as an experimental measure, and on an optional basis for 
procuring entities. The Law209 included new principles of efficiency, innovation, economy 
and sustainable development; stressed the need for a cost-benefit analysis210, including 
of social and environmental considerations, prior to the decision to procure; addressed 
e-procurement; included efficient qualification processes and other changes to speed up 
procurement; delimited the procedural stages more clearly; promoted integration of 
design and build elements; provided for the possibility of negotiating improved terms 
with the winning bidder; and provided the option of not disclosing the budget to, among 
other things, address bid-rigging211. This new, optional, regime, was not in fact used for 
any of our mapped procurements but was, however, used in some cases, such as for 
airport related works, and later was gradually extended to cover most major federal 
works212.  
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There has been some disagreement on the merits and constitutionality of the new 
regime213. The fact that it granted a wider margin of discretion to pursue efficient, 
innovative and sustainable procurement was perceived by some as a negative aspect 
and possible enhancer of illicit activities214; and Gaffney215 argues that it causes debt 
problems as a result of municipal and state governments taking advantage of the 
situation to build on a massive scale in an accelerated time frame. This implies that this 
is an example of a problematic exemption from regular procurement rules for sport 
events rather than a positive development. However, lasting reforms from the new 
regime have been regarded by others as a positive legacy for Brazil’s procurement 
system216 and a driving force for beneficial change in the overall public procurement 
regime in Brazil217.  
Under Federal Law n.º 8666/93, which was used for our mapped projects, most of the 
infrastructure was procured using open public tenders without pre-qualification. Direct 
awards were available only in exceptional circumstances. They were used for two of the 
mapped procurements: the Handball Centre, on the grounds there were no bids in the 
open procedure218, and improvements in Sambódromo, on the grounds of emergency219. 
There was a general use of lowest price award criteria without even evidence in the 
tender documents or contracts of the detailed technical specifications or conditions, 
which may be considered problematic, as well as other problems including non-
compliance with information obligations (see above). No evidence of e-procurement was 
found on any of the official websites for any of the mapped procurements; even the 
solicitations were posted at the headquarters of the procuring entity and/or published in 
the municipal diary/journal of Rio de Janeiro, with no evidence in the Transparency 
Portal or OPA website of wider publication at Federal level as required by law for 
federally-funded projects (paragraph 9.5. of Portaria n.º 84/2013). 
  
Numerous amendments were found, including price increases (for example, with the 
Velodrome) and changes to timescales. These were published but merely with a brief 
statement of the relevant legal provisions and the title of the amendment (the law 
requiring merely including a vague obligation to publish a “short version” of 
amendments220), without detail or reasons. 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
establishments and socio-educational assistance units (art. 1, VI, of Law n.º 12462, of August 4, 2011, on 
Differentiated Public Procurement Regime (RDC), amended by Law 13190, of November 19, 2015); works and 
engineering services related to improvements in urban mobility or expansion of logistics infrastructure (art. 1, 
VIII, of Law n.º 12462, of August 4, 2011, on Differentiated Public Procurement Regime (RDC), amended by 
Law 13190, of November 19, 2015); contracts for the lease of movable and immovable property (art. 1, IX and 
47-A of Law n.º 12462, of August 4, 2011, on Differentiated Public Procurement Regime (RDC), amended by 
Law 13190, of November 19, 2015); actions in organs and entities dedicated to science, technology and 
innovation (art. 1, X, of Law n.º 12462, of August 4, 2011, on Differentiated Public Procurement Regime 
(RDC), amended by Law 13243, of January 11, 2016); and engineering works and services within the public 
systems of education and research, science and technology (art. 1, para. 3, of Law n.º 12462, of August 4, 
2011, on Differentiated Public Procurement Regime (RDC), amended by Law 13190, November 19, 2015). 
Some of its features have now been incorporated into the proposed new Public Procurement Law for Brazil in 
Bill 1292/95, which is expected to be adopted later this year (authors’ translation). 
213 See R. Monteiro Rezende “O regime diferenciado de contrataçoes públicas, comentarios à lei 12.462 de 
2011” (The Differentiated Public Procurement Regime, Commentaries on the Law 12.462 of 2011; authors’ 
translation) (Núcleo de Estudos e Pesquisas do Senado, 2011), p.12. 
214 C. Mendes Bertoncini Corrêa and R. Zumblick Martins da Silva, “O regime diferenciado de contratações 
públicas e um novo panorama licitatório no Brasil” (The Differentiated Public Procurement Regime and a New 
Bidding Panorama in Brazil; authors’ translation) (2016) 23:29 Revista da ESMESC 315, at p.336. 
215 C. Gaffney, “The Brazilian experience as ‘role model’”, in Transparency International, Global Corruption 
Report: Sport (Abingdon: Routledge, 2016), Ch.3.13, pp.204–210, available via 
https://www.transparency.org/whatwedo/publication/global_corruption_report_sport.   
216 A. Spalding and University of Richmond Law School Anti-Corruption Team, “Olympic Anti-Corruption Report: 
Brazil and the 2016 Rio Games” (2017), at https://law.richmond.edu/olympics/archive-brazil.html. 
217 M.J. Filho, Comentários ao RDC (Commentaries on the RDC; authors’ translation) (São Paulo: Dialética, 
2013), p.15. 
218 Art. 24, 5 of Federal Law n.º 8666/93, of June 21, 1993 (on file with the authors). 
219 Art. 24, 4 of Federal Law n.º 8666/93, of June 21, 1993. 
220 Art. 61 of Federal Law n.º 8666/93, of June 21, 1993. 
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As with other mega-events there were cost overruns at various points. For example, the 
reserve price defined in tender documents was higher than the planned/budgeted 
amount for some mapped procurements (Tennis Centre, Olympic Velodrome), with no 
formal justification published in the Transparency Portal or OPA website. However, the 
Oxford Olympics Study indicates that overrun overall from the event bid to final cost for 
the direct sport-related costs covered by the study appeared to be221, at 51%, no higher 
than the median for Olympics since 1999222 and less than the London and Sochi 2014223, 
with a cost per athlete similar to previous Summer Games and substantially lower than 
London224. On the other hand, it became clear quickly after the Games that many of the 
plans for using infrastructure that could have justified some of the expenditure would not 
come to fruition, with the infrastructure being effectively abandoned and falling into 
disrepair225. There was also a struggle to complete all the infrastructure, including venue 
infrastructure, on time226 and it appears that some (including athletes’ accommodation) 
was not ready to the required standard227; and as illustrated by Hayman’s article in this 
issue there were some extreme cost-overruns on some of the broader infrastructure 
projects228. 
 
Corruption allegations over the infrastructure procurement have been made relating to 
five contractors (OAS, Odebrecht, Queiroz Galvão, Mendes Júnior and Camargo 
Correa)229. These are part of a bigger picture of alleged widespread corruption that is still 
being investigated as part of “Operation Car Wash”, which commenced in March 2014 
over allegations of bribery by construction firms of executives of Petrobras, the state oil 
company, but has spread much more widely and led to the arrest of many politicians and 
business persons (including the Governor and several lawmakers of Rio state230) and a 
lengthy jail sentence for former President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva. Six of the 12 
stadiums built for the 2014 Brazil World Cup have also been under investigation for 
irregularities and bribery231, as have alleged payments from politicians to the IOC in 
connection with the bid to host the Games232. 
                                                          
221 The Games had not been competed at the time of the Oxford study and therefore only preliminary data 
could be used. 
222 After the Olympic Games Knowledge Management Program took effect. 
223 B. Flyvbjerg, A. Stewart and A. Budzier, “The Oxford Olympics Study 2016: Cost and Cost Overrun at the 
Games” (University of Oxford, Saïd Business School Research Papers, July 2016), at 
https://eureka.sbs.ox.ac.uk/6195/1/2016-20.pdf. 
224 B. Flyvbjerg, A. Stewart and A. Budzier, “The Oxford Olympics Study 2016: Cost and Cost Overrun at the 
Games” (University of Oxford, Saïd Business School Research Papers, July 2016), at 
https://eureka.sbs.ox.ac.uk/6195/1/2016-20.pdf. 
225 D. Burke, “Brazil's $12 billion Olympic legacy lies in ruins: Five months after the Rio Games, stadiums are 
crumbling as cash-strapped nation is left with crippling debts”, Mail Online, February 20, 2017, at   
https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-4241412/Brazil-s-12-billion-Olympic-legacy-lies-ruins.html. 
226 On the pre-event delays see A. Zimbalist, Circus Maximus: the economic gamble behind hosting the 
Olympics and the World Cup, 2nd edn (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2016), pp.108–110. 
227 T. Lewis, “Rio 2016: five Olympic stories to take your breath away”, The Guardian, July 31, 2016, at 
 https://www.theguardian.com/sport/2016/jul/30/five-stars-to-watch-at-rio-olympics. 
228 G. Hayman, “Better procurement for major sporting events: will we see open contracting for Paris 2024?” 
(2019) 28 P.P.L.R. xxx. 
229 V.  Konchinski and V. Segalla, “Operação Lava Jato ameaça 73% das obras da Olimpíada de 2016”, UOL 
Esporte, November 21, 2014, at https://esporte.uol.com.br/rio-2016/ultimas-noticias/2014/11/21/operacao-
lava-jato-ameaca-73-das-obras-da-olimpiada-de-2016.htm; P. Stauffer, “Há mais projetos ligados a Rio 2016 
sob investigação do que revelado, diz procurador da Lava Jato”, Reuters, April 19, 2016, at 
https://br.reuters.com/article/businessNews/idBRKCN0XG2GY. And see also e.g. J. Chade, “Stadium deals, 
corruption and bribery: the questions at the heart of Brazil’s Olympic and World Cup ‘miracle’”, The Guardian, 
April 23, 2017, at https://www.theguardian.com/sport/2017/apr/23/brazil-olympic-world-cup-corruption-
bribery.  




231 J. Chade, “Stadium deals, corruption and bribery: the questions at the heart of Brazil’s Olympic and World 
Cup ‘miracle’”, The Guardian, April 23, 2017, at https://www.theguardian.com/sport/2017/apr/23/brazil-
olympic-world-cup-corruption-bribery.   
232 Rio Olympic chief arrested in connection with bribery to get the Games – see M. Kelner, “Rio 2016 Olympic 
chief Carlos Nuzman arrested in corruption investigation”, The Guardian, October 5, 2017, at 
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The Differentiated Contracting Regime referred to earlier was just one of four new laws 
enacted in the run-up to the 2014 World Cup and 2016 Olympics following public 
protest, the others being Law No. 12.527/2011 on access to information requiring 
proactive publication of certain procurement information as well as provision of further 
information on request; a 2013 Anti-Corruption law which, among other things, provides 
a more extensive scope for bribery and creates a wide corporate liability; and a 2013 law 
giving enforcement powers to prosecutors233. Spalding et al have described these as 
together providing an “Olympic governance legacy” that have “fundamentally reshaped 
Brazilian anti-corruption enforcement in ways that will endure long after the 2016 
Olympics have ended”234. They argue that discovery of, and action on, corruption should 
be viewed more as a success than a failure of integrity policy, given that without the 
reforms, for which the mega-events served as a catalyst, corrupt behaviour would simply 
have remained hidden235. 
 
 
5.4. Winter Olympic and Paralympic Games, Vancouver, Canada  
Very little information was available on Vancouver, probably reflecting the length of time 
since the event, the fact that e-procurement was then in its infancy and the dissolution 
in 2014 of the Vancouver Organizing Committee for the 2010 Olympic and Paralympic 
Winter Games (VANOC), the main procuring entity. The main information sources were 
reports by VANOC and British Columbia’s official website for procurement notices. 
However, not all notices for the venues were published/found and the accessible 
documents were limited to solicitations, the remainder of the procedures being paper-
based. No master procurement plan or programme was found, or even the bid for 
hosting the event that would indicate the extent of infrastructure procurement. The 
projects examined were a small number that both appeared important and for which at 
least minimal, although limited, information was available: the Nordic Competition venue 
drilling works and Whistler Sliding Center236, a procedure in lots covering site 
preparation, roads and utilities, track, refrigeration plant and building, and other building 
and civil works. The tenders were not found online.237 
As noted, the main procuring entity for infrastructure was VANOC, a non-profit 
organisation with the status of a public authority238 created for the event, which 
dissolved in 2014239.  
No information on the pre-tendering phase was found online. However, as regards risk 
management, one report indicates that VANOC put in place a comprehensive risk 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/oct/05/brazilian-police-arrest-olympics-chief-carlos-arthur-nuzman-
bribery-investigation. 
233 See A. Spalding and University of Richmond Law School Anti-Corruption Team, “Olympic Anti-Corruption 
Report: Brazil and the 2016 Rio Games” (2017), at https://law.richmond.edu/olympics/archive-brazil.html, 
Ch.4; L.B. Arrieta, “Taking the Jeitinho out of Brazilian Procurement: The Impact of Brazil’s Anti-Bribery Law” 
(2014) 44 Public Contract Law Journal 157.  
234 A. Spalding and University of Richmond Law School Anti-Corruption Team, “Olympic Anti-Corruption Report: 
Brazil and the 2016 Rio Games” (2017), at https://law.richmond.edu/olympics/archive-brazil.html, Ch.4. 
235 A. Spalding and University of Richmond Law School Anti-Corruption Team, “Olympic Anti-Corruption Report: 
Brazil and the 2016 Rio Games” (2017), at https://law.richmond.edu/olympics/archive-brazil.html, Ch.4. 
236 Other notices found related only to goods and services or small infrastructure procurements, such as a 
notice relating to the Nordic Competition venue. 
237 The procurement notices were accessed via the British Columbia procurement website: 
https://www.bcbid.gov.bc.ca/open.dll/welcome?lamguage=En.  
238 Under the Canada Corporations Act (Canada Business Corporations Act (R.S.C., 1985, c. C-44)). VANOC 
was guided by a 20-member board of directors nominated by the Government of Canada, the Province of 
British Columbia, the City of Vancouver, the Resort Municipality of Whistler, the Canadian Olympic Committee, 
the Canadian Paralympic Committee and the Squamish and Lil'wat First Nations. It reported to the Canadian 
Olympic Committee and IOC: see https://searcharchives.vancouver.ca/vancouver-organizing-committee-for-
2010-olympic-and-paralympic-winter-games. 




assessment system, including appointing a Vice President of Risk Management, and 
indicated also frequent meetings with the construction team and risk management 
activities at the planning stage240.   
As for procurement procedures, according, to the Games Audit: "In October 2003, 
VANOC’s Audit and Finance Committee established interim policies and procedures such 
as Delegation of Financial Authorities and Interim Procurement Procedures which were 
inspired by the policies used by the Province of British Columbia until the Committee 
developed a full and detailed set of Policies. Most of the policies were finalized in 
2006".241 Policies on procurement procedures were not found online and the relationship 
with relevant legislation is unclear but the solicitations indicate that open public tenders, 
which in one case included pre-qualification242, were used for the mapped procurements.  
 
VANOC was responsible for contract execution as well as award, and for the Whistler 
Sliding Centre appointed a private party (Stantec Architecture Ltd) to manage the design 
and construction. There is, however, no information online on the structures for, or 
existence of, contract amendments.  
 
The Games as a whole broke even243. According to the Oxford Olympics Study, covering 
sport-related infrastructure, the event also had the lowest cost overruns between bidding 
for the event and completion of any Winter Olympics at only 13% (lower than for most 
types of major infrastructure), and a cost per athlete around the median for all Winter 
Olympics and the lowest (just) of the four in the current millennium244. No allegations of 
integrity problems were found, the main controversy reported being the limited use of 
French.245  
5.5. Winter Olympic and Paralympic Games, Sochi, Russia, 2014  
 
Sochi was perceived by some as aiming primarily to promote Russia, put Sochi on the 
map, and bolster internal support – a “nationalist” rather than “commercial” narrative246. 
Indeed, it has been suggested that mega-events in Russia even serve to “provide 
corruption opportunities that facilitate the informal networks needed to keep the system 
running”247, offering incentives to support the regime by distribution of benefits and also 
a degree of control over business; and that corruption leaks and measures represent 
jockeying for position within the ruling elites rather than serious attempts to address 
corruption248. Some of these perspectives are also relevant for other events, but have 
been particularly examined in relation to Sochi249, and analysis of the approach to 
                                                          
240 See “Audit of the Vancouver Organizing Committee (VANOC) for the 2010 Olympic and Paralympic Winter 
Games: Contributions Agreements” (Canadian Heritage, Assurance Services Directorate, Corporate Review 
Branch, October 2007), at http://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2014/pc-ch/CH6-18-2007-eng.pdf.  
241 See “Audit of the Vancouver Organizing Committee (VANOC) for the 2010 Olympic and Paralympic Winter 
Games: Contributions Agreements” (Canadian Heritage, Assurance Services Directorate, Corporate Review 
Branch, October 2007), at http://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2014/pc-ch/CH6-18-2007-eng.pdf.  
242 Here VANOC reserved the right to limit the number of pre-qualified suppliers invited (that is, to operate a 
reduction in numbers process) but no further details were found. 
243 See “Vancouver 2010 Winter Olympics debt-free, VANOC final report says”, CBC News, July 3, 2014, at 
http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/british-columbia/vancouver-2010-winter-olympics-debt-free-vanoc-final-
report-says-1.2695994.  
244 B. Flyvbjerg, A. Stewart and A. Budzier, “The Oxford Olympics Study 2016: Cost and Cost Overrun at the 
Games” (University of Oxford, Saïd Business School Research Papers, July 2016), at 
https://eureka.sbs.ox.ac.uk/6195/1/2016-20.pdf. 
245 See Office of the Commissioner of Official Languages, Raising Our Game for Vancouver 2010: Final Report 
on the Vancouver 2010 Olympic and Paralympic Winter Games (December 2010), at 
http://www.officiallanguages.gc.ca/sites/default/files/stu_etu_games_jeux_e_02_2011.pdf. 
246 See, for example, R.W. Orttung and S. Zhemukhov, “The 2014 Sochi Olympic mega-project and Russia’s 
political economy” (2014) 30 East European Politics 175, at p.177. 
247 R.W. Orttung and S. Zhemukhov, “The 2014 Sochi Olympic mega-project and Russia’s political economy” 
(2014) 30 East European Politics 175, at p.176. 
248 See R.W. Orttung and S. Zhemukhov, “The 2014 Sochi Olympic mega-project and Russia’s political 
economy” (2014) 30 East European Politics 175, at p.185. 
249 See the literature in the notes to this article. 
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integrity risk clearly needs to take account of these perspectives, rather than to assume 
that a corruption-free event is the national objective. As explained below, the costs of 
Sochi escalated way beyond what is usual even for mega-events, with many (although 
unproven) allegations of corruption and fraud. 
Information and documentation for some infrastructure procurement was available 
online. Information on individual procurements was found in the Russian e-procurement 
system for some procurements of OlymStroy, a state corporation funded by the federal 
budget and subject to federal oversight, which had main responsibility for infrastructure 
procurement. This extensive documentation included solicitations, specifications, 
qualification criteria, breakdown of estimated price, time schedules, contract templates, 
information on lots and evaluation commission reports. However, there was limited 
information on procurement of the venues and other sport-related projects (as opposed 
to other projects) of OlymStroy, and on projects by other entities. According to the initial 
Programme250, other entities involved included Krasnaya Polyana (a publicly owned 
joined stock company) and Company for the Development of Mountain Ski Resort "Rosa 
Khutor" (a limited liability company); but the Russian e-procurement system contained 
procurement material only from OlymStroy251, presumably because limited liability 
companies were outside public procurement rules. Further, OlymStroy’s official website 
is archived and was accessible only with limitations252, precluding access to the pages 
containing procurement notices and documentation253, although the event Programme 
and procurement policies were still found. It has been reported that OlymStroy refused 
to publish its specific project costs254. Limited use of electronic means, with tenders 
generally being paper-based, also limited the documentation available, as tenders were 
not published.   
This event involved procurement of both sport-related infrastructure and other 
infrastructure such as transport, power and sewage treatment, the latter accounting for 
80%, and directed at regeneration and at promoting Sochi as a prominent resort255. 
OlymStroy was set up as a state corporation in 2007 specifically for organising the 
Games256, and was the main entity undertaking the venue procurement - which included 
11 stadia (ten new) in two clusters, mostly procured by OlymStroy257 - and other site-
related procurement. OlymStroy also undertook other infrastructure procurement, 
including for roads, some of which we mapped, as discussed below. It has been 
suggested that OlymStroy was allocated responsibilities to limit transparency, as such a 
state corporation is subject to less transparency than both public entities and the 
Organising Committee for the Olympic Games (OCOG), the latter being accountable to 
the International Olympic Committee258; and consideration of the model of a bespoke 
entity as a vehicle for delivering event infrastructure may need to take into account the 
                                                          
250 Decision of the Government of the Russian Federation N 991 of December 29, 2007, “On the Program on 
the Construction of Olympic Venues and Development of the city of Sochi as a Mountain Climatic Resort” 
(authors’ translation from Russian). 
251 The procurement documents were accessed through the single point of access: 
http://zakupki.gov.ru/epz/main/public/home.html.  
252 See https://web.archive.org/web/20130323101853/http://sc-os.ru/ru/about/.  
253 It cannot be seen exactly what information was formerly available on the site for the various procurements. 
254 A. Foxall, Russia’s Olympic Shame: Corruption, Human Rights and Security at ‘Sochi 2014’ (London: The 
Henry Jackson Society, 2014), pp.4–6. For costs of the stadia and other key infrastructure, taken from the 
media, see pp.8–10. 
255 O. Gulubchikov, “The Sochi Winter Olympics: Who stands to gain?”, in Transparency International, Global 
Corruption Report: Sport (Abingdon: Routledge, 2016), Ch.3.10, pp.183–191 at pp.183–184, available via 
https://www.transparency.org/whatwedo/publication/global_corruption_report_sport.   
256 See Federal Law N 238-FZ of October 30, 2007, “On State Corporation for the Construction of Olympic 
Venues and the development of the city of Sochi as a mountain climatic resort” (authors’ translation from 
Russian).  
257 Some was undertaken by other entities e.g. the design and build for the complex of ski jumps K-125, K-95 
by OJSC Krasnaya Polyana and the design and built of a small ice arena by a limited liability company UGMK – 
Holding.    
258 R.W. Orttung and S. Zhemukhov, “The 2014 Sochi Olympic mega-project and Russia’s political economy” 
(2014) 30 East European Politics 175, at pp.183–185. 
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difference in the contexts for creating OlymStroy, on the one hand, and the bespoke 
bodies for London and Vancouver, on the other. As noted, other types of entities also 
undertook infrastructure procurement at Sochi. This included some venue procurement, 
as already mentioned; the main gas and electricity works and services, which were 
entrusted to existing monopolists in the form of state corporations (for example, gas 
pipes and automatic gas allocation stations to Gazprom, railway works to Russian 
Railway Roads and roads to the Federal Transport Agency); and procurement for the 
Main Olympic village, which was entrusted to a limited liability company, RogSibAl. 
Construction of hotel accommodation was made the responsibility of those hotels by 
mentioning them in the event Programme. 
Three projects were chosen for mapping on the basis that they were significant and that 
some information was available, all undertaken by OlymStroy. These were the project for 
security support facilities for venues and infrastructure for the Mountain Cluster (3.3 
billion USD); a sewage pumping station (3 million USD); and certain renovation works 
for municipal roads. As noted, no significant information was available for the main 
venue procurement. 
Both the two new construction projects were done on a Design and Build basis, each 
with a single contractor. For the Games generally there was an initial attempt to 
leverage private financing, in particular from oligarchs, for infrastructure such as hotels 
and roads, aiming to cover over half the Games’ cost; but in the end this apparently 
counted for less than 10259. There is no indication of use of private finance for the 
mapped projects., 
No documents on market research were located for the mapped procurement (and is 
often not done in Russia); nor was there evidence of feasibility studies, impact 
assessment or systematic risk management. It has been suggested that poor planning in 
investigations and specification design contributed to the significant cost overruns.260 
However, a Programme for the Construction of Olympic Venues and the Development of 
the city of Sochi as a Mountain Climate Resort261, amended in 2010262, set out planned 
construction activities and responsible authorities (although it can be noted that some of 
the mapped projects were not actually referred to there).  
The general national legislation on public procurement did not apply to OlymStroy; its 
procurement was governed by the more flexible Law 223-FZ263 adopted specifically for 
state corporations, natural monopolies and certain other quasi-public bodies, reflecting 
the generally limited transparency requirements for such bodies. This Law does not 
require specific procurement methods but just adherence to general principles such as 
transparency, equal participation and value for money and (in Art. 3(2)) a requirement 
to publish a notice no later than 20 days before a bid deadline. Complaints are 
investigated by the Federal Antimonopoly Agency. OlymStroy itself, however, adopted 
documents to govern its procurement, and its General Rules on the Selection of 
Investors, Contractors for the Construction of Olympic Venues (2011) prescribe three 
                                                          
259 A. Foxall, Russia’s Olympic Shame: Corruption, Human Rights and Security at ‘Sochi 2014’ (London: The 
Henry Jackson Society, 2014), pp.4–6; A. Zimbalist, Circus Maximus: the economic gamble behind hosting the 
Olympics and the World Cup, 2nd edn (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2016), pp.84–86. 
Breakdown of the costs for selected Olympic venues can be found in “Sochi 2014: Encyclopaedia of Spending”, 
at http://sochi.fbk.info/en/. 
260 O. Gulubchikov, “The Sochi Winter Olympics: Who stands to gain?”, in Transparency International, Global 
Corruption Report: Sport (Abingdon: Routledge, 2016), Ch.3.10, pp.183–191 at p.185, available via 
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261 See Decision of the Government of the Russian Federation N 991 of December 29, 2007, “On the Program 
on the Construction of Olympic Venues and Development of the city of Sochi as a Mountain Climatic Resort” 
(authors’ translation from Russian).  
262 See Government Decision N 57 of February 5, 2010, “On amending the Program on the Construction of 
Olympic Venues and Development of the city of Sochi as a Mountain Climatic Resort” (authors’ translation from 
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263 See Federal Law N 223-FZ of July 11, 2011, “On Procurement of Goods, Services, Works by certain types of 
legal entities” (authors’ translation from Russian). 
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procurement methods, tender, auction and competitive negotiations, all of which are 
open public tenders within our study definition. Auction was used for one of the mapped 
procurement and competitive negotiations, in which negotiations were conducted with 
suppliers, for the other two. The national procurement legislation also did not apply to 
much of the other infrastructure procurement which, as noted, was undertaken either by 
other entities subject to Law 223-FZ or by limited liability companies outside 
procurement laws altogether. As mentioned, various notices were published 
electronically but bid submission was paper-based. 
As regards contract execution, OlymStroy was required to submit annual accountancy 
and statistical reports to the President and Government of Russia264, report on the 
construction in the plan and subject annual financial reports to an audit by an 
organisation chosen by the Supervisory Board. Physical and financial progress was also 
reported with the exact amount of allocated and spent money for the given period and 
dates of the major stages of the construction process together with information on 
progress265. An internal commission controlled financial and economic activities of the 
OlymStroy and external audit was supposed to be carried out by the Accounts Chamber 
of Russia; however, our research was able to find only limited analysis by the latter266 
and no full audit report. There was no information on exact governance mechanisms to 
control amendments, or on amendments made to the mapped projects.  
The Oxford Olympics Study found Sochi to have the highest sport-related costs, at USD 
21.9 billion, of any Games in history (Summer or Winter), with a cost per athlete more 
than four times that of the next most expensive Winter Games267; and the cost of 
specific types of projects, such as roads, was significantly higher than comparable 
projects outside Russia268. The Oxford Olympics Study put the cost overruns from bid to 
completion for the sporting infrastructure at 289%, easily the greatest of the nine post-
199 Games (with a median of 51% and a mean average –significantly affected by Sochi 
itself – of 75%).  The Anti-Corruption Foundation, established in 2011 by Aleksey 
Navalny and funded by private donations, reported that certain contractors had friendly 
relations with Putin and some were selected using non-transparent procedures269 
(although it has also been suggested that this merely “reflects the objective reality of 
corporate capacity to undertake large-scale projects given the oligarchic structure of 
Russia’s economy”270). In another report, however, Navalny points to actual corruption 
and collusion in procurement271 and other opposition figures have suggested that this 
                                                          
264 Federal Law N 238-FZ of October 30, 2007, “On State Corporation for the Construction of Olympic Venues 
and the development of the city of Sochi as a mountain climatic resort” (authors’ translation from Russian).  
265 See Report on the construction of Olympic venues and implementation of other activities related to the 
construction of Olympic venues for the year 2012 (authors’ translation from Russian), at 
https://web.archive.org/web/20140207042205/http:/www.sc-
os.ru:80/common/upload/otchet_2012/form_14.pdf. 
266 See Accounts Chamber of the Russian Federation, “Analysis of the measures undertaken for the elimination 
of irregularities in the preparation and realisation of ХХII Winter Olympic and XI Winter Paralympic Games in 
Sochi in 2014” (authors’ translation from Russian; Russian content), at 
http://www.ach.gov.ru/press_center/news/21280?sphrase_id=7349935.  
267 B. Flyvbjerg, A. Stewart and A. Budzier, “The Oxford Olympics Study 2016: Cost and Cost Overrun at the 
Games” (University of Oxford, Saïd Business School Research Papers, July 2016), at 
https://eureka.sbs.ox.ac.uk/6195/1/2016-20.pdf. 
268 As reported by See R.W. Orttung and S. Zhemukhov, “The 2014 Sochi Olympic mega-project and Russia’s 
political economy” (2014) 30 East European Politics 175, at p.183. 
269 See also R.W. Orttung, “Olimpstroy: Building the Sochi Olympics from Scratch” (2014) 143 Russian 
Analytical Digest 5. 
270 O. Gulubchikov, “The Sochi Winter Olympics: Who stands to gain?”, in Transparency International, Global 
Corruption Report: Sport (Abingdon: Routledge, 2016), Ch.3.10, pp.183–191 at p.188, available via 
https://www.transparency.org/whatwedo/publication/global_corruption_report_sport. 
271 See B. Nemtsov and L. Martynyuk, “Winter Olympics in the Subtropics” (Moscow: 2013), at 
https://www.putin-itogi.ru/winter-olympics-in-the-subtropics/ (translation by Kerkko Paananen):  
https://www.putin-itogi.ru/cp/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/ZimniayaOlimpiadaVSubtropikah-Nemtsov-
Martyniuk.pdf); and see generally A. Foxall, Russia’s Olympic Shame: Corruption, Human Rights and Security 
at ‘Sochi 2014’ (London: The Henry Jackson Society, 2014).  
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accounts for more than 50% of the Games bill272. It has, indeed, been argued that the 
role of the Games in providing benefits to the elite from corruption to maintain support 
for the regime, combined with lack of democratic accountability and financial oversight, 
provides the main explanation of cost overruns273. Where legal proceedings were 
initiated – including relating to matters such as misuse of power during construction and 
signing of false labour contracts274 – either these were closed for absence of evidence275 
or information on outcomes is not available276.  
Many cases relating to the concluded contracts were brought in the Court of Arbitration 
both by and against OlymStroy, and after OlymStroy’s liquidation suppliers were unable 
to maintain claims (an attempt by one to stop the liquidation was rejected)277 and 
several went bankrupt278. After liquidation OlymStroy also stopped claiming money 
itself.279 The Accounts Chamber280 instructed several entities to eradicate certain 
irregularities, including in procurement.281 It also mentioned that some venues were 
commissioned late, with late transfer to municipal and state ownership; that the 
Krasnodar region failed to finish five projects concerning matters such as sewage 
treatment and landfill with the Programme timescale282; and that hotel construction also 
suffered from late and inadequate completion283.  
5.6. World Games, Wrocław, Poland, 2017  
 
There was a limited amount of procurement information available online for this event. 
The general information on a bespoke web page284 included information about the 
                                                          
272 B. Nemtsov and L. Martynyuk, “Winter Olympics in the sub-tropics”, (2013), p.3, at  
https://www.putin-itogi.ru/cp/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/ZimniayaOlimpiadaVSubtropikah-Nemtsov-
Martyniuk.pdf. 
273 R.W. Orttung and S. Zhemukhov, “The 2014 Sochi Olympic mega-project and Russia’s political economy” 
(2014) 30 East European Politics 175. 
274 See R.W. Orttung and S. Zhemukhov, “The 2014 Sochi Olympic mega-project and Russia’s political 
economy” (2014) 30 East European Politics 175, at p.185, referring to a report of 46 cases initiated by Russia’s 
Investigative Committee that did not, however, result in any trial; and the announcement by investigators “The 
investigators announced about corruption in OlymStroy worth 25m roubles after the resignation of Balloev” 
(authors’ translation from Russian), in Gazeta, January 31, 2011, at 
https://www.gazeta.ru/news/business/2011/01/31/n_1682318.shtml?updated.  
275 See “OlymStroy” in RuCompromat: Encyclopaedia of the compromising materials’ library, at 
http://rucompromat.com/organizations/olimpstroy (authors’ translation from Russian).  
276 O. Gulubchikov, “The Sochi Winter Olympics: Who stands to gain?”, in Transparency International, Global 
Corruption Report: Sport (Abingdon: Routledge, 2016), Ch.3.10, pp.183–191 at p.188, available via 
https://www.transparency.org/whatwedo/publication/global_corruption_report_sport. 
277 See Y. Vinogradova, “‘OlymStroy’ is dying but is not conceding: How liquidated state corporation continues 
claiming debts from the suppliers”, Vedomosti, May 25, 2015, at 
https://www.vedomosti.ru/realty/articles/2015/05/25/593389-itogi-olimpiiskih-stroek (authors’ translation 
from Russian; article content in Russian). 
278 See S. Starikov and T. Dzyadko “‘OlymStroy’ owes about 6 billion RUB to contractors”, RBC, October 21, 
2014, at https://www.rbc.ru/business/21/10/2014/54450d18cbb20f2ce4aa042f (authors’ translation from 
Russian; article content in Russian).  
279 See Y. Vinogradova, “‘OlymStroy’ is dying but is not conceding: How liquidated state corporation continues 
claiming debts from the suppliers”, Vedomosti, May 25, 2015, at 
https://www.vedomosti.ru/realty/articles/2015/05/25/593389-itogi-olimpiiskih-stroek (authors’ translation 
from Russian; article content in Russian).    
280 See L. Chizhova, “‘OlymStroy’ and Corruption”, Svoboda, January 17, 2012, at 
https://www.svoboda.org/a/24454085.html (authors’ translation from Russian; article content in Russian).  
281 See Accounts Chamber of the Russian Federation, “Analysis of the measures undertaken for the elimination 
of irregularities in the preparation and realisation of ХХII Winter Olympic and XI Winter Paralympic Games in 
Sochi in 2014” (Accounts Chamber of the Russian Federation, April 10, 2015), at 
http://www.ach.gov.ru/press_center/news/21280?sphrase_id=7349935 (authors’ translation from Russian; 
analysis content in Russian). 
282 See Accounts Chamber of the Russian Federation, “Analysis of the measures undertaken for the elimination 
of irregularities in the preparation and realisation of ХХII Winter Olympic and XI Winter Paralympic Games in 
Sochi in 2014”, (Accounts Chamber of the Russian Federation, April 10, 2015), 
http://www.ach.gov.ru/press_center/news/21280?sphrase_id=7349935  (authors’ translation from Russian 
analysis content in Russian). 
283 A. Zimbalist, Circus Maximus: the economic gamble behind hosting the Olympics and the World Cup, 2nd 
edn (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2016), p.89. 
284 https://theworldgames2017.com/ (still accessible).  
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infrastructure, while the main source of information on the procurement was the City of 
Wrocław web page285, linking to a page that included documentation such as solicitations 
and specifications286. The largest procurements were advertised in the Supplement to 
the Official Journal of the European Union (OJEU S)287 and as well as the City web 
page288. Pre-event reports in local media information included information matters such 
as the second Olympic Stadium renovation procurement (see below)289 and 
infrastructure costs290. 
 
The study mapped the event’s two main venue projects: renovation of the Olympic 
Stadium of 1928 (USD 25 770 000) and renovation of a swimming pool complex (USD 
14 350 000). These were procured by Wrocławskie Inwestycje (Wroclaw Investment), a 
limited liability company with 100% municipal ownership291.  
Both the stadium and pool were done by the method of Design and Build by a single 
contractor. Both were financed directly through Wrocławskie Inwestycje from the 
municipal budget, with co-financing from the Ministry of Sport and Tourism but no 
private finance.  
 
Little public information was available on planning activities – although, there was some 
market analysis - or risk management; and nor could information be found on 
amendments or other matters relating to contract execution. 
 
As regards award procedures, public procurement in Poland is regulated by the Act of 29 
January 2004 - Public Procurement Law292, which transposes the main EU procurement 
directives293. This provides for various award procedures, including some allowing 
dialogue (for example, the EU’s competitive dialogue procedure could have been used), 
but the mapped procurements used the open procedure, a type of open public tender 
allowing any party to bid in a single-stage tendering procedure without negotiations or 
pre-qualification. Other than publication of electronic solicitations and other notices as 
required by law, the processes, including contract documents, were paper-based, 
(although full electronic procurement has since become mandatory as required by EU 
law from 2018). 
 
Despite market analysis, budget increases became necessary: the largest procedures 
were both annulled because each received just one bid which exceeded not only the 
project budgets – the bid for the stadium was double the budget – but Wroclaw’s entire 
budget for the sporting infrastructure. This resulted in delay to both renovations (the 
pool project being amended significantly and tendered in two parts the second time 
                                                          
285 https://www.wroclaw.pl/przetargi-twg-2017 
286 Formerly at http://bip.theworldgames2017.com/ but no longer accessible. 
287 See http://ted.europa.eu. 
288 https://www.wroclaw.pl/przetargi-twg-2017. 
289 “Wrocław: Rusza drugi przetarg na Olimpijski” (Wrocław: The second tender for the Olympic is starting; 
authors’ translation), Stadiony.net, May 14, 2014, source available in Polish at 
http://stadiony.net/aktualnosci/2014/05/wroclaw_rusza_drugi_przetarg_na_olimpijski. 
290 M. Leśnik, “World Games 2017 w liczbach i pieniądzach” (World Games 2017 in numbers and money’; 
authors’ translation), Wroclife, July 19, 2017, source available in Polish at https://wroclife.pl/czas-wolny/the-
world-games-2017-wroclaw-otwarcie-bilety-koszty/. 
291 Wrocławski Komitet Organizacyjny ­ Światowe Igrzyska Sportowe 2017 Spółka z ograniczoną 
odpowiedzialnością (Wrocław Organizing Committee – World Sports Games 2017), set up specifically for the 
event also with 100% municipal ownership, acted on behalf of the city authorities, especially in procurement 
connected with the organisation of the event, such as procurement of legal services. Other major 
procurements included organisation of hotel services (accommodation and catering) for athletes and officials, 
and tournament markings. 
292 Journal of Laws of 2018 item 1986 with changes. 
293 Directive 2014/24/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on public 
procurement and repealing Directive 2004/18/EC [2014] OJ L 94/65 (Public Contracts Directive); and Directive 
2014/25/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on procurement by entities 
operating in the water, energy, transport and postal services sectors and repealing Directive 2004/17/EC 
[2014] OJ L 94/243. 
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around) but both were still completed just in time in time for the Games294. Several 
other legal challenges were also made, including one relating to compliance of bids with 
the specification in the second award procedure for the stadium and some relating to 
services contracts295. 
The external audit entities that provide ongoing oversight for public procurement are the 
Central Anti-Corruption Bureau296, Supreme Audit Office297 and Regional Chamber of 
Accounts in Wrocław298. However, there was no information on any corruption problems 
during execution. Overall the event was considered a success299 and was awarded the 
“Event of the Year” title in the national Polish Radio Sport Awards. 
5.7. Youth Olympics, Buenos Aires, Argentina, 2018  
 
Unlike many other events, and perhaps because the procurements were recent or 
ongoing, there was a considerable amount of public information on the infrastructure 
procurement for Buenos Aires, which remained online at the time of writing in May 2019. 
Information such as solicitations, evaluation methodology, award notices, and 
specifications, was available for all mapped procurements on the official procurement 
website of the Government of Buenos Aires.300 That Government also set up two 
independent sections within its portal for both the Olympic Park301 and Olympic Village 
projects302, providing direct links to the contracts and procurement documentation, as 
well as information relating to the procuring entity, contractor, stage of performance, 
type of works and contract value. The event also had a legacy website with a detailed 
timeline for social, urban, and sport legacies303; this includes an open data section with 
full information on goods and services (although not infrastructure) procurement304.  
The mapping covered the Olympic Park (63 million USD) and Olympic Village (67 million 
USD) projects, which appear to have been the only infrastructure projects. There were 
nine separate procurements leading to nine contracts for the Olympic Park site 
preparation and construction, and twenty for the Village site preparation and 
construction, all of which were mapped. The procurements were undertaken at separate 
times but often with a short window between each - for example, the solicitation notice 
for Lot III of the Village was published on 23rd April 2015 and that for Lot IV on 11th May 
– with limits placed on the number available to individual contractors. No reasons could 
be found for this approach but it could have been to facilitate involvement of small and 
local contractors. 
                                                          
294 “Otwarcie Stadionu Olimpijskiego” (Olympic Stadium Opening Ceremony; authors’ translation), April 8, 
2017 at https://www.wroclaw.pl/go/wydarzenia/sport-i-rekreacja/35234-otwarcie-stadionu-olimpijskiego (in 
Polish). 
295 Judgment of the National Appeals Chamber of August 26, 2014, file signature KIO 1642/14, at 
ftp://ftp.uzp.gov.pl/KIO/Wyroki/2014_1642.pdf; Judgment of the National Appeals Chamber of April 4, 2017, 
file signature KIO 538/17, at ftp://ftp.uzp.gov.pl/KIO/Wyroki/2017_0538.pdf. 
296 https://www.cba.gov.pl/en.  
297 https://www.nik.gov.pl/en.  
298 https://bip.wroclaw.rio.gov.pl/.  
299 “The World Games 2017 Imprezą Roku w Plebiscycie Nagrody Sportowe Polskiego Radia!” (The World 
Games 2017 is the Event of the Year in the Polish Radio Sports Awards!; authors’ translation), at 
https://theworldgames2017.com/the-world-games-2017-impreza-roku-w-plebiscycie-nagrody-sportowe-
polskiego-radia/ (in Polish). 
300 Buenos Aires Ciudad, Buscador Avanzado de Obras (City of Buenos Aires, Advanced Search for Works – title 
translate from Spanish by Sebastian Barreto-Cifuentes), https://www.buenosaires.gob.ar/baobras/buscador-
avanzado-de-obras (in Spanish).  
301 Buenos Aires Ciudad, Parque Olímpico (City of Buenos Aires, Olympic Park; authors’ translation). 
https://www.buenosaires.gob.ar/baobras/parque-olimpico (in Spanish).  
302 Buenos Aires Ciudad, Villa Olímpica (City of Buenos Aires, Olympic Village; authors’ translation), 
https://www.buenosaires.gob.ar/baobras/villa-olimpica (in Spanish).  
303 Buenos Aires Ciudad, Legado Olímpico (City of Buenos Aires, Olympic Legacy; authors’ translation), 
https://legadoolimpico.buenosaires.gob.ar/ (in Spanish).  
304 Buenos Aires Ciudad, Legado Olímpico (City of Buenos Aires, Olympic Legacy; authors’ translation), 
https://legadoolimpico.buenosaires.gob.ar/gobierno-abierto/ (in Spanish).  
40 
 
The entity responsible for this procurement was the Ministry of Urban Development and 
Transportation of the City of Buenos Aires, a permanent unit of the City Government, 
with a further special unit created within it for the Games. This Ministry and its units are 
covered by the regular public procurement legal frameworks of Argentina (Act 13064) 
and the City of Buenos Aires (Act 5460 plus Decrees). The procurements were directly 
financed by the Ministry and taken into public sector ownership. 
No evidence was found on market research or engagement or on risk management 
activities directly linked to the project. However, the internal control body (part of the 
local administration) does have an auditing manual on risk management.305  
The legal framework offered three procurement procedures: public tender procedure 
(licitación pública), restricted invitation (licitación privada) and direct award. For all the 
mapped procurement public tender was used, a type of open public tender under our 
definition that allows tenders by all interested parties. However, in all procedures at least 
one registration was necessary - in the National Register of Public Works Builders - 
Registro Nacional de Constructores de Obras Públicas - while the water and sewer 
contract required two registrations.306 This could potentially operate as a barrier to 
participation, given that the time between solicitation and bid submission was between 
15 and 20 days.  
In general, the solicitations received a good response, with from four to 16 bids for each 
contract, and a minimum of three responsive bids. However, for several of the contracts 
the bidders were the same, and on at least in one occasion the best bidder was rejected 
because it had already received a contract for the same project. Further, in the case of 
the Village, in particular, successive procurement of similar projects with similar 
dimensions, separated only by days, could create a significant risk of collusion. 
As mentioned, there was significant electronic publication of documents. However, the 
extent to which electronic means were used for the procedure (for example, for 
submissions) is not known.  
As regards contract execution, Act 13064, which was applicable to all mapped 
procurements, includes provisions on performance including substantive limits and 
approval requirements for amendments, and supervision of the works307, as also do the 
Standard Specifications.308 No public information was found on amendments. 
Generally, there was no evidence or public suggestion of integrity issues. With the 
contract for the roof for the Parque Roca the media reported cost-overruns of 76% and 
delays, but the auditing body of the Government of Buenos Aires appears to have 
concluded that this was due to bad planning rather than integrity issues.309 Other than 
this the contracts were performed in a timely and satisfactory manner and generally 
                                                          
305 Buenos Aires Ciudad, Sindicatura General de la Ciudad de Buenos Aires, Manual de Análisis de Riesgos (City 
of Buenos Aires, General Comptroller of the City of Buenos Aires, Risk Assessment Manual; authors’ 
translation), source available in Spanish at https://www.buenosaires.gob.ar/sindicatura/manual-de-analisis-de-
riesgos.  
306 As indicated in the specifications.  
307 Chapters IV on The Performance of the Works and V on Alterations to the Terms, Articles 25–39 of the 
13064 Act of 1947; authors’ translation.  
308 Decree 1254 of 2008 of the Government of the Autonomous City of Buenos Aires, Annex: General 
Specifications for Major Works, Clause 1.6.23 on Supervision, and Clause 1.13 on modifications and new 
prices; authors’ translation.  
309 M. Giambartolomei, “Atrasos y exceso de gastos en el estadio de Parque Roca” (Delays and cost overrun in 
the Roque Park Stadium; authors’ translation), La Nación, February 4, 2017, at 
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nid1981667 (in Spanish). Although this contract was included in the legacy of the Games, and is often linked to 
them, the procurement was launched, and the contract concluded, in 2013, 4 years before the other contracts. 
41 
 
within budget310. 5.8. 2010 FIFA World Cup, South Africa (2010 - South 
Africa World Cup) 
Information on procurement of infrastructure for this event - mainly ten stadia (five new 
build and five refurbished) and transport works - was difficult to locate, and specific 
procurement information is not generally publicly available. Factors contributing to the 
difficulties in accessing information include fragmented procurement responsibilities, 
meaning that consolidated event information is difficult to obtain; the fact that basic e-
procurement was introduced in South Africa only in 2015; and the fact that the Local 
Organising Committee (LOC), the 2010 FIFA World Cup Organising Committee South 
Africa311, was wound up in 2011312, as were dedicated units created within various 
government departments. However, some information was obtained from records placed 
before various oversight bodies in the lead-up to and after the event, such as 
submissions to parliamentary committees313, while information on post-event integrity 
allegations is available on the websites of the South African Competition Commission314 
and Competition Tribunal315 and in the media316 and other literature and commentary.317  
Mapping was done for one of the five new stadia, the Cape Town stadium, chosen 
because of its size, because information was available, and because the difficulty of 
tracking down information precluded mapping other events in the project timescale. The 
procurement budget for all ten stadia was approximately USD 1 037 000 000318, with a 
cost of approximately USD386 680 000for Cape Town making it the single largest 
procurement319. Although the mapping is not concerned directly with legacy unrelated to 
procurement procedure, it is worth noting as background that despite significant 
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313 E.g. Financial and Fiscal Commission Report: Briefing to the National Assembly Public Works Portfolio 
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presentation on status of funding of 2010 World Cup stadiums to the National Assembly Finance Portfolio 
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and Provincial and Local Government Portfolio Committee, Parliament of the Republic of South Africa, “2010 
World Cup: 9 Hosting Cities’ State of Readiness: Briefings”, August 29, 2006, at 
https://pmg.org.za/committee-meeting/7256/; Public Works Portfolio Committee, Parliament of the Republic of 
South Africa, “Follow-up on collusion in construction industry: input by Deputy Minister of Public Works, 
Competition Commission & Construction Industry Development Board”, September 9, 2013, at 
https://pmg.org.za/committee-meeting/16318/. 
314 Competition Commission of South Africa, “2010 FIFA World Cup Stadia Referral” (Media Advisory, November 
13, 2014), at http://www.compcom.co.za/media-advisory-13-november-2014-2010-fifa-world-cup-stadia-
referral/.  
315 Competition Tribunal South Africa, Consent Orders 016949; 016956; 016964; 016980; 016998; 017004; 
017020; 017038; 017046; 017053; 017061; 017012; 017277; 016931; and 016972, at 
https://www.comptrib.co.za/cases/consent-order/?year=2014. 
316 See e.g. Z. Nicholson, “World Cup stadium collusion revealed”, Business Report, July 16, 2013, at 
https://www.iol.co.za/business-report/companies/world-cup-stadium-collusion-revealed-1547328; L. Steyn, 
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317 See in particular C. Schulz Herzenberg (ed.), Player and referee: Conflicting interests and the 2010 FIFA 
World CupTM [e-book] (Pretoria: Institute of Security Studies, 2010), at 
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emphasis on legacy during planning,320 a strong argument has been made that the Cape 
Town stadium is a white elephant321 that does not fulfil any local need, is not financially 
viable, will rely on public subsidy for a long time and contributed little to development.322  
 
As generally with major events, the LOC had minimal involvement in the major 
infrastructure procurement.323 This was mainly undertaken by entities within whose 
ordinary mandate aspects of the event fell. All stadia were accordingly procured by the 
local authorities of the host cities while national road and rail procurement, for example, 
was facilitated by the Department of Transport and dedicated transport entities 
(Passenger Rail Agency of South Africa (Prasa) and South African National Roads Agency 
Limited (SANRAL)) and other infrastructure by numerous other entities.324 However, a 
2010 Unit was set up in the National Treasury to coordinate financial aspects, including 
for all infrastructure development, which included a Procurement Task Team assisting 
host cities with procurement325.   
This approach meant that the City of Cape Town procured the Cape Town stadium.326 In 
doing so, the City followed the regular procurement rules for local government 
infrastructure in South Africa. This is largely done in terms of the Local Government: 
Municipal Finance Management Act 56 of 2003, which provides a distinct set of rules, 
primarily in the Municipal Supply Chain Management Regulations, 2005, promulgated 
under the Act, for local government procurement.327 Under this regime, each local 
government must establish its own Supply Chain Management Policy with its own 
detailed procurement rules, which may differ considerably. The rules of the Construction 
Industry Development Board on public procurement, created under the Construction 
Industry Development Board Act 38 of 2000,328 applicable to works procurement, also 
applied. The procurement was also subject to the Preferential Procurement Policy 
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“2010 FIFA World Cup Country Report” (Pretoria: 2013), pp. 29-30, 53, 124-128, 130, 146, 150, 173, at 
https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/gcis_document/201409/srsacountryreport2013-withcovera.pdf. 
Procurement for the overall event consisted of 24 sub-projects, National Treasury presentation on status of 
funding of 2010 World Cup stadiums to the National Assembly Finance Portfolio Committee, March 7, 2007, at 
https://pmg.org.za/committee-meeting/7831/. 
325 There was also a 2010 FIFA World Cup Government Coordinating Unit within the National Department of 
Sports and Recreation that provided coordination of all aspects of the event. 
326 Sport and Recreation Portfolio Committee and Provincial and Local Government Portfolio Committee, 
Parliament of the Republic of South Africa, “2010 World Cup: 9 Hosting Cities’ State of Readiness: Briefings”, 
August 29, 2006, at https://pmg.org.za/committee-meeting/7256/. 
327 These rules are distinct from procurement rules applied to procurement at national and provincial levels, 
which is governed by the Public Finance Management Act 1 of 1999 and that does not apply to local 
government. 
328 These are primarily the Construction Industry Development Regulations, Government Notice R8986 in 
Government Gazette 31603 of 14-11-2008; Construction Industry Development Regulations, Government 
Notice R464 in Government Gazette 36629 of 02-07-2013 and the CIDB Standard for Uniformity in 
Construction Procurement, Government Gazette 33239 of 28-05-2010.  
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Framework Act 5 of 2000 which, in particular, grants preferences under South Africa's 
broad-based black economic empowerment policy.329 
The Cape Town stadium was designed by a professional team, based on FIFA and LOC 
requirements.330 The demolition of the existing Green Point stadium on the site and the 
construction of the new stadium based on the design were then put out to tender in a 
single procedure331, although there was a delay in commencing construction while 
funding was secured. The procurement received funding from national, provincial and 
local levels332 and the stadium is owned by the City.333 
The evidence suggests very little market engagement and research during the planning 
phase. In April 2006 (less than a year before construction had to start), the newly 
elected mayor stated that the expected studies and costings had not been done.334 A 
subsequent feasibility study suggested that the Cape Town stadium was not the best 
option, but there is no indication of market engagement for the actual procurement. The 
extent of cost overruns and adjustments that occurred in the stadia procurement 
generally, including for Cape Town, suggest some inadequacies of planning, as explained 
later. 
One of the seven board committees of the LOC was the Audit & Risk Committee 
responsible for implementing effective risk management.335 At the highest governance 
level there was thus focused attention to risk management from the outset. At the 
operational level, the LOC’s Chief Risk Officer reporting to the Chief Operating Officer 
had primary operational responsibility for risk management.336 In the preparations, it is 
clear that a number of procurement risks were identified and actions taken to manage 
them337. For example, a particular risk identified as the solicitations were published was 
the very high level of provisional sums, in some instances up to 60% of the amounts of 
                                                          
329 At that time the detailed rules on preferential procurement under this policy were set out in the Preferential 
Procurement Regulations, 2001. 
330 World Cup 2010 Host Cities on Alleged Funding Crisis for Stadia: Briefing to the National Assembly Sport 
and Recreation Portfolio Committee, January 23, 2007, at https://pmg.org.za/committee-meeting/7657/; K. 
Schoonbee and S. Brümmer, “Public loss, FIFA’s gain: How Cape Town got its ‘white elephant’”, in C. Schulz 
Herzenberg (ed.), Player and referee: Conflicting interests and the 2010 FIFA World CupTM (Pretoria: Institute 
of Security Studies, 2010), Ch.6, pp.133–167 [e-book], at 
http://ccs.ukzn.ac.za/files/ISS%20Player%20and%20Referee.pdf. 
331 World Cup 2010 Host Cities on Alleged Funding Crisis for Stadia: Briefing to the National Assembly Sport 
and Recreation Portfolio Committee, January 23, 2007, at https://pmg.org.za/committee-meeting/7657/. 
332 Sport & Recreation South Africa, “2010 FIFA World Cup Country Report” (Pretoria: 2013), pp.45 & 55, at 
https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/gcis_document/201409/srsacountryreport2013-withcovera.pdf; 
Schoonbee and S. Brümmer, “Public loss, FIFA’s gain: How Cape Town got its ‘white elephant’”, in C. Schulz 
Herzenberg (ed.), Player and referee: Conflicting interests and the 2010 FIFA World CupTM (Pretoria: Institute 
of Security Studies, 2010), Ch.6, pp.133–167 [e-book], at 
http://ccs.ukzn.ac.za/files/ISS%20Player%20and%20Referee.pdf; G. Davies, “Managing the alchemy of the 
2010 Football World Cup” in U. Pillay, R. Tomlinson and O. Bass (eds), Development and Dreams: The urban 
legacy of the 2010 Football World Cup (Cape Town: HSRC Press, 2009), pp.46–48. 
333 Not all stadia for the event are similarly publicly owned, although all were predominantly publicly financed – 
see G. Davies, “Managing the alchemy of the 2010 Football World Cup” in U. Pillay, R. Tomlinson and O. Bass 
(eds), Development and Dreams: The urban legacy of the 2010 Football World Cup (Cape Town: HSRC Press, 
2009), p.35. 
334 Schoonbee and S. Brümmer, “Public loss, FIFA’s gain: How Cape Town got its ‘white elephant’”, in C. Schulz 
Herzenberg (ed.), Player and referee: Conflicting interests and the 2010 FIFA World CupTM (Pretoria: Institute 
of Security Studies, 2010), Ch.6, pp.133–167 at p.146 [e-book], at 
http://ccs.ukzn.ac.za/files/ISS%20Player%20and%20Referee.pdf. 
335 Sport & Recreation South Africa, “2010 FIFA World Cup Country Report” (Pretoria: 2013), pp.12–13, at 
https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/gcis_document/201409/srsacountryreport2013-withcovera.pdf. 
336 Sport & Recreation South Africa, “2010 FIFA World Cup Country Report” (Pretoria: 2013), p.16, at 
https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/gcis_document/201409/srsacountryreport2013-withcovera.pdf. 
337 This emerges, for example, from a number of oversight reports, submitted to various bodies such as 
parliamentary portfolio committees, prior to the event, that show an awareness of a range of risks and actions 
taken to address these. See e.g. National Treasury presentation on status of funding of 2010 World Cup 
stadiums to the National Assembly Finance Portfolio Committee, March 7, 2007, at 
https://pmg.org.za/committee-meeting/7831/; World Cup 2010 Host Cities on Alleged Funding Crisis for 




bills of quantities.338  The 2010 Unit within National Treasury, which we saw included a 
Procurement Task Team, identified this risk and implemented mitigation strategies. This 
Unit had regular interaction with the implementing institutions, such as host cities, on 
the management of emerging risks.339 Subsequent to the event the main government 
Department involved, Sport & Recreation, reviewed the risks that emerged and 
formulated lessons,340 a number of which focused on procurement and, in particular, the 
stadia construction.341 At local level, Cape Town has since introduced greater 
transparency measures in procurement although the influence of the World Cup 
experience on this is unclear.342  
 
The legal framework prescribed an open public tender for the stadia procurements.343 
Pre-qualification was required, however, under the grading system of the Construction 
Industry Development Board.344 Direct awards were available only in exceptional 
circumstances and were not used for the mapped procurement. Limited negotiations 
could be done with the preferred bidder(s), primarily relating to costs. The procedure 
was conducted over two stages with only bidders shortlisted during the first stage345 
invited to submit final bids. Award criteria were price (90 points out of 100) and broad-
based black economic empowerment status as prescribed by the 2000 Act (10 points). 
At the time there was virtually no use of electronic procurement and communications in 
South Africa, with limited initiatives introduced only much later.346  
Only a limited number of bids were received, as also with the other stadia 
procurements347, and only two bidders (both joint ventures) invited to submit second-
stage bids348. At the time this was ascribed to the limited number of qualifying, large 
construction companies operating in South Africa and the number of concurrent projects 
relating to both the World Cup and other infrastructure.349 However, it subsequently 
emerged that there were significant levels of collusion, as discussed later. The limited 
number of bids evidently impacted adversely on the cost and the City is currently 
pursuing a damages claim against some contractors.350  
 
There were no challenges in the High Court relating to the Cape Town stadium, despite 
such challenges being frequent in South Africa for large procurements.351 However, this 
                                                          
338 National Treasury presentation on status of funding of 2010 World Cup stadiums to the National Assembly 
Finance Portfolio Committee, March 7, 2007, at https://pmg.org.za/committee-meeting/7831/. 
339 Sport & Recreation South Africa, “2010 FIFA World Cup Country Report” (Pretoria: 2013), p.55, at 
https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/gcis_document/201409/srsacountryreport2013-withcovera.pdf. 
340 Sport & Recreation South Africa, “2010 FIFA World Cup Country Report” (Pretoria: 2013), at 
https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/gcis_document/201409/srsacountryreport2013-withcovera.pdf. 
341 See Sport & Recreation South Africa, “2010 FIFA World Cup Country Report” (Pretoria: 2013), pp.45 & 50, 
at https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/gcis_document/201409/srsacountryreport2013-withcovera.pdf. 
342 C. Schulz Herzenberg, “Conclusions and recommendations”, in C. Schulz Herzenberg (ed.) Player and 
referee: Conflicting interests and the 2010 FIFA World CupTM (Pretoria: Institute of Security Studies, 2010), 
Ch.8, pp.203–213 at p.211 [e-book], at http://ccs.ukzn.ac.za/files/ISS%20Player%20and%20Referee.pdf. 
343 Municipal Supply Chain Management Regulations, regulation 12(1)(d).  
344 See A.M. Anthony, The Legal Regulation of Construction Procurement as a Relational Construct in South 
Africa (LLD dissertation, Stellenbosch University, 2018), pp.161–162, available via 
https://scholar.sun.ac.za/handle/10019.1/103815. 
345 It is not known what kind of criteria were applied at this stage. 
346 See G. Kramer, “Electronic Public Procurement as a Tool of Reform in South African Public Procurement” 
(2016) 3:1 African Public Procurement Law Journal 1. 
347 See e.g. Nelson Mandela Bay Municipality, “Report to Portfolio Committee on Sport and Recreation” (2007), 
at https://pmg.org.za/committee-meeting/7657/. 
348 City of Cape Town v WBHO Construction (Pty) Ltd and Others (86873/2014) [2017] ZAGPPHC 271 (March 
31, 2017), at http://saflii.org/za/cases/ZAGPPHC/2017/271.html. 
349 National Treasury presentation on status of funding of 2010 World Cup stadiums to the National Assembly 
Finance Portfolio Committee, March 7, 2007, at https://pmg.org.za/committee-meeting/7831/. 
350 See City of Cape Town v WBHO Construction (Pty) Ltd and Others (86873/2014) [2017] ZAGPPHC 271 
(March 31, 2017), at http://saflii.org/za/cases/ZAGPPHC/2017/271.html. 
351 As the South African Supreme Court of Appeal stated in South African Post Office v De Lacy 2009 (5) SA 
255 (SCA): “Cases concerning tenders in the public sphere are coming before the courts with disturbing 




might have been because of collusion. There were a number of challenges to other event 
procurements352.   
 
Execution of the contract, including payments, was closely monitored by both the City 
and oversight entities, such as the National Treasury, which facilitated the bulk of the 
financing, and LOC.353 While some monitoring information became publicly available via 
reports to entities, such as parliamentary portfolio committees,354 information about 
execution and progress was not generally publicly available. Strict rules governed 
amendments, generally requiring procuring entities to deal with deviations to contracts 
through the formal supply chain management function of the entity, and the cost 
overruns were subjected to these rules.355   
As mentioned, a feature of the stadia procurements, including Cape Town, was the very 
significant mismatch between the planning and implementation, most evident in major 
cost overruns. The initial cost estimate for the Cape Town stadium was approximately 
USD128 000 000, whereas the lowest tender was for approximately USD183 000 000,356 
and the eventual cost approximately USD 386 680 000.357 During the planning phase, 
the significant level of provisional sums used in tender documents was specifically 
pointed out as a risk.358 National Treasury reported to Parliament that this was an 
indication that "[t]he professional teams probably did not do good work to finalise the 
tender documents."359 Major adjustments also had to be made to design as the project 
unfolded, such as eliminating certain features (for example, a sliding roof)360 and 
procuring additional work on the concrete frame to stiffen the structure, because 
detailed designs were not done during the planning.361 
Despite initial fears, and some reports of irregularities362, South Africa was not beset by 
major corruption allegations, and arguably illustrates the dividends that may be paid by 
a major political effort to prevent political interference and corruption in a major 
                                                          
352 E.g. Lohan Civil–Tebogo Joint Venture v Mangaung Plaaslike Munisipaliteit (508/2009) [2009] ZAFSHC 46 
(April 6, 2009), at http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZAFSHC/2009/46.html, where the High Court invalidated an 
award of a tender for road construction; and Digital Horizons (Pty) Ltd v SA Broadcasting Corporation and 
Another (2008/19224) [2008] ZAGPHC 272 (September 8, 2008), at 
http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZAGPHC/2008/272.pdf, where an application for interim relief to stop the 
implementation of a contract awarded for the supply of broadcasting vehicles to the national broadcaster for 
purposes of the event was dismissed. 
353 See G. Davies, “Managing the alchemy of the 2010 Football World Cup” in U. Pillay, R. Tomlinson and O. 
Bass (eds), Development and Dreams: The urban legacy of the 2010 Football World Cup (Cape Town: HSRC 
Press, 2009), p.37. 
354 See e.g. World Cup 2010 Host Cities on Alleged Funding Crisis for Stadia: Briefing to the National Assembly 
Sport and Recreation Portfolio Committee, January 23, 2007, at https://pmg.org.za/committee-meeting/7657/. 
355 Schoonbee and S. Brümmer, “Public loss, FIFA’s gain: How Cape Town got its ‘white elephant’”, in C. Schulz 
Herzenberg (ed.), Player and referee: Conflicting interests and the 2010 FIFA World CupTM (Pretoria: Institute 
of Security Studies, 2010), Ch.6, pp.133–167 at pp.148–149 [e-book], at 
http://ccs.ukzn.ac.za/files/ISS%20Player%20and%20Referee.pdf. 
356 M. Marsden, “Presentation to the Portfolio Committee on Sport and Recreation – funding of 2010 stadia” 
available via World Cup 2010 Host Cities on Alleged Funding Crisis for Stadia: Briefing to the National Assembly 
Sport and Recreation Portfolio Committee, January 23, 2007, at https://pmg.org.za/committee-meeting/7657/. 
357 Sport & Recreation South Africa, “2010 FIFA World Cup Country Report” (Pretoria: 2013), p.45, at 
https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/gcis_document/201409/srsacountryreport2013-withcovera.pdf.  
358 National Treasury presentation on status of funding of 2010 World Cup stadiums to the National Assembly 
Finance Portfolio Committee, March 7, 2007, at https://pmg.org.za/committee-meeting/7831/. 
359 National Treasury presentation on status of funding of 2010 World Cup stadiums to the National Assembly 
Finance Portfolio Committee, March 7, 2007, at https://pmg.org.za/committee-meeting/7831/. 
360 M. Marsden, “Presentation to the Portfolio Committee on Sport and Recreation – funding of 2010 stadia” 
available via World Cup 2010 Host Cities on Alleged Funding Crisis for Stadia: Briefing to the National Assembly 
Sport and Recreation Portfolio Committee, January 23, 2007, at https://pmg.org.za/committee-meeting/7657/. 
361 Schoonbee and S. Brümmer, “Public loss, FIFA’s gain: How Cape Town got its ‘white elephant’”, in C. Schulz 
Herzenberg (ed.), Player and referee: Conflicting interests and the 2010 FIFA World CupTM (Pretoria: Institute 
of Security Studies, 2010), Ch.6, pp.133–167 at pp.148–149 [e-book], at 
http://ccs.ukzn.ac.za/files/ISS%20Player%20and%20Referee.pdf. 
362 R. Rose, “Soccer City: What it says about the murky world of government tenders”, in C. Schulz Herzenberg 
(ed.), Player and referee: Conflicting interests and the 2010 FIFA World CupTM (Pretoria: Institute of Security 
Studies, 2010), Ch.2, pp.21–49 [e-book], at http://ccs.ukzn.ac.za/files/ISS%20Player%20and%20Referee.pdf. 
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event363. However, as noted, major collusion issues emerged. Investigations by the 
competition authorities from 2008 revealed that the major construction companies that 
won the stadia work, including on the Cape Town stadium, and other infrastructure 
projects, colluded in securing the work and several were fined364 based on admissions of 
guilt and settlement with the Competition Commission, confirmed by the Competition 
Tribunal365.  
  
5.9. FINA World Championships, Budapest, Hungary, 2017  
Much information on the procurement for this event was available after the event from 
the Public Procurement Authority database.366 Although there were no open public 
tenders (see below), national legislation still required entities to publish information, 
including an award notice, summary of the bid evaluation, the concluded contract and 
information on execution367. Although the database does not contain every required 
document, it does include the award notice for all procedures, the contract and 
amendments for many, and, in some cases, a summary of the evaluation and a 
document on contract execution; and procedural information such as the number of 
bidders, type of procedure and certain timescales was also available. The value of bids 
and signed contracts and amounts finally paid could also be extracted. On the other 
hand, it was impossible or difficult to obtain information not directly related to the 
procedures, including price estimates in the bid to host the event or pre-event analyses. 
For procurements conducted by the Hungarian National Asset Management Inc. much 
information was also available on its website368, as was also the case for procurements 
by the National Sports Centres non-profit organisation. However, very little information 
was found on BP 2017 World Championship Organising and Conducting Nonprofit (BP 
2017)369, which was the main organising body and responsible for most procedures. 
Information, including allegations of corruption, was found on websites in Hungarian370 
and (some) English websites371 and the website of anti-corruption NGO atlatszo.hu was a 
useful source on costs372, although information on these websites was not confirmed by 
official public sources. 
A search revealed at least 32 procurement procedures directly related to the 
organisation and execution of the event, and there were also others, such as for works 
around the city. The present study mapped the construction of the main infrastructure at 
                                                          
363 R. Calland, L Naidoo and A. Whaley, The Vuvuzela Revolution: Anatomy of South Africa’s World Cup 
(Auckland Park: Jacana Media, 2011). 
364 See: Competition Commission of South Africa, “Referral of Complaint by Commission” to the Competition 
Tribunal of South Africa (November 12, 2014), available via http://www.compcom.co.za/media-advisory-13-
november-2014-2010-fifa-world-cup-stadia-referral/#; Public Works Portfolio Committee, Parliament of the 
Republic of South Africa, “Follow-up on collusion in construction industry: input by Deputy Minister of Public 
Works, Competition Commission & Construction Industry Development Board”, September 9, 2013, at 
https://pmg.org.za/committee-meeting/16318/; “Collusion in Built Environment Investigation Outcomes: 
Council for Built Environment, Construction Industry Development Board & Competition Commission, with 
Minister”, briefing to the Portfolio Committee on Public Works of Parliament, March 15, 2016, at 
https://pmg.org.za/committee-meeting/22213/; City of Cape Town v WBHO Construction (Pty) Ltd and Others 
(86873/2014) [2017] ZAGPPHC 271 (March 31, 2017), at http://saflii.org/za/cases/ZAGPPHC/2017/271.html.    
365 See, for example, Competition Tribunal of South Africa Consent Order: Competition Commission and Aveng 
Africa (Pty) Ltd, Case number: CO043Jun13 (July 23, 2013), at https://www.comptrib.co.za/case-detail/6034. 
366 http://www.kozbeszerzes.hu/adatbazis/keres/hirdetmeny. 




370 These included https://index.hu, https://hvg.hu, https://magyarnemzet.hu, https://444.huand 
http://www.atv.hu. 
371 Information in English was available, in particular, at https://budapestbeacon.com/ and 
https://dailynewshungary.com/. 
372 B. Csepregi, “90 milliárd forintba fog kerülni a 2017-es vizes-vb – kiszámoltuk a kormány helyett” (“Water 
Sports World Championship is to cost 90 billion HUF – we have calculated it instead of the government”; 





the five main competition venues (involving 14 procedures): the Danube Arena 
(swimming, diving), the main piece of new infrastructure; Hajós Alfréd Swimming Pool 
(water polo) and Lake Balaton (open water swimming), both involving significant 
refurbishment/development; and City Park (synchronised swimming) and Batthyányi 
Square (high diving), which were new but temporary venues.  
BP 2017 was set up as a 100%-owned state company373 specifically for organisational, 
operational and management aspects of the event. This body was responsible for most 
procurement, although mapped procurements were also done by the Hungarian National 
Asset Management Inc (procurements for construction of the Danube Arena and works 
for high diving), and National Sport Centres - a public body responsible for managing 
sport venues (refurbishment works for Hajós Alfréd Swimming Pool). All are listed on the 
Public Procurement Authority website as entities subject to the public procurement legal 
framework374 which is based on the EU directives. Of the mapped procurements, the 
design and construction were undertaken separately for the high diving facility but not 
for the others. None of the procurements, including the mapped procurements, used 
private financing. 
As regards risk management, Hungarian National Asset Management Inc and National 
Sports Centres, as permanent organisations, carry out risk management activites 
generally, and information on their management and finances is published on their 
websites as required by law; and the former has a published Code of Ethics including on 
integrity management.375 On the other hand no information was found on any specific 
risk management activities of BP 2017. Besides the general information376, there was 
also evidence that BP 2017 procured expert risk management services377; however no 
published reports were found on risk management relating to the Championships. 
 
As to planning, Budapest originally won the bid for the 2021 Championships but after the 
Mexican city of Guadalajara withdrew from the 2017 event Budapest offered to step in 
and was announced as the new host on 11 March 2015, giving just over two years to 
complete preparations. This was alleged to justify use of the EU’s negotiated procedure 
without a call for competition, allowed by EU procurement law when “extreme urgency” 
precludes use of other procedures378. No more specific information was found on the 
planning phase. In this respect, the general national legal framework was supplemented 
with specific legislation, Act XXXIII of 2015 on the Development of Installations 
Necessary for the Swimming, Water Polo, Diving, Synchronised Swimming and Open 
Water World Championships to be Organised in Budapest (FINA Act)379, permitting the 
contracts for the event to be procured in general through this exceptional procedure. The 
                                                          
373 BP 2017 was headed by an Organising Committee that involved key government ministers, the mayor of 
Budapest and the government commissioner responsible for top priority investments in Budapest. The 
president was Miklós Seszták, who was Minister for National Development at the time. 
374 As falling within the definition of contracting authorities under the Public Contracts Directive. 
375 Az MNV Zrt. Etikai Kódexe, 27/2013. számú vezérigazgatói utasítás (“Code of Ethics of MNV Ltd, CEO order 
no. 27/2013”; authors’ translation). Available in Hungarian at: 
http://www.mnvzrt.hu//data/cms939218/Etikai_Kodex.pdf. 
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procurement: A „17. FINA Világbajnokság” előkészítése és lebonyolítása érdekében egyes elemzői és 
kockázatmenedzsment szakértői kompetenciák igénybevétele (“access to analytical and risk management 
expert competences for the preparation and running of the 17th FINA World Championships”, translation from 
Hungarian by Gabor Soos). Data concerning the procurement are available in Hungarian at: 
https://www.kozbeszerzes.hu/adatbazis/megtekint/hirdetmeny/portal_7324_2017/. 
378 Art. 32(2)(c) of Directive 2014/24/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on 
public procurement and repealing Directive 2004/18/EC [2014] OJ L 94/65 (Public Contracts Directive). 
379 2015. évi XXXIII. törvény a Budapesten megrendezendő Úszó-, Vízilabda-, Műugró, Műúszó és Nyíltvízi 
Világbajnokság megvalósításához szükséges létesítményfejlesztésről (“Act XXXIII of 2015 on the Development 
of Installations Necessary for the Swimming, Water Polo, Diving, Synchronised Swimming and Open Water 




Hungarian rules for the procedure (supplementing those of EU law) were followed under 
Act CXLIII of 2015 on Public Procurement380, with usually 3 three contractors being 
invited to bid and the award almost always based on lowest price. It is notable that for 
most procedures for which this information was available the time from soliciting bids to 
contract signature was extremely short, often only 8-9 days, so that bidders without 
advance information would have had very short preparation time. Electronic procedures 
were not used381.  
As noted, contract information was published as required by law for some but not all 
procurements. The Public Procurement Authority has a general right to control contract 
execution382, based on a sample and involving checking documents and site visits, but 
no information was found on the exercise of this control here.  
Hungary completed the necessary procurements on time but, as discussed, there was a 
notable lack of transparency and the perception in some media was that the costs were 
extraordinarily high and that many contracts were awarded to persons connected with 
Government ministers.383 The event’s initial cost estimate was a modest HUF 24.5 billion 
(91.26 million USD) but the final bill was around HUF 170 billion (633.15 million USD)384. 
The largest increase was for the Danube Arena, the design of which was altered 
significantly from the original plans. However, there are no cases known where 
allegations of corruption were proven before a court or state authority. 
5.10. Asian Games and Asian Para Games, Guangzhou, China, 2010  
In general, there was limited public information for Guangzhou at the time of the 
research in 2018. Very few procurement documents, including tender documents or 
contracts, were available, although there were some notices for public tenders (advance 
notices, solicitations etc) online.385 The main information sources were media reports 
and official websites of the procuring entities, providing only piecemeal information. This 
could indicate an absence of transparency giving rise to integrity risks and, as explained 
below, various allegations of corruption were indeed raised; but the position must also 
                                                          
380 2015. évi CXLIII. törvény a közbeszerzésekről (“Act CXLIII of 2015 on Public Procurement”; authors’ 
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story behind the biggest and most expensive sports event in Hungary’s history”, The Budapest Beacon, July 
14, 2017, at https://budapestbeacon.com/fina-2017-story-behind-biggest-expensive-sports-event-hungarys-
history/. Articles in Hungarian include: Z. Jandó, “Óriásit kaszáltak a vizes vb első nyertesei” (“Huge amounts 
have been won by the first winners of the Water Sports World Championships”; authors’ translation), Magyar 
Nemzet, June 3, 2017, available in Hungarian at: https://mno.hu/belfold/oriasit-kaszaltak-a-vizes-vb-elso-
nyertesei-2401779; “Így szabadult el a vizes vb költségvetése” (“This is how the budget of the Water Sports 
World Championships got out of control”; authors’ translation), HVG, July 10, 2017, available in Hungarian at: 
https://hvg.hu/sport/20170710_igy_szabadult_el_a_vizes_vb_koltsegvetese. 
384 One article mentions that the same event in Kazan in Russia, cost only RUB 3.5 billion (HUF 16 billion, USD 
54 million), although this cost did not include any related works around the city. See: “Így szabadult el a vizes 
vb költségvetése” (“This is how the budget of the Water Sports World Championships got out of control”; 
authors’ translation), HVG, July 10, 2017, available in Hungarian at: 
https://hvg.hu/sport/20170710_igy_szabadult_el_a_vizes_vb_koltsegvetese. See in English: B. Pivarnyik, 
“FINA 2017: The story behind the biggest and most expensive sports event in Hungary’s history”, The 
Budapest Beacon, July 14, 2017, at https://budapestbeacon.com/fina-2017-story-behind-biggest-expensive-
sports-event-hungarys-history/. 
385 For example, for the Asian Games Village, 13 public notices were found, including advance notices of 




9A%E8%BF%90%E6%9D%91&curPageNo=1&pagination_input= (all sources in Chinese). 
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be seen in the light of the limited use of electronic means before 2010, when there was 
no unitary online portal for procurement information and documents may not generally 
have been electronic or archived in that form. Moreover, historical data is commonly 
erased in China, especially at sub-central level, when websites are updated or 
transferred to new IP addresses386 and particularly where there is an institutional change 
(as, for example, with the then-Guangzhou Municipal Management of Bureau of Major 
Public Infrastructures, the procuring entity for the Asian Games Village, which was later 
merged into the Guangzhou Municipal Bureau of Agent Construction Projects). 
The mapping387 covered three major new permanent sports venues, Guangzhou Cycling 
& Skating and Maximal Exercise Centre (price unknown), Guangdong Olympic Aquatics 
Centre (43.357 million USD)388 and Guangdong Olympic Tennis Centre (28 million 
USD)389 plus the Asian Games Village (3.9705 billion USD), containing the athletes’ 
accommodation and other facilities such as a media centre.390. Two bodies undertook the 
mapped procurement391, both permanent public bodies, namely the Guangzhou 
Administration Office of Major Public Construction Projects392, responsible for the Village 
and the Cycling and Skating Centre, and the Administration of Agent Construction 
Projects, Guangdong Province, in charge of the Aquatics and Tennis Centres. All the 
mapped infrastructure was subject to the (complex and fragmented393) Chinese 
regulatory framework for procurement, in particular the 1999 Tendering and Bidding 
Law394 (which generally requires open public tenders, allowing restricted tendering in 
                                                          
386 The material found when the document research was done in 2018 was no longer found in May 2019, for 
reasons that are not clear but may be due to updating. 
387 78 sports venues were constructed or renovated along with a venue for the opening and closing 
ceremonies, with a total investment of 1,134,565,680 USD (7248000000 RMB). Apart from venues, 
construction work covered the Asian Games Village plus municipal infrastructure projects (transportation etc) 
(estimated cost of 17,055,775,000 USD, accounting for 90% of the event total). See “The Result of the 
Guangzhou Asian Games Venues Audit Was Announced: Illegal Subcontracting Emerged in Eight Venue 
Construction Projects”, People's Daily Online, November 26, 2011, available at 
http://politics.people.com.cn/GB/16397070.html (source in Chinese; authors’ translation). See also “Adhering 
to the Principle of Thrift Saving In Running the Asian Games, The Total Investment Still Exceeds 120 Billion 
RMB”, Titan Zhoubao, available at http://sports.titan24.com/other/2010-10-15/86890.html (source in Chinese; 
authors’ translation). 
388 See “The Provincial-level Project in 2010 Asian Games-Guangdong Olympic Aquatics Centre”, released by 
Administration of Agent Construction Projects, Guangdong Province on its official website, available at 
http://djj.gd.gov.cn/service/intro/content/post_382062.html and 
http://www.tyj.gd.gov.cn/4294295/4308050.html (all figures converted to USD as at June 15, 2018) (source 
in Chinese; authors’ translation). 
389 See “The Provincial-level Project in 2010 Asian Games- Guangdong Olympic Tennis Centre”, released by 
Administration of Agent Construction Projects, Guangdong Province on its official website, available at 
http://djj.gd.gov.cn/service/intro/content/post_382061.html and 
http://www.tyj.gd.gov.cn/4294295/4308050.html (source in Chinese; authors’ translation). 
390 See “The 16th Asian Games, Guangzhou 2010”, December 13, 2017, announcement by Asian Games 
Committee, Chinese text available at http://www.hangzhou2022.cn/yybk/yyls/201712/t20171213_664.shtml. 
391 Multiple bodies were involved in procurement for the Games in accordance with their remits: see Jingren 
Ouyang et al., “Analysis on the Construction Planning and Post-competition Utilization of Guangzhou Asian 
Games Venues”, Social Science Research Project of the General Administration of Sport of China (2009) 
(source in Chinese; authors’ translation). 
392 Now merged into Guangzhou Municipal Bureau of Agent Construction Projects. Guangzhou Administration 
Office of Major Public Construction Projects was in charge of 60.8% of the infrastructures for the Games, 
accounting for 86.5% of the total investment in venues. See “RMB15 Billion Poured into Major Asian Games 
Projects”, July 3, 2017, available at http://www.gz2010.cn/10/0703/14/6AM56SCM0078002U.html (source in 
Chinese; authors’ translation). 
393 See generally P. Wang, “Coverage of the WTO's Agreement on Government Procurement: Challenges of 
Integrating China and other Countries with a Large State Sector into the Global Trading System” (2007) 10 
Journal of International Economic Law 887; P. Wang, “China’s Evolving Legal Framework on Public 
Procurement” (2004) 13 P.P.L.R. 285; P. Wang, “Accession to the Agreement on Government Procurement: the 
Case of China”, in S. Arrowsmith and R. Anderson (ed.), The WTO Regime on Government Procurement Recent 
Developments and Challenges Ahead (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), Ch.3, pp.92-116. 
394 Tendering and Bidding Law of the People’s Republic of China [中华人民共和国招标投标法], promulgated on 
August 30, 1999, came into force on Jan. 1st, 2000, Chinese text available at 
http://www.npc.gov.cn/wxzl/gongbao/2000-12/05/content_5004749.htm. A peculiarity of China’s 1999 
Tendering and Bidding Law is that it regulates construction tendering by the private as well as public sector. 
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limited case395) and related ministerial rules, along with applicable local rules (of 
Guangdong Province and Guangzhou Municipality).  
All the mapped procurements adopted the Design and Build model, but with the design 
novated to the construction contractor(s)396. No information was available on use or 
otherwise of private financing. There was little public information about planning, 
although there was evidence of feasibility studies for the Aquatics and Tennis Centres.397 
For these two venues, evidence was found of cost-benefit analysis at the time of 
research (2018) but is no longer accessible.398 There was also generally little found on 
comprehensive risk management although it cannot be concluded that it did not occur. 
There was in fact evidence of a risk assessment for the Village399 and of engagement of 
private expertise for ongoing management of construction for the Aquatics Centre; and 
there was also information on post-award audit by the Guangzhou Municipal Fiscal 
Bureau on the use of funds in venues and urban construction400, which presumably 
covered the Village and Cycling and Skating Centres, as well as evidence of external 
audit relating to the Aquatics and Tennis Centres401. 
As regards procurement procedure, the legal framework provides for tendering 
procedures in line with international standards and the piecemeal information online, 
including news reports and solicitations, shows open public tenders for the mapped 
procurements402. However, there was almost no further detail. While solicitation and 
award notices were published electronically, the procurements were generally paper-
based.  
 
There was also minimal public information on contract execution and the governance 
mechanisms, if any, are not clear. Evidence was found of amendments in the 
                                                          
395 Restricted tendering under the Chinese 1999 Tendering and Bidding Law largely falls within the concept of 
restricted tendering as defined for this study, not requiring a public solicitation.  
396 On the Asian Games Village, for instance see “Announcement of the Result of the 2010 (Guangzhou) Asian 
Games Village Planning and Design Competition” (source in Chinese; authors’ translation), available at 
http://www.gzlpc.gov.cn/gzlpc/ywpd_cxgh_tzgg/200704/ef9d53a8b860476e818efdf752f3d6c3.shtml; on the 
Cycling & Skating Centre, “Announcement on the List of Participants in the International Competition for the 
Architectural Design of the Guangzhou Cycling & Skating Centre” (source in Chinese; authors’ translation), text 
available at http://fszrzy.foshan.gov.cn/zwgk/cgxx/200712/t20071220_3020089.html. The information about 
the design for the Aquatics Centre and Tennis Centre was available on announcement by the Administration of 
Agent Construction, Guangdong Province, on its official website, which however is no longer accessible at the 
time of writing. The original webpages were accessible at 
http://www.gdsdjj.gov.cn/ViewMessage.aspx?ColumnId=10&MessageId=105 
397 See “Guangdong Provincial Development and Reform Commission Approved Feasibility Study for Aquatics 
Centre for 2010 Asian Games”, available at http://drc.gd.gov.cn/xmgg/content/post_318270.html; and 
“Guangdong Provincial Development and Reform Commission Approved Feasibility Study for Tennis Centre for 
2010 Asian Games”, available at http://drc.gd.gov.cn/xmgg/content/post_836019.html (sources in Chinese; 
authors’ translation). 
398 Information was found at http://www.gcpo.com.cn/chn201212061526227/ (in Chinese). 
399 The evidence of risk assessment was found on the public notice made by Guangzhou Administration Office 
of Major Public Construction Projects on its official website, which was available at 
http://www.gcpo.com.cn/chn201212061526227/ (in Chinese) but no longer accessible at the time of writing. 
400 “Asian Games Venues Audit Found 448 Issues Regarding Failing to Use Open Tendering as Required”, 
Jinyang Newspaper, February 27, 2013, at 
http://sports.ifeng.com/zonghe/qita/detail_2013_02/27/22531046_0.shtml (source in Chinese; authors’ 
translation). 
401 Information on external inspection for the Aquatics Centre can be found through public announcement by 
Administration of Agent Construction Projects, Guangdong Province on its official websites, for instance, 
available at http://djj.gd.gov.cn/news/job/content/post_382071.html; 
http://djj.gd.gov.cn/news/job/content/post_382143.html; 
http://djj.gd.gov.cn/news/job/content/post_382093.html (sources in Chinese). Information on external 
inspection activities on Guangdong Olympic Tennis Centre is available at 
http://djj.gd.gov.cn/service/intro/content/post_382061.html (in Chinese) 
402 The evidence of open tendering in the procurement process can be found through several briefings made by 
Administration of Agent Construction Projects, Guangdong Province on its official websites on its official 
website, see the Briefing in September, available at 
http://djj.gd.gov.cn/public/count/content/post_382083.html; see also the Briefing in July, available at 
http://djj.gd.gov.cn/public/count/content/post_382076.html (all sources in Chinese). 
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procurement of the Aquatics and Tennis Centres,403 but it is not known what rules and 
processes applied. Likewise there is almost no current information on reports on financial 
and physical process, although for the Tennis Centre updates on financial progress were 
found on the procuring entity’s website.404 
The Games was known for its significant budget overrun, criticised in the media405, but, 
interestingly, there was no official data on actual expenditure and, as indicated above, 
the cost of the Cycling and Skating Centre is unknown. Concerns had been raised in the 
Guangzhou People’s Congress Standing Committee in 2009 on the lack of information on 
use of funds.406  It seems there were many irregularities: the Guangzhou Municipal Fiscal 
Bureau audit report on the infrastructure reportedly identified 448 procurement 
irregularities, including illegal subcontracting, failure to use open tendering, lack of 
feasibility analysis and absence of budgetary approval covering procurement planning, 
tendering and post-tendering stages407. There were also significant allegations of 
procurement corruption; thus according to a news report, from 2009 to 2010 16 
corruption cases involving around 782,375 USD were investigated involving 12 personnel 
from government and state owned enterprises408, although no information could be 
found on the outcomes. 
5.11. XIX Commonwealth Games, New Delhi, India, 2010  
A reasonable amount of information was available online for New Delhi, although with 
variation in detail for different procurements. The most important sources were the six 
Reports of the High Level Committee for the Games,409 the Post Games Report of the 
Organising Committee410 and Report No. 6 of 2011 by the Comptroller and Auditor 
General of India.411 The bid documents were not available at the time of the research 
(2018) and it is not known whether they were once published, but some excerpts were 
on the High Level Committee’s website.412  
Mapping covered 15 procurements relating to the renovation and/or construction of 12 
venues, namely Jawaharlal Nehru Stadium, Thyagaraj Stadium, Chhattarsal Stadium, 
                                                          
403 See “Exploring A New Way to Prevent Corruption in the Field of Engineering Construction in Guangdong 
Province”, (authors’ translation), text in Chinese available at http://www.bjgtjz.com/newsview.asp?nid=5226. 
404 http://www.gdsdjj.gov.cn/Columns/MessageColumnMore.aspx?ColumnId=24. 
405 For example, see Hongqi Pan, “The NPC Supervision Has Been Dilatory” (authors’ translation), Henan 
Business Newspaper, February 24, 2011, source available in Chinese at 
http://finance.ifeng.com/money/roll/20110224/3477156.shtml. 
406 According to Mr J. Deng, a Committee member: “No one is clear about how much the Asian Games would 
cost”, and “there is not even a rough figure”, and “Some said the budget was RMB 200 billion, but there is no 
official data as evidence” – in “Guangzhou Municipal People’s Congress Demanded Publication of Expenditure 
for Asian Games: That Could Amount to 200 Billion RMB”, December 16, 2009, Chinese text available at 
http://news.163.com/09/1216/21/5QMFIE6T0001124J.html (translation of quotes and reference details by Ke 
Ren). 
407 The original title was “Report on the Research and Deliberations Regarding the Use of Funds for Venues and 
Urban Constructions in Asian Games and Asian Paralympics” (authors’ translation). See “Asian Games Venues 
Audit Found 448 Issues Regarding Failing to Use Open Tendering as Required”, Jinyang Newspaper, February 
27, 2013, at http://sports.ifeng.com/zonghe/qita/detail_2013_02/27/22531046_0.shtml (source in Chinese; 
authors’ translation); and “The Result of the Guangzhou Asian Games Venues Audit Was Announced: Illegal 
Subcontracting Emerged in Eight Venue Construction Projects”, People's Daily Online, November 26, 2011, at 
http://politics.people.com.cn/GB/16397070.html (source in Chinese; authors’ translation). At the time of 
writing the Audit report mentioned in the news release was not available on the Internet. 
408  See Huihui Wei and Jiefeng Cui, “Panyu Municipality Investigated 15 Corruption Cases in Construction, 12 
National Staff Involved in the Cases”, Xinxishibao, August 17, 2010, at http://news.gz.fang.com/2010-08-
17/3677585.htm (source in Chinese; authors’ translation). 
409 High Level Committee Commonwealth Games 2010’s website available at 
https://archive.india.gov.in/high_level/reports.htm. 
410 Organising Committee Commonwealth Games 2010 Delhi, “Delhi 2010 Post Games Report” (Commonwealth 
Games Federation), available at https://thecgf.com/sites/default/files/2018-03/D2010-Post-Games-Report.pdf. 
411 Comptroller and Auditor General of India, “Audit Report on XIXth Commonwealth Games 2010 – Report No. 
6 of 2011-12” (Comptroller and Auditor General of India, August 5, 2011), available via 
https://www.cag.gov.in/content/report-no-6-2011-%E2%80%93-performance-audit-xixth-commonwealth-
games.  




Delhi University Stadium, Delhi Public School, R.K. Puram, Yamuna Sports Complex, 
Major Dhyan Chand National Stadium, Dr. S.P. Mukherjee Swimming Pool Complex, 
Indira Gandhi Stadium Complex, Dr. Karni Singh Shooting Range, Shivaji Stadium and 
the Commonwealth Games Village. The venue procurements were selected based on 
their significance for each venue and accessibility of information, and accounted for 
about 20% in value of the sport-specific infrastructure.413  Multiple agencies were 
involved, the main procuring entities being the Central Public Works Department, New 
Delhi Municipal Council, Delhi Development Authority (which handled the Village),414, 
Government of National Capital Territory of Delhi, Delhi University, All India Tennis 
Association and Jamia Millia Islamia University.415 Most of the procuring entities were 
public but there were some limited procurements by bodies of a private nature, such as 
the All India Tennis Association.416 There were also various projects in Delhi relating to, 
for example, transport, utilities and tourist facilities417, with the main procuring entities 
here being the Public Works Department of the Government of National Capital Territory 
of Delhi, New Delhi Municipal Council, Delhi Development Authority, Municipal 
Corporation Delhi, Delhi Jal Board and Delhi Transport Corporation.418 
India has no central legal procurement framework and different entities have their own 
rules, which other entities sometimes follow. The most widely used are those in the 
Manual of the Central Public Works Department,419 which was generally applied and 
referred to in procurements by that Department and the Public Works Department of the 
Government of National Capital Territory of Delhi. Reference was made to the Manual 
and also the General Conditions of Contract of the Central Public Works Department by 
the High Level Committee, which criticised the non-application or arbitrary application of 
their provisions, such as by including unlawful clauses for increased payments,420 failing 
to apply the standard financial criteria in the Manual so as to favour a certain bidder at 
pre-qualification stage421 and permitting unlawful sub-contracting.422 While there are 
rules and directives on procurement in the General Financial Rules 1963423 and 
                                                          
413 Based on total tendered costs of the 15 mapped procurements taken from High Level Committee’s Fourth 
Report and annexed bidding documents (where available) against the total approved venue budget stated in 
the Post Games Report. See: High Level Committee Commonwealth Games 2010, “Games Venues – Fourth 
Report of HLC” with annexures (High Level Committee, 2011), available via 
https://archive.india.gov.in/high_level/fourth_report.htm; Organising Committee Commonwealth Games 2010 
Delhi, “Delhi 2010 Post Games Report” (Commonwealth Games Federation), pp.126–127, available at 
https://thecgf.com/sites/default/files/2018-03/D2010-Post-Games-Report.pdf. 
414  On the Village, see High Level Committee Commonwealth Games 2010, “Commonwealth Games Village – 
Second Report of HLC” with annexures (High Level Committee, 2011), available via 
https://archive.india.gov.in/high_level/second_report.htm. 
415 For details on responsibility of different agencies for Games venues see the tables in Organising Committee 
Commonwealth Games 2010 Delhi, “Delhi 2010 Post Games Report” (Commonwealth Games Federation), 
pp.123–125, available at https://thecgf.com/sites/default/files/2018-03/D2010-Post-Games-Report.pdf. 
416 There is no single formal division of entities into public and private in India. 
417 E.g. a new airport terminal, improvement of the Metro and upgrade of power distribution and water supply. 
See: High Level Committee Commonwealth Games 2010, “Report on City Infrastructure – Third Report of 
HLC”, with annexures (High Level Committee, 2011), available via 
https://archive.india.gov.in/high_level/third_report.htm; Organising Committee Commonwealth Games 2010 
Delhi, “Delhi 2010 Post Games Report” (Commonwealth Games Federation), pp. 161–167, available at 
https://thecgf.com/sites/default/files/2018-03/D2010-Post-Games-Report.pdf. 
418 High Level Committee Commonwealth Games 2010, “Report on City Infrastructure – Third Report of HLC” 
(High Level Committee, 2011), pp. 10–15, available via 
https://archive.india.gov.in/high_level/third_report.htm. 
419 Central Public Works Department, “CPWD Works Manual 2007” (Government of India), available at 
https://cpwd.gov.in/newsitem/latestnewspdf/Final-WorksManual.pdf. Note that at the time of the event, the 
2007 version of the Manual was used. Revised version of the Manual was subsequently published in 2012, 
2014 and 2019, all of which are available at https://cpwd.gov.in/Documents/cpwd_publication.aspx.  
420 High Level Committee Commonwealth Games 2010, “Games Venues – Fourth Report of HLC” (High Level 
Committee, 2011), pp.35–36, available via https://archive.india.gov.in/high_level/fourth_report.htm. 
421 High Level Committee Commonwealth Games 2010, “Games Venues – Fourth Report of HLC” (High Level 
Committee, 2011), pp.50–51, available via https://archive.india.gov.in/high_level/fourth_report.htm. 
422 High Level Committee Commonwealth Games 2010, “Games Venues – Fourth Report of HLC” (High Level 
Committee, 2011), p.57, available via https://archive.india.gov.in/high_level/fourth_report.htm. 
423 Amended in 2005 and after the Games in 2017. 
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Delegation of Financial Powers Rules 1978, none of the sources examined referred to 
them.  
Planning was problematic and the Audit report criticised the planning phase for not 
following the four-phase approach in India’s bid for the event.424 For 12 of the 15 
procurements, M/s Events Knowledge Service was appointed to prepare venue briefs425 
(translated to detailed designs by the venue owners/implementing agencies).426 It was 
appointed simply by endorsement by the Commonwealth Games Federation, with which 
it had close ties427, but the appointment process took two and a half years, a period 
during which little other Games preparation took place.428 Further, the fact that 
Consultancy Engineering Services was appointed - by tender429 - as design consultant for 
all five main venues430 was found questionable in the Audit Report, which also mentions 
evidence of favouritism in the tendering processes.431 Later approval of the specifications 
and designs also suffered significant delay.432 However, there was evidence of advance 
notices published for 13 of the mapped procurements.  
There was little published information on risk management, including of integrity risks. 
Although this was in theory a task of the Organising Committee,433 it was found that this 
                                                          
424 Indian Olympic Association, “Delhi 2010 Commonwealth Games: Bid Document” (Commonwealth Games 
Federation), p.18, available at https://thecgf.com/sites/default/files/2018-
03/Delhi%202010%20Games%20Bid.pdf. 
425 On these venue briefs see: High Level Committee Commonwealth Games 2010, “Games Venues – Fourth 
Report of HLC” (High Level Committee, 2011), pp.20–25, available via 
https://archive.india.gov.in/high_level/fourth_report.htm; For the type of activities M/s Event Knowledge 
Services was consulted for see: Comptroller and Auditor General of India, “Audit Report on XIXth 
Commonwealth Games 2010 – Report No. 6 of 2011-12” (Comptroller and Auditor General of India, August 5, 
2011), pp.253–254, available via https://www.cag.gov.in/content/report-no-6-2011-%E2%80%93-
performance-audit-xixth-commonwealth-games. 
426 Comptroller and Auditor General of India, “Audit Report on XIXth Commonwealth Games 2010 – Report No. 
6 of 2011-12” (Comptroller and Auditor General of India, August 5, 2011), p. 83, available via 
https://www.cag.gov.in/content/report-no-6-2011-%E2%80%93-performance-audit-xixth-commonwealth-
games.   
427 M/s Event Knowledge Services’ Chief Executive Officer was a member of the Commonwealth Games 
Federation Co-ordination Commission, which was tasked with monitoring the Commonwealth Games Delhi 
2010 arrangements. See: Comptroller and Auditor General of India, “Audit Report on XIXth Commonwealth 
Games 2010 – Report No. 6 of 2011-12” (Comptroller and Auditor General of India, August 5, 2011), p.142, 
available via https://www.cag.gov.in/content/report-no-6-2011-%E2%80%93-performance-audit-xixth-
commonwealth-games; High Level Committee Commonwealth Games 2010, “Games Venues – Fourth Report 
of HLC” (High Level Committee, 2011), pp.20–21, available via 
https://archive.india.gov.in/high_level/fourth_report.htm. 
428 For a timeline of preparation activities see: Comptroller and Auditor General of India, “Audit Report on XIXth 
Commonwealth Games 2010 – Report No. 6 of 2011-12” (Comptroller and Auditor General of India, August 5, 
2011), p.81, available via https://www.cag.gov.in/content/report-no-6-2011-%E2%80%93-performance-
audit-xixth-commonwealth-games; High Level Committee Commonwealth Games 2010, “Games Venues – 
Fourth Report of HLC” (High Level Committee, 2011), pp.20–21, available via 
https://archive.india.gov.in/high_level/fourth_report.htm. 
429 For information on tendering processes and participating bidders see: Comptroller and Auditor General of 
India, “Audit Report on XIXth Commonwealth Games 2010 – Report No. 6 of 2011-12” (Comptroller and 
Auditor General of India, August 5, 2011), pp.256–257, available via https://www.cag.gov.in/content/report-
no-6-2011-%E2%80%93-performance-audit-xixth-commonwealth-games. 
430 Comptroller and Auditor General of India, “Audit Report on XIXth Commonwealth Games 2010 – Report No. 
6 of 2011-12” (Comptroller and Auditor General of India, 5th August, 2011), p.256, available via 
https://www.cag.gov.in/content/report-no-6-2011-%E2%80%93-performance-audit-xixth-commonwealth-
games. 
431 Comptroller and Auditor General of India, “Audit Report on XIXth Commonwealth Games 2010 – Report No. 
6 of 2011-12” (Comptroller and Auditor General of India, August 5, 2011), pp.258–261, available via 
https://www.cag.gov.in/content/report-no-6-2011-%E2%80%93-performance-audit-xixth-commonwealth-
games. 
432 The two key planning documents for the Games, namely the General Organisational Plan (GOP) and the 
Games Master Schedule (GMS), were approved only in August 2007 and November 2008 respectively – 
Comptroller and Auditor General of India, “Audit Report on XIXth Commonwealth Games 2010 – Report No. 6 
of 2011-12” (Comptroller and Auditor General of India, August 5, 2011), pp.81–84, available via 
https://www.cag.gov.in/content/report-no-6-2011-%E2%80%93-performance-audit-xixth-commonwealth-
games. 
433 Comptroller and Auditor General of India, “Audit Report on XIXth Commonwealth Games 2010 – Report No. 
6 of 2011-12” (Comptroller and Auditor General of India, August 5, 2011), pp.99–104, available via 
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only entailed ensuring insurance cover.434 However, there was at least a Study Report, 
Preparedness for the XIX Commonwealth Games 2010435 published by the Comptroller 
and Auditor General in July 2009 (about 15 months before the Games) to aid the 
Executive in ‘monitoring and benchmarking progress’, including on infrastructure. 
The 2011 Audit Report described the Organising Committee’s internal control framework 
as ‘inadequate and ineffective’ for reasons including irregular distribution of work 
(making it hard to establish the trail of decision making and accountability), 
inadequate/no documentation (casting doubt on the records’ authenticity and/or their 
completeness) and inadequate legal vetting of documents, and it refers to internal audit 
and “vigilance” work – which refers to anti-corruption activity – being initiated only in 
2010.436 
All 15 mapped procurements were conducted by open public tender with pre-
qualification. Nine involved post-tender negotiations to reduce price, all successful, and 
all award criteria that could be found were limited to price. Other procurement methods 
were sometimes used for the non-mapped procurements, including many direct awards 
grounded on urgency. Of the contracts scrutinised by the Comptroller and Auditor 
General of India, 107, worth about 50 million USD were awarded without tendering; 28, 
worth about 55 million USD, were awarded based on a single tender (a notable example 
being the Village contracts437) - and in many such cases, all vendors except one were 
rejected on sometimes questionable grounds; and 14, worth about 200 million USD, 
were awarded to vendors not fulfilling eligibility criteria.438 All the procurements studied 
were mainly paper-based, although whether there was some limited electronic 
communication is not known. No information was publicly available about the execution 
of the mapped procurements or on challenges.  
The event’s original bid budget was about 185 million USD but the budget estimate as of 
October 2010 had risen to more than fifteen times that439 and some reports speculate 
that the final cost was even higher.440 There were many quality problems.441 Two 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
https://www.cag.gov.in/content/report-no-6-2011-%E2%80%93-performance-audit-xixth-commonwealth-
games. 
434 Comptroller and Auditor General of India, “Audit Report on XIXth Commonwealth Games 2010 – Report No. 
6 of 2011-12” (Comptroller and Auditor General of India, August 5, 2011), pp.234–235, available via 
https://www.cag.gov.in/content/report-no-6-2011-%E2%80%93-performance-audit-xixth-commonwealth-
games; the Central Public Works Department published a report on some of its procurement projects but 
apparently only post-event: see “Note on Projects Related to Commonwealth Games (CWG)” (Central Public 
Works Department), at  
http://cpwd.gov.in/GeneralCircularPdf/Common%20Wealth%20Games%20Related.pdf. 
435 The full report could not be found online but a summary is found as Annexe 2.1 in Comptroller and Auditor 
General of India, “Audit Report on XIXth Commonwealth Games 2010 – Report No. 6 of 2011-12” (Comptroller 
and Auditor General of India, August 5, 2011), pp.575–576, available via 
https://www.cag.gov.in/content/report-no-6-2011-%E2%80%93-performance-audit-xixth-commonwealth-
games. 
436 Comptroller and Auditor General of India, “Audit Report on XIXth Commonwealth Games 2010 – Report No. 
6 of 2011-12” (Comptroller and Auditor General of India, 5th August, 2011), pp.106–110, available via 
https://www.cag.gov.in/content/report-no-6-2011-%E2%80%93-performance-audit-xixth-commonwealth-
games. 
437 See: High Level Committee Commonwealth Games 2010, “Commonwealth Games Village – Second Report 
of HLC” Commonwealth Games Village (High Level Committee, 2011), pp.24–25, available via 
https://archive.india.gov.in/high_level/second_report.htm. 
438 Comptroller and Auditor General of India, “Audit Report on XIXth Commonwealth Games 2010 – Report No. 
6 of 2011-12” (Comptroller and Auditor General of India, August 5, 2011), p.112, available via 
https://www.cag.gov.in/content/report-no-6-2011-%E2%80%93-performance-audit-xixth-commonwealth-
games; also see Annexe 7.3 for detail of the irregularities. 
439 Comptroller and Auditor General of India, “Audit Report on XIXth Commonwealth Games 2010 – Report No. 
6 of 2011-12” (Comptroller and Auditor General of India, August 5, 2011), pp.86–87, available via 
https://www.cag.gov.in/content/report-no-6-2011-%E2%80%93-performance-audit-xixth-commonwealth-
games. 
440 “Commonwealth Games 2010: The ballooning budget”, NDTV, April 7, 2010, at 
https://www.ndtv.com/sports-news/commonwealth-games-2010-the-ballooning-budget-414670; N.T. Mehta, 





examples receiving media attention (not related to the mapped procurements) were the 
collapse of the table-tennis court roof at the Yamuna Sports Complex just months after 
its inauguration442 and collapse of the footbridge next to Jawaharlal Nehru Stadium with 
injuries to 23 people, less than a month prior to the Games.443 Delay in delivery was also 
common, with the Audit Report and High Level Committee Report mentioning extensive 
delays from the late preparation and execution of many contracts. Of the nine mapped 
procurements for which the completion date was known none was completed on 
schedule, with the Jawaharlal Nehru Stadium’s new weightlifting auditorium being 16 
months late.444  
All the mapped procurements were the subject of allegations of integrity problems – one 
in the pre-tendering stage, 11 in the tendering stage and seven at post-award stage.445 
They included manipulation of pre-qualification procedures to restrict competition in five 
cases,446 favouritism in evaluation in nine cases447 with one instance leading to an award 
to an ineligible bidder,448 excessive payment in 13 cases449 and misrepresenting costs for 
tax reduction in one case.450  
Outside the mapped procurements, there were several arrests for forgery and fraud,451 
and, according to India’s Central Vigilance Commission, more than £1 billion was 
defrauded from the Games’ budget.452 There were many corruption allegations,453 often 
involving inflated prices, one high-profile instance being the arrest454 of Suresh Kalmadi, 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
441 “Commonwealth Games: Corruption, chaos & amp; a race to avert a crisis”, The Independent, August 19, 
2010, at https://www.independent.co.uk/sport/general/others/commonwealth-games-corruption-chaos-amp-
a-race-to-avert-a-crisis-2057234.html; D. Bond, “Delhi learning downside of hosting games”, September 22, 
2010, BBC (blog), at http://www.bbc.co.uk/blogs/davidbond/2010/09/delhi_learning_downside_of_hos.html; 
S.K. Chakrabarti, “Will India be Ready to Host the Commonwealth Games?”, Time, July 31, 2010, at 
http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2007643,00.html.  
442 R. Banerjee, “Yamuna complex shows a dismal picture”, The Times of India, July 31, 2010, at 
https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/news/Yamuna-complex-shows-a-dismal-picture/articleshow/6239115.cms.  
443 R. Bedi, “Commonwealth Games in chaos as 23 injured in stadium footbridge collapse”, The Telegraph, 
September 21, 2010, at 
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/sport/othersports/commonwealthgames/8016046/Commonwealth-Games-2010-
in-chaos-as-23-injured-in-stadium-foot-bridge-collapse.html.  
444 Comptroller and Auditor General of India, “Audit Report on XIXth Commonwealth Games 2010 – Report No. 
6 of 2011-12” (Comptroller and Auditor General of India, August 5, 2011), Annexe 16.4 at pp. 686–693, 
available via https://www.cag.gov.in/content/report-no-6-2011-%E2%80%93-performance-audit-xixth-
commonwealth-games. 
445 High Level Committee Commonwealth Games 2010, “Games Venues – Fourth Report of HLC” (High Level 
Committee, 2011), available via https://archive.india.gov.in/high_level/fourth_report.htm; Comptroller and 
Auditor General of India, “Audit Report on XIXth Commonwealth Games 2010 – Report No. 6 of 2011-12” 
(Comptroller and Auditor General of India, August 5, 2011), available via 
https://www.cag.gov.in/content/report-no-6-2011-%E2%80%93-performance-audit-xixth-commonwealth-
games. 
446 High Level Committee Commonwealth Games 2010, “Games Venues – Fourth Report of HLC” (High Level 
Committee, 2011), pp.32–33, 50, 81, 113–121, 127, 130, 342, available via 
https://archive.india.gov.in/high_level/fourth_report.htm. 
447 High Level Committee Commonwealth Games 2010, “Games Venues – Fourth Report of HLC” (High Level 
Committee, 2011), pp.67–71, 81, 84, 88, 113–121, 127, 130, available via 
https://archive.india.gov.in/high_level/fourth_report.htm. 
448 High Level Committee Commonwealth Games 2010, “Games Venues – Fourth Report of HLC” (High Level 
Committee, 2011), pp.127&130, available via https://archive.india.gov.in/high_level/fourth_report.htm. 
449 High Level Committee Commonwealth Games 2010, “Games Venues – Fourth Report of HLC” (High Level 
Committee, 2011), pp.41–44, 67–71, 81, 84, 88, 106–108, 119, 142, available via 
https://archive.india.gov.in/high_level/fourth_report.htm.  
450 High Level Committee Commonwealth Games 2010, “Games Venues – Fourth Report of HLC” (High Level 
Committee, 2011), pp.54–58, available via https://archive.india.gov.in/high_level/fourth_report.htm. 
451 D. Noble, “Take a stand” (2011) 16:4 Supply Management 27. 
452 D. Noble, “Take a stand” (2011) 16:4 Supply Management 27. 
453 S.K. Chakrabarti, “Will India be Ready to Host the Commonwealth Games?”, Time, July 31, 2010, at 
http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2007643,00.html.  
454 “Top 10 facts about Kalmadi’s Commonwealth Games scandal”, NDTV, January 19, 2012, at 
https://www.ndtv.com/india-news/top-10-facts-about-kalmadis-commonwealth-games-scandal-568261; The 
“Commonwealth Games Scam”, Times of India, December 17, 2016, at 
https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/miscellaneous/commonwealth-games-scam/articleshow/56032112.cms; 
Transparency International, Global Corruption Report: Sport (Abingdon: Routledge, 2016), available via 
https://www.transparency.org/whatwedo/publication/global_corruption_report_sport.    
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Chairman of the Organizing Committee along with nine other officials.455 According to a 
2013 article, the Central Vigilance Commission along with the Central Bureau of 
Investigation was at that time working on 51 alleged corruption cases456 and there were 
also allegations of serious tax evasion by both public and private bodies relating to the 
event’s projects.457  
Clearly there were issues with the procurement that created both integrity and other 
risks, although how far these contributed to the substantive procurement failures cannot 
be assessed here.  There was evidence that many contract awards did not fully comply 
with applicable rules, such as those of the Central Public Work Department Manual458 and 
General Conditions of Contract,459 as well as of other substantial irregularities.460 One of 
the most problematic issues was the delay in planning and starting the procurements, as 
discussed earlier, leading to short timelines and ‘an artificial or consciously created sense 
of urgency.’461 In a sample of 458 contracts studied by the Comptroller and Auditor 
General of India, 428, accounting for 82% of the value of those contracts were finalised 
only in 2010.462  The Audit Report of Comptroller and Auditor General of India states:  
‘The argument of urgency was used to obviate the regular process of tendering 
for award of contracts. We found numerous instances of single tendering, award 
on “nomination basis”, award of contracts to ineligible vendors, inconsistent use 
of restrictive Pre-Qualification (PQ) conditions to limit competition to favour 
particular vendors, inadequate time for bidding, cancellation and re-tendering of 
contracts, and inexplicable delays in contract finalization, all of which seriously 
compromised transparency and economy.’463  
Citing urgency, the application of certain procurement procedures was waived by the 
government and/or implementing agencies, including those relating to restrictive clauses 
                                                          
455 “CWG scam: Court to frame charges against Kalmadi, 9 others”, News18, February 4, 2013, at 
https://www.news18.com/news/politics/cwg-mess-tsr-backgrounder-588636.html. 
456 “Central Vigilance Commission closes 10 corruption cases in Commonwealth Games projects”, Daily News 
and Analysis, October 11, 2013, at http://www.dnaindia.com/india/report-central-vigilance-commission-closes-
10-corruption-cases-in-commonwealth-games-projects-1902284.  
457 “CWG scam: CVC declines to share details of scam probe”, The Indian Express, October 11, 2016, at 
http://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-news-india/cwg-scam-cvc-declines-to-share-details-of-scam-
probe-3076583/.  
458 For some examples see: High Level Committee Commonwealth Games 2010, “Games Venues – Fourth 
Report of HLC” (High Level Committee, 2011), pp.35–36, 50–51, 57, 115, 188, 207, 228, 241, available via 
https://archive.india.gov.in/high_level/fourth_report.htm. 
459 For some examples see: High Level Committee Commonwealth Games 2010, “Games Venues – Fourth 
Report of HLC” (High Level Committee, 2011), pp.36, 116–117, 187–188, 270, available via 
https://archive.india.gov.in/high_level/fourth_report.htm.   
460 Comptroller and Auditor General of India, “Audit Report on XIXth Commonwealth Games 2010 – Report No. 
6 of 2011-12” (Comptroller and Auditor General of India, August 5, 2011), pp.112–114 and Annexe 7.3, 
available via https://www.cag.gov.in/content/report-no-6-2011-%E2%80%93-performance-audit-xixth-
commonwealth-games. 
461 Comptroller and Auditor General of India, “Audit Report on XIXth Commonwealth Games 2010 – Report No. 
6 of 2011-12” (Comptroller and Auditor General of India, August 5, 2011), p.563, available via 
https://www.cag.gov.in/content/report-no-6-2011-%E2%80%93-performance-audit-xixth-commonwealth-
games. 
462 Comptroller and Auditor General of India, “Audit Report on XIXth Commonwealth Games 2010 – Report No. 
6 of 2011-12” (Comptroller and Auditor General of India, August 5, 2011), p.111, available via 
https://www.cag.gov.in/content/report-no-6-2011-%E2%80%93-performance-audit-xixth-commonwealth-
games. 
463 Comptroller and Auditor General of India, “Audit Report on XIXth Commonwealth Games 2010 – Report No. 





(such as earnest money deposit requirements, bank guarantees and warranty periods464) 
and inspection of material prior to dispatch.465  
 
5.12. XXI Commonwealth Games, Gold Coast, Australia, 2018 
The body responsible for planning, organising and delivering this event was the Gold 
Coast 2018 Commonwealth Games Corporation (GOLDOC), established under the 
Commonwealth Games Arrangements Act 2011 in January 2012 specifically to plan, 
organise and deliver the Games, and dissolved in December 2018466. It is a not for profit 
body corporate and a statutory body for the purposes of the Financial Accountability Act 
2009 and Statutory Bodies Financial Arrangements Act 1982 (which cover various bodies 
of a public nature) meaning that it was subject to all relevant Queensland Government 
procurement policies467 when conducting procurement activities for the Games.  
Its “Games Delivery Partners”468 were the Queensland Government’s Office of the 
Commonwealth Games (OCG), an office within the Department of Tourism, Major 
Events, Small Business and the Commonwealth Games, which was first advisor to the 
State Government on its investment in the Games and capital budget management; City 
of Gold Coast (CGC), responsible for most city operations relating to the event and for 
the city legacy, and which now owns many of the venue assets; the Australian 
Government, which provided, for example, services relating to customs, bio-security, 
tourism and communications, and national security; and Commonwealth Games 
Australia (CGAus), the overall national controlling body responsible for operations, 
publicity and development.  
These Games were hosted across 18 facilities, located on the Gold Coast, and in 
Brisbane, Cairns and Townsville. Three new venues were provided and a further seven 
had major upgrades, with the overall infrastructure program totalling AUDUSD320 
million. 
The procurements mapped related to four sport venues, namely the Queensland State 
Velodrome (new), Nerang Mountain Bike Trails (upgrade), Carrara Stadium(upgrade) 
and Gold Coast Aquatics Centre (upgrade)469. The mapping covered 7 procurement 
exercises covering all the substantial construction for these venues. 
                                                          
464 Comptroller and Auditor General of India, “Audit Report on XIXth Commonwealth Games 2010 – Report No. 
6 of 2011-12” (Comptroller and Auditor General of India, August 5, 2011), p.552, available via 
https://www.cag.gov.in/content/report-no-6-2011-%E2%80%93-performance-audit-xixth-commonwealth-
games. 
465 Comptroller and Auditor General of India, “Audit Report on XIXth Commonwealth Games 2010 – Report No. 
6 of 2011-12” (Comptroller and Auditor General of India, August 5, 2011), p.379, available via 
https://www.cag.gov.in/content/report-no-6-2011-%E2%80%93-performance-audit-xixth-commonwealth-
games.  
466 With remaining assets or liabilities to be transferred to the Queensland Government at that point: Gold 
Coast 2018 Commonwealth Games Corporation, “Annual Report 2017 – 2018: Financial Statements 2017 – 
2018” (Gold Coast 2018 Commonwealth Games Corporation, 2018), p.9, available at 
https://gc2018.com/sites/default/files/2018-10/GOLDOC-Annual-Report-2017-2018.pdf. 
467 For example, Queensland Government Chief Procurement Office, Department of Public Works, “State 
Procurement Policy: better Procurement, better Outcomes” (Queensland Government, Department of Public 
Works, September 2010) available at 
https://www.energex.com.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0007/343951/State-Procurement-Policy-2010.pdf; 
Queensland Government, Department of Housing and Public Works, “Queensland Procurement Policy” 
(Queensland Government, Department of Housing and Public Works, June 2013), available at 
https://www.cabinet.qld.gov.au/documents/2013/Jun/Procurement/Attachments/Attachment%20-
%20Queensland%20Procurement%20Policy%202013.PDF; and “Forward Procurement Plan for the 2018 Gold 
Coast Commonwealth Games” (Queensland Government, 2014). 
468 Gold Coast 2018 Commonwealth Games Corporation, “Annual Report 2017 – 2018” (Gold Coast 2018 
Commonwealth Games Corporation, 2018), pp.10–11, available at 
https://gc2018.com/sites/default/files/2018-10/GOLDOC-Annual-Report-2017-2018.pdf. 
469 State of Queensland, “Gold Coast 2018 Commonwealth Games Post Games Report” (State of Queensland, 




As with many other events, there was no detailed information available at the time of 
the research on risk management or execution. However, this seems unlikely to indicate 
an absence of risk management activity: there were requirements on this under the 
relevant Games Policies discussed later, and such requirements are generally strictly 
followed in Queensland government procurements (using a risk management approach 
based on ISO31000)470. Documents on this are normally internal documents only, so 
would not be expected to be found in public information. As regards execution, 
significant amendments (about USD 8000 or more) were required to be published471 – a 
requirement generally followed strictly in Queensland - and would thus have been 
publicly available at the time made (although no longer publicly available). 
There was no evidence of use of private finance for the sport venues mapped for this 
project. 
The Queensland government has expressed a strong policy commitment to transparency 
in procurement information, including the period of infrastructure procurement for this 
event472 and to electronic procurement (see below). The principal information sources 
used were GOLDOC’s Annual Reports to the Queensland Parliament473, including a post-
games report474; the awarded contracts portal of the Queensland Government 
(QTenders)475; the details for each venue from the (now archived) “Embracing 2018” 
website476; and fact sheets for each of the venues under examination located in Ahead of 
the Games publications477, all available electronically. All procurement documents are 
available to download free of charge from QTenders at the time of the procurement but – 
although their existence remains listed on the site – they cannot be viewed or 
downloaded after the tender deadline478.  
It appears that the procurement activities for the venue infrastructure were conducted 
primarily through the Department of State Development, Manufacturing, Infrastructure 
                                                          
470 See https://www.treasury.qld.gov.au/resource/guide-risk-management/, which encourages use of 
ISO31000; https://www.forgov.qld.gov.au/risk-management-and-internal-controls, which outlines the 
expectation that public officials will understand and manage risks associated with achieving business 
objectives; and Queensland Government, Department of Housing and Public Works, “Queensland Procurement 
Policy” (Queensland Government, Department of Housing and Public Works, June 2013), Principle 5, p.8, which 
requires risk to be included in significant procurement plans (available at 
https://www.cabinet.qld.gov.au/documents/2013/Jun/Procurement/Attachments/Attachment%20-
%20Queensland%20Procurement%20Policy%202013.PDF). 
471 Office of the Chief Advisor – Procurement, “Procurement guidelines: Contract disclosure”, Version 3.0 (The 
State of Queensland, Department of Housing and Public Works, May 2019), p.9, available at 
https://www.hpw.qld.gov.au/SiteCollectionDocuments/ProcurementGuideContractDisclosure.pdf; and 
predecessor versions referred to in Queensland Government, Department of Housing and Public Works, 
“Queensland Procurement Policy” (Queensland Government, Department of Housing and Public Works, June 
2013), p.9, available at 
https://www.cabinet.qld.gov.au/documents/2013/Jun/Procurement/Attachments/Attachment%20-
%20Queensland%20Procurement%20Policy%202013.PDF. 
472 Queensland Government Chief Procurement Office, Department of Public Works, “State Procurement Policy: 
better Procurement, better Outcomes” (Queensland Government, Department of Public Works, September 
2010), p.5, available at https://www.energex.com.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0007/343951/State-
Procurement-Policy-2010.pdf; Queensland Government, Department of Housing and Public Works, 
“Queensland Procurement Policy” (Queensland Government, Department of Housing and Public Works, June 
2013), p.9, available at 
https://www.cabinet.qld.gov.au/documents/2013/Jun/Procurement/Attachments/Attachment%20-
%20Queensland%20Procurement%20Policy%202013.PDF. 
473 Available via https://publications.qld.gov.au/dataset/annual-report-gold-coast-2018-commonwealth-games-
corporation-goldoc. 
474 State of Queensland, “Gold Coast 2018 Commonwealth Games Post Games Report” (State of Queensland, 
2019), available via https://publications.qld.gov.au/dataset/gold-coast-2018-commonwealth-games-post-
games-report. 
475 https://www.hpw.qld.gov.au/qtenders/. 
476 It can be accessed at the National Library of Australia, at 
http://pandora.nla.gov.au/pan/146667/20190115-0215/www.embracing2018.com/index.html. 
477 Queensland Government, “Ahead of the Games: Evaluation Report for the Gold Coast 2018 Commonwealth 
Games Legacy Program”, Edition 5 November 2017 (Queensland Government, 2017), pp.13–26. 
478 While they can be requested under the Right to Information Act 2009, applications take significant time to 
finalise, as well as incurring an application fee of USDUSD37.80 plus cost-recovery charges. 
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and Planning (DSDMIP) through the Major Projects Office479 (whereas goods and non-
construction services procurement relating to the venues (not mapped for this study) 
was predominantly undertaken by GOLDOC)480. 
Legislation and policy at the Commonwealth (national) level do not generally apply to 
State procurement, and Queensland has no specific State procurement legislation 
(although there is legislation on certain relevant matters such as financial management 
and freedom of information)481; instead procurement policies are set by administrative 
means. The State Procurement Policy September 2010482 (SPP) which was replaced by 
the Queensland Procurement Policy June 2013483 (QPP), and the Queensland Charter of 
Local Content, provided the overarching direction and principles for Games procurement.  
The SPP articulated three core principles of advancing the priorities of the Government, 
value for money, and Probity and accountability for outcomes, while the QPP articlated 
six: value for money (stated as primary484); working across agency boundaries to 
achieve savings and benefits; leaders in procurement practice; advancing government 
objectives; stakeholder and community confidence; and procurement integrity with 
accountabilityfor outcomes. There is provision for use open procurement processes 
wherever possible and limited processes must not be used for the purposes of avoiding 
competition485; and entities must ensure that there is a complaints management 
mechanism for complaints relating to the award procedure486. 
Also applicable was the specific Forward Procurement Plan for the Gold Coast 
Commonwealth Games 2018 (FPP), the primary purpose of which was to inform potential 
suppliers of opportunities, but which also aimed to provide a consistent overview of 
procurement activities at a whole-of-government level and outline procurement probity 
requirements. The document expressly applied to procurement undertaken by GOLDOC, 
                                                          
479 Queensland Government, Department of State Development, Manufacturing, Infrastructure and Planning, 
http://www.dsdmip.qld.gov.au/infrastructure-and-planning/planning/major-projects.html; see Gold Coast 2018 
Commonwealth Games Corporation, “Annual Report 2017 – 2018: Financial Statements 2017 – 2018” (Gold 
Coast 2018 Commonwealth Games Corporation, 2018), p.9, available at 
https://gc2018.com/sites/default/files/2018-10/GOLDOC-Annual-Report-2017-2018.pdf, and Gold Coast 2018 
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construction services. See for example procurements for accreditation and secure materials at 
https://www.hpw.qld.gov.au/qtenders/tender/display/tender-details.do?id=18329; bulk fuel and fuel cards at 
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https://www.hpw.qld.gov.au/qtenders/tender/display/tender-details.do?id=19463. 
481 For example, Financial Accountability Act (Queensland) 2009; Financial and Performance Management 
Standard (Queensland) 2009; Public Sector Ethics Act (Queensland) 1994; Right to Information Act 
(Queensland) 2009; and Public Interest Disclosure Act (Queensland) 2010. 
482 Queensland Government Chief Procurement Office, Department of Public Works, “State Procurement Policy: 
better Procurement, better Outcomes” (Queensland Government, Department of Public Works, September 
2010) available at https://www.energex.com.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0007/343951/State-Procurement-
Policy-2010.pdf. 
483 Queensland Government, Department of Housing and Public Works, “Queensland Procurement Policy” 
(Queensland Government, Department of Housing and Public Works, June 2013), available at 
https://www.cabinet.qld.gov.au/documents/2013/Jun/Procurement/Attachments/Attachment%20-
%20Queensland%20Procurement%20Policy%202013.PDF. 
484 Queensland Government, Department of Housing and Public Works, “Queensland Procurement Policy” 
(Queensland Government, Department of Housing and Public Works, June 2013), p.3, available at 
https://www.cabinet.qld.gov.au/documents/2013/Jun/Procurement/Attachments/Attachment%20-
%20Queensland%20Procurement%20Policy%202013.PDF. 
485 Queensland Government Chief Procurement Office, Department of Public Works, “State Procurement Policy: 
better Procurement, better Outcomes” (Queensland Government, Department of Public Works, September 
2010), p.8, available at https://www.energex.com.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0007/343951/State-
Procurement-Policy-2010.pdf. 
486 Queensland Government, Department of Housing and Public Works, “Queensland Procurement Policy” 





budget funded Queensland state Government agencies, and statutory authorities and 
bodies.  It was open to local governments, such as the City of Gold Coast, to undertake 
their procurements in accordance with the FPP, at their discretion. 
Both the SPP487 and the QPP488 required the use of electronic means for notices and 
provision of documents on-line and, as noted above, the existence of these documents 
was indicated in QTenders. The extent of use of electronic tendering for the mapped 
projects is not known. 
Of the 7 mapped infrastructure procurements, four, including the most significant (main 
sport precinct, velodrome construction and aquatics facility) were done by inviting all 
qualified suppliers from all those registered on an advertised and continuously accessible 
list but (so far as can be established) without any individual public solicitation for the 
procurements that might have alerted non-registered firms to seek to register489. This 
approach which we suggested can be considered an open public tender but a qualified 
one490, in view of the possible impact of limiting access to already-registered suppliers 
and the absence of a specific public solicitation. The other procurements mapped were 
very small procurements using a restricted tender491.  
No actual or alleged integrity issues were uncovered. Sporting venues were available 
well ahead of the event ensuring that they were used and tested beforehand.492 The 
main controversy seems to have been the decision not to include a roof on the aquatics 
centre493. The sport venues overall appear to have been delivered with a negligible 
USDUSD783,000 overrun from the amount budgeted494. 
 
                                                          
487 Queensland Government Chief Procurement Office, Department of Public Works, “State Procurement Policy: 
better Procurement, better Outcomes” (Queensland Government, Department of Public Works, September 
2010), p.9, available at https://www.energex.com.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0007/343951/State-
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488 Queensland Government, Department of Housing and Public Works, “Queensland Procurement Policy” 
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Queensland Government, Department of Housing and Public Works, “Queensland Procurement Policy” 
(Queensland Government, Department of Housing and Public Works, June 2013), p.10, available at 
https://www.cabinet.qld.gov.au/documents/2013/Jun/Procurement/Attachments/Attachment%20-
%20Queensland%20Procurement%20Policy%202013.PDF. 
491 The procedure used was called a “Limited offer process”, defined in the above Queensland procurement 
policy as “a procurement method where the agency invites a supplier/s of its choice to offer” – Queensland 
Government, Department of Housing and Public Works, “Queensland Procurement Policy” (Queensland 
Government, Department of Housing and Public Works, June 2013), p.10, available at 
https://www.cabinet.qld.gov.au/documents/2013/Jun/Procurement/Attachments/Attachment%20-
%20Queensland%20Procurement%20Policy%202013.PDF; in these cases the process took the form of an 
invitation to several suppliers – that is, a competitive process within our definition of restricted tender, rather 
than a direct award. 
492 State of Queensland, “Gold Coast 2018 Commonwealth Games Post Games Report” (State of Queensland, 
2019), p.20, available via https://publications.qld.gov.au/dataset/gold-coast-2018-commonwealth-games-
post-games-report. 
493 See for example T. Balym, and G. Stolz, “Gold Coast’s $42m Aquatic Centre pool slammed by top swimmers 
and coaches for not having a roof”, Courier Mail, August 23, 2014, at 
https://www.couriermail.com.au/news/queensland/gold-coasts-42m-aquatic-centre-pool-slammed-by-top-
swimmers-and-coaches-for-not-having-a-roof/news-story/13005dabb6434779e7098ee6b8721feb; and A. 
Potts, “Commonwealth Games Minister Stirling Hinchliffe rules out permanent aquatic centre roof”, Gold Coast 
Bulletin, February 29, 2016, at https://www.goldcoastbulletin.com.au/sport/commonwealth-
games/commonwealth-games-minister-stirling-hinchliffe-rules-out-permanent-aquatic-centre-roof/news-
story/d7b7d1c8dd08fd7d8bf07c4b7095a0fc. 
494 See State of Queensland, “Gold Coast 2018 Commonwealth Games Post Games Report” (State of 
Queensland, 2019), p.266, available via https://publications.qld.gov.au/dataset/gold-coast-2018-
commonwealth-games-post-games-report, for a breakdown of actual versus budgeted expense for each venue.  
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5.13. Central American and Caribbean Games, Veracruz, Mexico, 2014  
 
The amount of public information on infrastructure procurement for Veracruz varied 
considerably between projects. For the main sports infrastructure key information 
required by law (solicitation and award notice) was published, and still available,495 on 
Compranet, an e-procurement website. For the construction of the Xalapa Velodrome 
there is a link in Compranet and the solicitation and bid evaluation documents are still 
available but not the award notice.496 For the complementary works on the Xalapa 
Velodrome only the contract was published and available in Compranet497, possibly 
because this was a direct award. For the Village procurement no information was found 
on official websites but only media reports on, among other things, corruption 
allegations498 and failure to complete in time for the event.499 Information from the audit 
body was also found online.500  
 
Our mapping covered most of the venue infrastructure, namely the construction contract 
for most sport venues (an integrated project for sport infrastructure, competition 
venues, and complementary works; value around 37 million USD), and the contract for 
building the Xalapa Velodrome (price unknown) and a separate contract for 
complementary Velodrome works (about 1.1 million USD). Although final prices are not 
all known, based on the auditing and aggregate value reported it appears that the 
mapped projects represented around 85% of the venue work.501 Our mapping also 
covered the Village. 
 
The body responsible for the sport-related infrastructure procurement was the Secretaría 
Infraestructura y Obras Públicas, Dirección General de Obras Públicas, Gobierno del 
                                                          
495 Secretaría de Hacienda y Crédito Público, Compranet (Secretary of the Public Service, Compranet; authors’ 
translation), source in Spanish at 
https://compranet.hacienda.gob.mx/esop/toolkit/opportunity/opportunityDetail.do?opportunityId=307922&opp
List=PAST 
496 Secretaría de Hacienda y Crédito Público, Compranet (Secretary of Public Service, Compranet; authors’ 
translation), source in Spanish at 
https://compranet.hacienda.gob.mx/esop/toolkit/opportunity/opportunityDetail.do?opportunityId=54643&oppL
ist=PAST. 
497 Secretaría de Hacienda y Crédito Público, Compranet (Secretary of Public Service, Compranet; authors’ 
translation), source in Spanish at 
https://compranet.hacienda.gob.mx/esop/toolkit/opportunity/opportunityDetail.do?opportunityId=437392&opp
List=PAST. 
498 “Villas de los Centroamericanos, negociazo para constructoras Carpin y Ara” (Central American Villages, a 
bargain for constructors Carpin and Ara; authors’ translation), Periodistas Digitales, Plumas Libres México, 
January 21, 2014, source available in Spanish at https://plumaslibres.com.mx/2014/01/21/villas-de-los-
centroamericanos-negociazo-para-constructoras-carpin-y-ara/; J. Ruiz, “Se caen a pedazos casas de Villas Arco 
Sur” (Villages Arco Sur fall apart; authors’ translation), Marcha México, February 23, 2016, source available in 
Spanish at http://marcha.com.mx/resumen.php?id=75709. 
499 J.H. Estrada, “Carpín despreocupado por las Villas Centroamericanas; ya está vendiendo las casas” (Carpín 
unconcerned about Central American Villages is already selling houses; authors’ translation), Metropolitano, 
August 21, 2014, source available in Spanish at http://www.metropolitanoenlinea.com/?p=42698; N. Zabaleta 
and B. Pereyra, “Federación y estado documentan la transa” (Federation and State documenting corrupt acts; 
authors’ translation), Proceso, March 13, 2016, source available in Spanish at 
https://noticias.vlex.com.mx/vid/federacion-documentan-transa-628863951; C. García, “No habrá Villa 
centroamericana en Veracruz” (There will be no Central American Village in Veracruz; authors’ translation), 
Centro Urbano, August 14, 2014, source available in Spanish at https://centrourbano.com/2014/08/14/no-
habra-villa-centroamericana-en-veracruz/; N. Zavaleta and R. Ochoa, “Los Juegos del Hambre… y de las 
deudas” (The hunger games… and the debts; authors’ translation), Proceso, July 11, 2015, source available in 
Spanish at https://realidadalternativajp.blogspot.com/2015/07/los-juegos-del-hambre-y-de-las-deudas.html. 
500 Auditoría Superior de la Federación, Informe de Auditoría, Gobierno del Estado de Veracruz de Ignacio de la 
Llave: Programas y Fondos Federales en el Estado de Veracruz (Superior Audit Body of the Federation, Auditing 
Report, Government of the State of Veracruz Ignacio de la Llave: Programmes and Federal Funding in the 
State of Veracruz – authors’ translation), source available in Spanish at 
https://www.asf.gob.mx/Trans/Informes/IR2014i/Documentos/Auditorias/2014_1021_a.pdf. 
501 Auditoría Superior de la Federación, Informe de Auditoría, Gobierno del Estado de Veracruz de Ignacio de la 
Llave: Programas y Fondos Federales en el Estado de Veracruz (Superior Audit Body of the Federation, Auditing 
Report, Government of the State of Veracruz Ignacio de la Llave: Programmes and Federal Funding in the 




Estado de Veracruz de Ignacio de la Llave, a permanent unit within the State 
government of Veracruz. Funding for construction, however, came from the Federal 
Government so that the Act of Public Works and Related Services (Ley de Obras Públicas 
y Servicios Relacionados) applied to the Veracruz government.   
 
The approach chosen, as noted above, was a single contract covering both design and 
build for most of the sport venues502, but also with two contracts for the Velodrome 
(construction and complementary works), one for rowing, one for rafting, and two for a 
football stadium.  All venues were taken into public ownership. The Village, on the other 
hand, was procured using a PPP with private financing. The media reported that the land 
was transferred by the government to the private partner which retained its property 
even though the Village was not ready for the Games.503  
 
No evidence was found in the public documents on market engagement or research, and 
no advance notices prior to the public solicitation were found for the mapped 
procurements. Nor could any public information be found of risk management for 
integrity or procurement risks.   
 
The legal framework, the Act for Public Works and Related Services,504 offered three 
procedures: open public tender, a single-stage tendering procedure in three variations 
(open to Mexican nationals only, open also to countries with a trade agreement on 
procurement with Mexico, or open to all); restricted invitation; and direct award. For 
both the main venue and construction of the Velodrome open public tender was used but 
with access only to Mexican nationals; for the Velodrome complementary works (of quite 
low value) a direct award was used; and there is no information on the procedure for the 
Village PPP. Only three bids were submitted for the main venue project, and only one, 
the most expensive, was considered responsive.505 The solicitations were required to be 
published on Compranet506, and notices were found for both the main venue and 
Velodrome. Electronic submission for bids is allowed, but not mandatory, under the Law 
(Article 36) and the solicitation notice mentioned this as an option for tenderers.  
 
As regards contract execution, there is a formal system for controlling execution of the 
works (assessment and payment)507. Contract amendments are governed by legal rules 
that include, but are not limited to, quantitative limitations (25% unless there is special 
approval) and reasons must be given. There was no information on amendments. 
 
There were a number of concerns over the event. As noted the Village was not 
completed on time and not used; and concerns were raised over the fact that the private 
partners kept the land granted by the State and retained the money from sale of the 
accommodation despite failure to deliver on time508. With the project for the sporting 
                                                          
502 As indicated in the solicitation and award notices, as well as the contract. The designs (preliminary draft) 
were part of the tender.  
503 “Villas de los Centroamericanos, negociazo para constructoras Carpin y Ara” (Central American Villages, a 
bargain for constructors Carpin and Ara; authors’ translation), Periodistas Digitales, Plumas Libres México, 
January 21, 2014, source available in Spanish at https://plumaslibres.com.mx/2014/01/21/villas-de-los-
centroamericanos-negociazo-para-constructoras-carpin-y-ara/; J.H. Estrada, “Carpín despreocupado por las 
Villas Centroamericanas; ya está vendiendo las casas” (Carpín unconcerned about Central American Villages is 
already selling houses – authors’ translation), Metropolitano, August 21, 2014, source available in Spanish at 
http://www.metropolitanoenlinea.com/?p=42698. 
504 Ley de Obras Públicas y Servicios Relacionados con las mismas, Nueva Ley publicada en el Diario Oficial de 
la Federación el 4 de enero de 2000 (Act for Public Works and Related Services, New Act published in the 
Oficial Journal of the Federation on January 4, 2000; authors’ translation).  
.505 As indicated in the award notice from 7 November 2013.  
506 Article 32 of the Act for Public Works and Related Services.   
507 Chapter 2 of the Act for Public Works and Related Services. 
508 J.H. Estrada, “Carpín despreocupado por las Villas Centroamericanas; ya está vendiendo las casas” (Carpín 
unconcerned about Central American Villages is already selling houses – authors’ translation), Metropolitano, 
August 21, 2014, source available in Spanish at http://www.metropolitanoenlinea.com/?p=42698; “Exigen que 
empresas paguen las 10 hectáreas de terreno que gobierno les donó para Villas Olímpicas” (It is required that 
the companies pay for the 10 hectares of land that the government donated for the Olympic Villages – authors’ 
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venues, the audit bodies found payment for works not performed (for example, on the 
volleyball complex), cost overruns, overpricing, and poor quality work.509 (For example, 
the media reported510 that an auditing body (ORFIS)511 found technical deficiencies for a 
significant number of venues.) More generally, the auditing process and media reports 
found irregularities relating to the Games organising committee, such as payment for 
phantom workers and false invoices.512 
 
5.14. African Games, Brazzaville, Republic of Congo, 2015  
Brazzaville involved construction of what is now called the Kintélé Sports Complex, 
where most competitions were held, although some used existing facilities. This 
consisted of a striking 60 000-seater stadium with athletics track, 10, 000 seater sports 
hall (Palais des Sport), aquatics complex, tennis and volleyball courts and other facilities. 
As is common with major sporting infrastructure in Africa, as mentioned earlier, the 
infrastructure was funded by China. The media reported that it was designed by Chinese 
architects in cooperation with an Australian firm, following a stadium-plus-sports hall 
model common in China513; and that the construction contracts were awarded to three 
Chinese companies514.  
 
Internet searches in French, English and Chinese found almost no procurement 
information other than brief mentions in the media. No solicitations or other documents 
generated by the procurements were found. The information available did not even 
reveal clearly who undertook the procurement, the national public authorities or the 
Chinese authorities, or the applicable regulatory framework (if any), although as the 
project was funded by China it seems likely that it was undertaken according to the rules 
laid down by China for aid-funded procurement. There is merely a brief press mention of 
the contracts being awarded to Chinese companies after some kind of international 
invitation to tender (appel d'offre)515. It was therefore not possible to map the 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
translation), Periodistas Digitales, Plumas Libres, August 12, 2014, source available in Spanish at 
https://plumaslibres.com.mx/2014/08/12/exigen-que-empresas-paguen-las-10-hectareas-de-terreno-que-
gobierno-les-dono-para-villas-olimpicas/.  
509 N. Zabaleta and B. Pereyra, “Federación y estado documentan la transa” (Federation and State 
documenting the corrupt acts- authors’ translation), Proceso, March 13, 2016, source available in Spanish at 
https://noticias.vlex.com.mx/vid/federacion-documentan-transa-628863951; Auditoría Superior de la 
Federación, Informe de Auditoría, Gobierno del Estado de Veracruz de Ignacio de la Llave: Programas y Fondos 
Federales en el Estado de Veracruz (Superior Audit Body of the Federation, Auditing Report, Government of the 
State of Veracruz Ignacio de la Llave: Programmes and Federal Funding in the State of Veracruz – authors’ 
translation; source available in Spanish at 
https://www.asf.gob.mx/Trans/Informes/IR2014i/Documentos/Auditorias/2014_1021_a.pdf.  
510 All of this information came from: N. Zabaleta and B. Pereyra, “Federación y estado documentan la transa” 
(Federation and State documenting the corrupt acts- authors’ translation), Proceso, March 13, 2016, source 
available in Spanish at at https://noticias.vlex.com.mx/vid/federacion-documentan-transa-628863951h. 
511 Part of the information reported by media could be found in: Orfis, Informe del Resultado 
de la Fiscalización Superior, Instituto Veracruzano Del Deporte, Cuenta Pública 2016, Fase de Comprobación, 
(Orfis, Report of Outcomes of the Superior Audit Body, Institute for Sports of Veracruz, Public Accountability 
2016, Phase of checking; authors’ translation), source available in Spanish at 
http://www.orfis.gob.mx/informe2016/archivos/TOMO%20I/Volumen%206/007%20Instituto%20Veracruzano
%20del%20Deporte%20%20%20%20%20%20.pdf. 
512 N. Zabaleta and B. Pereyra, “Federación y estado documentan la transa” (Federation and State 
documenting the corrupt acts; authors’ translation), Proceso, March 13, 2016, source available in Spanish at 
https://www.proceso.com.mx/433240/centroamericanos-veracruz-2014-federacion-documentan-la-transa. 
513 “New stadium: Congo feels proud again”, StadiumDB.com, September 4, 2015, at 
http://stadiumdb.com/news/2015/09/new_stadium_congo_feels_proud_again. 
514 “Infrastructures sportives: Les congolais savourent le complexe sportif de la Concorde” (Sporting 
infrastructure: The Congolese enjoy the Concorde sports centre) (authors’ translation), Alterteplusinfos, 
September 2, 2015, source available in French at 
https://alerteplusinfos.wordpress.com/2015/09/02/infrastructures-sportives-les-congolais-savourent-le-
complexe-sportif-de-la-concorde/. 
515  “Infrastructures sportives: Les congolais savourent le complexe sportif de la Concorde” (Sporting 
infrastructure: The Congolese enjoy the Concorde sports centre) (authors’ translation), Alterteplusinfos, 





procurement for this infrastructure in the same way as for other events, even to a 
limited degree. 
 
The stadium is reported as having been completed a few weeks before the Games516. 
The media reported cost overruns of around 50%, although it is not clear whether this 
refers to overruns from estimate to completion or award to completion517. 
 
5.15. African Cup of Nations, Gabon, 2017  
This 2017 African Cup of Nations (soccer) was hosted by Gabon after civil war in Libya, 
the planned host, disrupted construction there518. Gabon already had some facilities from 
co-hosting the event in 2012 and two new stadia, each with a capacity around 20 000, 
were built for 2017, Stade D’Oyem and Stade de Port-Gentil519. As with the complex built 
for Brazzaville, the stadia were funded by China520 and the contracts awarded to Chinese 
contractor, the Shanghai Construction Group and China State 
Construction Engineering Corps respectively521, as agreed in July and April 2015522.  
As with Brazzaville, other than the very recent World Bank material (see below) internet 
searches in French, English and Chinese, including Government sources523, found no 
information on the infrastructure procurement other than brief fragmented information in 
the media (in all three languages). Again, no notices or other documents generated by 
the procurements were found. The information available again did not even reveal 
clearly who undertook the procurement, the national or Chinese authorities, or the 
regulatory framework. At the relevant time the Gabon Public Procurement Code provided 
for standard-type procurement methods and even limited use of single tenders to 15 
percent of the total amount of contracts but a 2017 IMF review observed that 94 percent 
of contracts in the review period were based on single tenders524 (It is not clear whether 
the procurements in question were subjected to that national regulatory framework in 
view of the Chinese involvement.) A World Bank assessment published just before this 
article went to press also highlighted this extensive use of direct awards and seems to 
indicate that the stadia contracts both used this method525. That World Bank assessment 
                                                          
516 See https://www.emporis.com/buildings/1283264/stade-municipal-de-kintele-brazzaville-republic-of-the-
congo. 
517 “New stadium: Congo feels proud again”, StadiumDB.com, September 4, 2015, at 
http://stadiumdb.com/news/2015/09/new_stadium_congo_feels_proud_again. 
518 “Libya stripped of right to host 2017 Nations Cup”, Reuters, August 23, 2014, at 
https://af.reuters.com/article/sportsNews/idAFKBN0GN0F920140823. 
519 See, for example, https://www.supersport.com/football/africa-cup-of-nations/afcon-2017-venues. 
520 S. Moussavou, “Gabon: Les banques chinoises s’engagent à financer les chantiers du stade d’Oyem et de 
117 KM de route” (Gabon: Chinese banks commit to finance construction sites for d’Oyem stadium and 117 km 
of road; authors’ translation), KOACI, December 5, 2015, source available in French at 
https://www.koaci.com/gabon-banques-chinoises-sengagent-financer-chantiers-stade-doyem-117km-route-
93833.html. 
521 “CAN 2017: Le Gabon sollicite l’experise chinoise pour la construction des stades” (CAN 2017: Gabon solicits 
Chinese expertise for construction of stadia; ; authors’ translation), OGOOUE INFOS, July 23, 2015, source 
available in French at http://www.ogooueinfos.com/index.php?action=voirNews&id=4052. 
522 “CAN 2017: Le Gabon sollicite l’experise chinoise pour la construction des stades” (CAN 2017: Gabon solicits 
Chinese expertise for construction of stadia; authors’ translation), OGOOUE INFOS, July 23, 2015, source 
available in French at http://www.ogooueinfos.com/index.php?action=voirNews&id=4052. Oddly, there is 
indication in the media of financing being concluded in December 2015, through the Industrial Commercial 
Bank of China (ICBC) and Exim Bank: S. Moussavou, “Gabon: Les banques chinoises s’engagent à financer les 
chantiers du stade d’Oyem et de 117 KM de route” (Gabon: Chinese banks commit to finance construction sites 
for d’Oyem stadium and 117 km of road; authors’ translation), KOACI, December 5, 2015, source available in 
French at https://www.koaci.com/gabon-banques-chinoises-sengagent-financer-chantiers-stade-doyem-
117km-route-93833.html. 
523 Notably the website of The Central Procurement Body. 
524 International Monetary Fund, “IMF Country Report No.17/408: Gabon” (December 2017), Attachment I 
para.28, pp.45–46, available via https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/CR/Issues/2017/12/28/Gabon-First-
Review-of-the-Extended-Arrangement-under-the-Extended-Fund-Facility-Requests-for-45529. 
525 World Bank, Gabon – Evaluation du Système National des Marchés Publics Suivant la Methodologie Revisee 
MAPS: Raport d’Evaluation (Gabon – Assessment of National Public Procurement System Based on the Revised 
MAPS Methodology: Assessment Report; ; authors’ translation) (Washington D.C.: World Bank Group, July 
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was also highly critical of the failure to retain records as required, even internally526, 
limiting the World Bank’s own ability to review the relevant procurements. Mapping was 
therefore again impossible. It is not known whether any tendering procedure was held or 
which companies were eligible. In this respect there is merely an indication in the media 
that some call for tenders was made for Stade de Port-Gentil, for which French firms 
normally active in the field did not participate, with the media speculating that this may 
have been by choice through concern over payment or because they may not have been 
invited527.  
Both stadia were completed and used for the event although the media reported some 
delays and issues with Stade de Port-Gentil528, including with the electricity connection, 
rain, and failure to improve access roads. The media also reported that the final stadium 
price was unknown529.  
 
6. Conclusions 
In this article we presented key findings of our mapping of infrastructure procurement in 
international sporting events, mainly relating to venues and other sport-related 
infrastructure, to explain in context some of the main information used for IPACS’ 
analysis of integrity risks. The mapping confirmed the assumption underlying IPACS’ 
work that such infrastructure procurement is to a large extent a public sector activity - 
although not exclusively so – and indicates that this activity generally does not even 
involve private funding where sport venues are concerned. The mapping also revealed 
how much the nature of the national procuring entities varies, from single bespoke 
entities procuring the whole sporting infrastructure to multiple and varied agencies – 
generally established entities - often involving more than one layer of Government. 
Introducing four further events into our own study also highlighted an additional 
dimension to the complexity, namely use of (Chinese) donor funds to finance events in 
developing countries, which may require special attention.  
In the light of the importance of information transparency both for monitoring activity 
and for learning lessons, another highlight from the mapping was the variation in, and 
limited nature of, public information, both at the time of the procurement and 
afterwards. In particular, there is very limited public information on planning (including 
risk management) and execution. In the case of the procurements financed by Chinese 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
2019), Vol.1, at 32 and Table 8, source available in French 
via http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/878741562942266886/. This indicates that 97% by value of 
contracts for projects related to the Cup of Nations, Presidential election and externally funded projects used 
the direct award method. 
526 World Bank, Gabon – Evaluation du Système National des Marchés Publics Suivant la Methodologie Revisee 
MAPS: Raport d’Evaluation (Gabon – Assessment of National Public Procurement System Based on the Revised 
MAPS Methodology: Assessment Report; authors’ translation) (Washington D.C.: World Bank Group, July 
2019), Vol.1, at 40, source available in French 
via http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/878741562942266886/. One of the contracts reviewed in 
Vol.3 (of the Assessment Report) concerned technical control of the sites for the Cup of Nations but there was 
no review of the construction contracts, possibly because of absence of information. The report notes that 
there is no obligation to publish the information.  
527 G. Mounomby, “Can-2017: Les entreprises françaises à l’écart au profit des consortiums chinois” (Can-
2017: French companies away to the benefit of Chinese companies; authors’ translation), Gabon Review, July 
22, 2015, source available in French at https://www.gabonreview.com/blog/can-2017-les-entreprises-
francaises-a-lecart-au-profit-des-consortiums-chinois/. 
528 “Construction du stade d’Oyem: le prestataire chinois parle des difficultés qu’il rencontre” (Construction of 
d’Oyem stadium: Chinese contractor talks about the difficulties encountered; authors’ translation), Le Nouveau 
Gabon, October 26, 2015, source available in French at  
http://www.lenouveaugabon.com/infrastructures/2610-9598-construction-du-stade-d-oyem-le-prestataire-
chinois-parle-des-difficultes-qu-il-rencontre; “Football/CAN 2017: Interruption des travaux du stade d’Oyem!” 
(Football/CAN 2017: Works discontinued at d’Oyem stadium!; authors’ translation ), Gaboneco, November 9, 
2016, source available in French at http://www.gaboneco.com/football-can-2017-interruption-des-travaux-du-
stade-d-oyem.html. 
529 “Les chinois sur le stade de Port-Gentil” (The Chinese on the stadium of Port-Gentil; ; authors’ translation), 




donor funds, information was non-existent on all phases; it was also currently largely 
unavailable for all events that took place early in the study period, even when available 
at the time of the procurement. Use of electronic means was variable but more common 
in later events and its use certainly offers prospects for greater transparency in future.  
As for the award procedure, for events for which significant information was available, 
most of the mapped venue procurements were undertaken broadly in compliance with 
national public procurement frameworks that reflect key elements of international 
standards, with open public tenders (sometimes, but not usually, involving dialogue) and 
supplier review mechanisms (which were invoked in a number of cases). However, there 
were also some significant departures from open tendering, including systematically at 
Budapest (using urgency as justification) and also for many procurements in New Delhi 
(although we did not specifically map any at the latter event because of limited 
information.) As observed, the main issues from the perspective of integrity risks here 
relate not to the adequacy of the formal framework but arise from unlawful use of 
exceptions or poor planning. 
As outlined, these and other specific findings of the mapping have helped IPACS to 
construct proposals for international federations, Governments and implementing 
agencies, in particular regarding the need for more strategic collection of, and careful 
recording of, procurement data, covering all phases; enhanced pre-tender activities, 
including planning and market engagement; better internal and external reporting 
systems; and training in identification of collusion risks. Such measures can no doubt 
contribute towards mitigation of integrity risks – and other risks - in future events, 
especially so far as opportunistic corruption is concerned.  
Consideration of the overall context of the mapped events, however, highlights the 
challenges involved in the light of literature findings on the peripheral role for 
procurement standards for agents in the face of endemic corruption involving the 
principals (politicians and senior civil servants). As we have seen, many of the mapped 
events were the subject of extensive or proven integrity allegations linked to the 
principal actors, often in spite of the regulatory frameworks. It is tempting to conclude 
that the only effective way to avoid integrity problems is to take more significant account 
of the country environment in choosing host countries but this, even if considered 
desirable, faces the obstacles of the reduced interest in hosting events by many “clean” 
countries, corruption problems in competitions to host events, and the position of the 
principals in the organisations allocating those events. On a positive note, however, of 
the mapped events held in countries with an endemic corruption problem, South Africa 
demonstrates that with political will it is possible largely to avoid public corruption, even 
in an environment in which procurement is fragmented. Further, the experience of Brazil 
with Rio and other events shows how integrity problems surrounding a major event can 
be a catalyst for change in both integrity and procurement policies that could have wider 
benefits for the host nations. For these situations, and for those countries where 
procurement corruption is more opportunistic than endemic, our mapping has identified 
useful concerns, information gaps and possible good practices. Applying the lessons from 
these findings, including by following the IPACS proposals, can both benefit the events to 
which they are applied and the hosts’ own future procurement and help preserve the 
lessons from those events for future events elsewhere. 
 
